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IS THE PRESIDENT BOUND BY
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS?
Derek Jinkst & David Slosstt

The United States is party to several treaties that regulate the conduct of
war, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims. These treaties require belligerent states, as a matter of international
law, to accordfair and humane treatment to enemy nationalssubject to their
authority in times of war. Moreover, these treaties are, as a matter of domestic law, part of the Supreme Law of the Land. The scope and content of the
Conventions have assumed central importance in debates about US. policy
toward al Qaeda and Taliban detainees held at GuantanamoBay, Cuba.
Critics charge that several aspects of U.S. policy toward the detainees violate
the Conventions. In response, the Bush Administration maintains, among
other things, that the Conventions are not binding on the President as a
matter of domestic law because the President has the constitutionalauthority
to violate the Conventions in the interest of protecting national security.
This Article evaluates the Bush Administration's claim.
The Administration'sposition has certain nontrivial virtues. Even
the United States has no legal right to violate the treaties as a matter of
internationallaw, good reasons exist to recognize an implied power to violate
(or supersede) treaties as a matter of domestic law. The central question is
who should have this authority: the President or Congress. Professorsfinks
and Sloss consider in detail three variationsof the Administration'sposition.
The President'spower to violate treaties might stem from (1) the President's
law-making authority; (2) the President's law-breaking authority; or (3) the
President's unfettered discretion to interpret U.S. treaty obligations. Following detailed considerationof each variation, Professorsfinks and Sloss conclude that the President has no authority to violate a treaty obligation f
Congress has the authority under Article I to enact legislation superseding
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that treaty obligation. Because the rules embodied in the Geneva Conventions address matters within the scope of Congress'sArticle I powers, the President lacks the constitutionalpower (absent congressionalauthorization) to
violate these treaties. Building on this claim, the authors also argue that the
President lacks the unilateral authority to violate the Conventions because
the existence of international rules empowers Congress to regulate matters
governed by the treaties, even if those matters would otherwise be subject to the
President's exclusive power. Finally, the authors suggest that there is some
meaningful role for courts to play in enforcing treaty obligations-irrespective of whether the President'sinterpretationof any given treaty is entitled to
substantial deference. In short, the authors conclude that the President is
bound by the Geneva Conventions, both as a formal legal matter and as a
practicalmatter.
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We have seen the war powers, which are essential to the preservation of
the nation in time of war, exercised broadly... in conditionsfor which they
were never intended, and we may well wonder in view of the precedents now
established whether constitutional government as heretofore maintained in
this republic could survive another great war even victoriously waged.1
INTRODUCTION

During wartime, the executive branch tends to accrue greater
2
powers at the expense of its legislative and judicial counterparts.
Throughout most of U.S. constitutional history, the powers accrued by
the executive branch during wartime reverted back to the other
branches in peacetime. 3 This reversion did not occur, however, at the
end of World War II. 4 As one distinguished scholar observed, "for the
first time in . . . history there [was], following a great war, no peace-

time Constitution to which [the American people could] expect to
return in any wholesale way, inasmuch as the Constitution of peacetime and the Constitution of wartime ha[d] become ...very much the
I

Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Harvard Law School, June 21, 1920, reprinted in
102 (1954).

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

2

See EDWIN S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 168 (1947).

3

See id, at 168-72.

4

Id, at 172.
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same Constitution." 5 Another respected scholar, writing at the end of
the Vietnam War, warned that "unless the American democracy
figures out how to control the Presidency in war and peace .. .our
6
system of government will face grave troubles."
Recently, in the context of the "War on Terror," President Bush
has attempted to build on precedents established during past wars to
support extraordinarily broad claims of executive power. In 2002, a
top legal advisor in the Justice Department told the White House that
"the President enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority."'7 Moreover, the legal advisor added,
"Congress lacks authority under Article I to set the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise his authority as Commander in Chief."" In short, when the President invokes his
Commander-in-Chief power, he is free to take any action that he believes will promote national security, and Congress is powerless to interfere with the exercise of presidential prerogative. 9
The Bush Administration's sweeping claims of executive power
have not gone unchallenged. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme
Court held that a U.S. citizen held captive in a military prison as an
alleged "enemy combatant" has a right to challenge the factual basis
of his detention.' 0 In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that aliens imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Guantanamo") as "enemy combat5

Id..

6

ARTHUR M.

SCHIFSI'JGR, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at x (1973).

7 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A, at 33 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo].
8 Id. at 34.
9 Several recently declassified memoranda from high-level legal advisors argue that
Congress lacks the authority to condition, in any meaningful way, the exercise of the President's Commander-in-Chief power. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Torture Act), does not apply to interrogations undertaken pursuant to
the President's Commander-in-Chief authority); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and RobertJ. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to WilliamJ, Haynes II,
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees 10-11 (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo/Delahunty Memo] (disclaiming the applicability of the War Crimes Act to conduct authorized by the President by
reference to the President's "plenary authority" as Commander in Chief); U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON

24
(2003) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION] ("In wartime,
it is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the
enemy."); id. (asserting that the President has "complete discretion in exercising the Commander-in-Chief power" and that "[a] ny effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of
unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-inChief authority in the President").
10
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. _, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONCERNS
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ants" have a right of access to U.S. courts.1 While Hamdi and Rasul
impose significant limitations on executive power in wartime, the
Court's decisions leave a number of crucial questions unanswered.
One such question is whether the President possesses the constitutional authority to violate treaties that regulate the conduct of warfare. Currently, the Bush Administration is holding approximately six
hundred prisoners at Guantanamo, most of whom were captured during the armed conflict in Afghanistan.' 2 Assuming that neither the
Taliban nor the al Qaeda detainees qualify as prisoners of war under
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
4
("POW Convention"), 13 as the Bush Administration maintains,' they
are still entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Civilian Convention") ,' 5 which applies to all "those who, at a given moment and in
any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict... of which they are not
nationals."1 6 The Bush Administration claims that it is treating the
Guantanamo detainees "in a manner consistent with the principles of
[the Conventions]."' 7 Even so, the Administration reserves the right
to deviate from specific requirements of the Conventions "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity."' 8
Is the President bound, in any meaningful sense, by the Geneva
Conventions? Do the treaties, applicable only in a time of war, condiI

124 U.S. 2686, 2698-99 (2004).
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. -,
12 See Michael Kilian, Guantanamo Detainees Get Chance to Argue for Release, CHI. TRiB.,
May 19, 2004, at 17 (reporting that "roughly 600" individuals were detained at
Guantanamo).
13 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention].
14 See Press Release, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Statement on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Press Statement], at http://www.whitehouse.
0
7
gov/news/rcleases/2003/05/20 3050 -18.html. For an analysis of issues related to the
see infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
as
POWs,
the
detainees
of
classification
15 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilian Convention].
16 Id. art. 4. The Bush Administration has suggested that the Civilian Convention
does not apply to the al Qaeda detainees because they are "unlawful combatants" and the
Civilian Convention applies only to "civilian non-combatants." See Fact Sheet: Status of
Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], at http://www.white
7
0
house.gov/news/releases/2002/02/2 02020 -13.html. On February 7, 2002, President
described in the Fact Sheet. See Memoranthe
policy
formalizing
a
directive
issued
Bush
dum from the President, to the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees],
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html. This position is
difficult to reconcile with the language of the Convention quoted above. See infra Part V.E
(discussing the detainees' status under the Civilian Convention).
17 See Fact Sheet, supranote 16.
18 See id. (stating that Guantanamo "detainees will not receive some of the ... privileges afforded to POWs" under the POW Convention).
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tion the exercise of the President's Commander-in-Chief power? The
Bush Administration would answer both questions in the negative. t 9
As a matter of international law, it would be untenable to claim that
the United States has a legal right to disregard its obligations under
the Geneva Conventions. 20 The Administration's claim, however, is
primarily one of domestic, rather than international law. 2' The "Bush
position" boils down to this: even assuming that the Geneva Conventions are binding on the United States as a matter of international law,
they do not bind the President as a matter of domestic law because the
President has the constitutional authority to violate specific provisions
of the Conventions to protect national security.2 2 This article evalu19 See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. As part of the claim that the President
enjoys complete discretion as Commander in Chief, Bush Administration lawyers argued
that the President has the constitutional authority to suspend application of the Geneva
Conventions-even if doing so is inconsistent with the Conventions, and with international
law generally. See Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 9, at 28-32. The President expressly
endorsed this view in his directive concerning the treatment of al Qaeda and Talibaa detainees. See Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra note 16. Indeed, the Administration has made clear that its decision to treat detainees in a manner consistent with the
Geneva Conventions is not dictated by law. See id Moreover, the approach taken by the
Justice Department in analyzing these questions strongly suggests that the Department of
Justice lawyers think the President is not bound by the Conventions. The legal memoranda are structured around the analysis of domestic criminal statutes, and they discuss
international law only insofar as it is relevant to the interpretation of the statutes in question (or simply as a matter of policy). For example, the views of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding the application of the treaties to the Guantanamo detainees are
structured around an analysis of the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2241. SeeYoo/Delahunty
Memo, supra note 9, at 1-2. As a consequence, the Yoo/Delahunty Memo is riddled with
inexplicable gaps in its analysis. For example, the memo analyzes whether contemplated
policies would constitute "grave breaches" of the Conventions-provisions of the treaties
covered by the War Crimes Act-but fails to analyze whether specific policy options would
violate provisions of the Conventions that do not violate domestic statutes. Id. at 2-11.
Similarly, the OLC's analysis of the legality of "counter-resistance" interrogation techniques is structured around an analysis of the Torture Act. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7.
The clear implication is that the OLC believes that international law hinds the President
only if incorporated directly into statutes.
20 See generally RFSTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FORtEIcN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 321 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("Every international agreement
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
This section embodies the pacta sunt servanda doctrine. See id. cmt. a.
21
See, e.g., Bybee Memo, supra note 7. The Bush Administration has also adopted the

position that, as a matter of international law, the Guantanamo detainees do not qualify as
prisoners of war under the POW Convention. See, e.g., Bush Directive on Treatment of
Detainees, supra note 16. While this issue is discussed briefly below, this Article focuses
primarily on the Justice Department's argument that the President has the constitutional
authority to violate treaties governing the treatment of wartime detainees.
22 The Bybee Memo, supra note 7, emphatically endorses the view characterized here
as the "Bush position." Other internal Bush Administration documents also endorse this
position. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION, supta note 9;
Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 9. When the Bush Administration declassified some of
these documents, press reports indicated that the Administration repudiated some of the
legal analysis in the Bybee memo. See, e.g., Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at Al. The Administration, however,
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ates the domestic constitutional arguments both for and against the
Bush position.
This Article is the first to offer a sustained analysis of the President's constitutional authority to violate a treaty that is the supreme
law of the land. Several scholars have analyzed the President's authority to terminate treaties in accordance with international law. 23 One
should recognize, however, that treaty termination and treaty violation raise distinct constitutional issues. A presidential decision to terminate a treaty in compliance with international law is generally
considered consistent with the President's constitutional duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 24 In contrast, a presidendid not repudiate the Bush position. In fact, shortly after releasing the declassified documents, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales convened a press briefing to clarify the
Administration's position. See Press Briefing, White House Counsel, Judge Alberto Gonzales (June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Press Briefing], available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/re
leases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html. At that press briefing, a reporter asked Judge
Gonzales:
[I]s it the opinion of this administration that "just as statutes that order a
President to conduct warfare in a certain manner would be unconstitutional, so, too, are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the
intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks." Is that good law in
this administration?
Id. Judge Gonzales did not disavow this statement of the Bush position. Instead, he asserted that the President "has not exercised his Commander-in-Chief override." Id This
statement implies that Judge Gonzales believes that the President has the constitutional
power, as Commander in Chief, to override statutes (and treaties) that regulate the interrogation of enemy combatants. In short, the statement implies that the White House
Counsel accepts the Bush position.
23
See, e.g., DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES
161-72, 181-206, 248-306 (1986) (reviewing various terminations of treaties by independent Presidential action throughout U.S. history and analyzing the termination of the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan by President Carter, which
was the subject of Goldwaterv. Carter,444 U.S. 996 (1979)); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 211-14 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the terms for
breaching or terminating a treaty); Raoul Berger, The President'sUnilateralTermination of the
Taiwan Treaty, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 577, 586-95, 613-17 (1980) (discussing Goldwaterv. Carter
and its invocation of the "sole organ" thcory, first articulated in the Curtis-Wrightopinion,
which holds that the President is the sole organ of the federal government in international
relations, and reviewing other historical instances of sole presidential termination of treaties); Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in US. Treaty Interpretation,
44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 491-92 (2004) (discussing the political branches' sovereign power to
denounce treaty obligations); Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, Litigating the President's
Power to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 647 (1979) (discussing the President's power
to terminate treaties in light of Goldwater v.Carter, and whether Congress can take legal
action against the President if the President unilaterally terminates a treaty); David J.
Scheffer, Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition
of the Republic of China, 19 HARv. INT'L L. J. 931, 977-94 (1978) (proposing greater Congressional involvement in the treaty termination process).
24
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3; see MichaelJ. Glennon, Process Versus Policy in Foreign Relations: ForeignAffairs and the United States Constitution, 95 MicH. L. REv. 1542, 1554 (1997)
(book review) (stating that lawful treaty termination violates neither the pacta sunt servanda
rule nor the President's duty under the Take Care Clause); cf HENKIN, supra note 23, at
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tial decision to breach a treaty, in contravention of international law,
may violate the President's duty under the Take Care Clause.
Scholars have also published numerous articles concerning the
President's authority to violate customary international law (CIL) .25
Treaties raise different constitutional issues, however, because the
Supremacy Clause expressly states that treaties, like statutes, are the
"supreme Law of the Land. '26 Of course, the majority view is that CIL
is also "supreme over the law of the several States,"' 27 but this does not
mean that CIL and treaties have coequal status within the hierarchy of
federal law. For example, while federal regulations are supreme over
state law, they rank lower than statutes in the federal hierarchy, because Congress enacts statutes, whereas agencies create regulations.
Similarly, one could argue that CIL ranks lower than treaties in the
federal hierarchy, because the Senate approves treaties, whereas CIL
evolves from state practice without legislative action. 28 Regardless,
this Article's purpose is not to defend a particular position regarding
212 (remarking that the President's duty to execute the laws, "including treaty-law, presumably ceases to exist when the treaty ceases to exist").
See generally Agora: May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw?, 80 Am.J.
25
INTr'L L. 913 (1986) (compiling a series of short essays exploring whether the President
may violate customary international law); Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law? (Cont'd), 81 A.M. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987) (continuing the debate); Michael J.
Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customay InternationalLaw by the
Executive Unconstitutional?,80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321 (1985) (evaluating the constitutional basis
for executive power to violate CIL); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Fxecutive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. Rlv. 1205 (1988) (arguing that the President is not bound by
international law, except where statutes or constitutional provisions duplicate international
law rules).
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl.2.
26
27

See RESTATEMENrr (THIRD), supra note 20, § 111 (1) (differentiating between "inter-

national law" and "international agreements of the United States," but stating that both
prevail over state law); see also id.§ 115 cmt. e (remarking that "any rule of customary
international law[ ] is federal law"). The prevailing view is that CIL is federal common law.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law
.... "); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the "settled proposition
that federal common law incorporates international law"); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is also well settled
that the law of nations is part of federal common law."). Professors Bradley and Goldsmith
have criticized the position that federal common law incorporates international law. See
Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997). But see Harold Hongju Koh,
Commentary, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824 (1998) (rebutting the "revisionist" claims made by Bradley and Goldsmith). The Supreme Court recently settled part of this debate, recognizing that some CIL is federal common law. See
Sosa v. Alvarez-Macham, 542 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765-66 (2004).
28 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J.
INTr'L L. 555, 576-77 (2002) (contending that Article III of the Constitution grants federal
courts the power to adjudicate claims arising under CIL, but that CIL does not preempt
conflicting state law because it is not one of the types of federal law included in the
Supremacy Clause). Professor Ramsey does not explicitly compare CIL to treaties, but his
analysis implies that treaties rank higher than CIL because treaties have preemptive force
under the Supremacy Clause.
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the domestic status of CIL. The point is that questions involving the
President's alleged power to violate treaties raises distinct constitutional issues. Therefore, even if the President does possess the constitutional authority to violate CIL, it does not necessarily follow that the
President has the constitutional authority to violate a treaty that is the
supreme law of the land.
The question of whether the President is bound by the Geneva
Conventions also implicates unique issues involving the President's
Commander-in-Chief power. 29 The Conventions belong to a fairly
small class of treaties that regulates the conduct of warfare. Scholars
have written extensively about the relationship between the President's Commander-in-Chief power and Congress's power to declare
war. 30 In addition to the Declare War Clause, 3 1 however, the Constitution grants Congress several other powers related to the conduct of
warfare. 3 2 Strikingly, there is very little commentary on the relationship between these congressional powers and the President's Commander-in-Chief power. 33 This relationship is important for the
purposes of this Article because law-of-war treaties address some matters that are arguably subject to the President's exclusive constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.- 4 Matters subject to the
President's exclusive authority are, by definition, beyond the scope of
29
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.I (designating the President as "Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States").
30
See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002);
John C. Yoo, War and Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002); see also Michael D.
Ramsey, Text and Histoiry in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1685 (2002) (responding to Professor Yoo's critique of Textualism and War Powers).
31 U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.11 (granting Congress the power to "declare War").
32 See id art. I, § 8, cl.10 (granting the power "[tlo define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations"); id. art. I,
§ 8, cl.11 (granting the power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water"); id art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting the power "[t]o
raise and support Armies"); id art. I, § 8, cl.13 (granting the power "[tio provide and
maintain a Navy"); id. art. I, § 8, cl.14 (granting the power "[tlo make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); see also PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw: UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 195 (2002) (remarking that "both
Congress and the President have additional powers that bear on the use of military force").
3'
But see Lieutenant Colonel Bennet N. Hollander, The President and Congress-Operational Control of the Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REv. 49, 73 (1965) (arguing operational control
of the armed forces falls within the exclusive province of the President as Commander in
Chief). Hollander does not address whether the President may violate treaties (or CIL)
regulating the conduct of war. In fact, Hollander suggests that the law of nations and the
law of war limit the scope of the President's Commander-in-Chief power. See id. at 58
(quoting Justice Story's dissent in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 147
(1814)). Hollander does not assert that the regulation of military operations is beyond the
scope of the treaty power. In short, Hollander does not analyze the problem considered in
this Article. Part IV offers a sustained analysis of the issues Hollander identifies, insofar as
they implicate the distribution of constitutional authority to violate treaties. See infra Part
IV.C.
34 See infta notes 377-96 and accompanying text.
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Congress's Article I powers.3 5 It is firmly established that Congress has
the power to violate U.S. treaty obligations within the scope of Article
I by enacting legislation that supersedes a particular treaty provision
as a matter of domestic law.36 If the Geneva Conventions govern matters beyond the scope of Congress's Article I powers, however, then
either the President has the constitutional authority to violate the treaties or the federal government as a whole lacks the power.
This Article contends that the President never possesses the unilateral authority to violate a treaty; he must always obtain congressional approval. Moreover, the courts have a meaningful role to play
in enforcing treaties. Part I provides general background information
on the Geneva Conventions. Part I also discusses the range of policies
and procedures adopted by the Bush Administration that may be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Conventions.
Parts II through V each address a different version of the claim
that the President is not bound by the Geneva Conventions. Part II
rebuts the argument that the President is not bound by the Geneva
Conventions because the Conventions lack the status of supreme federal law. Part II demonstrates that, prior to September 11, 2001
(9/11), the Geneva Conventions were the supreme law of the land
under the Supremacy Clause. Moreover, legislation enacted since
9/11 has not altered the domestic status of the Conventions in any
material respect.
Part III analyzes the relationship between treaties and the President's independent lawmaking authority, assessing whether the President has the authority to supersede the Conventions as a matter of
domestic law. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an executive order relating to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain
enemy aliens (Military Order).37 President Bush's Military Order authorized the Secretary of Defense to prescribe rules governing conditions of detention and to issue regulations for trials before military
commissions. 38 Insofar as regulations adopted pursuant to the Military Order conflict with certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
the question arises whether the Military Order supersedes the relevant
35
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 23, at 86-96 (discussing the distinction between "concurrent" and "exclusive" powers). "Concurrent" powers are shared between the President
and Congress, but Congress is powerless to interfere in areas where the President exercises
"exclusive" authority. See id.
See infra note 189.
36
37
See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
38
See Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2003) [hereinafter DOD Order].
Only regulations for trials before military commissions have been published; rules governing the conditions of detention have not.
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treaty provisions as a matter of domestic law. Part III contends that,
although the President has a limited power to create federal law by
issuing unilateral executive orders, any conflict between the Military
Order and the Geneva Conventions must be resolved in favor of the
treaties.
Part IV confronts the central question raised in this Article:
whether the President has the constitutional authority to violate the
Geneva Conventions. The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, Part
IV rebuts the claim that the President, as Commander in Chief, has
the constitutional authority to violate federal statutory and constitutional law in order to protect national security in emergency situations. Second, this Part demonstrates that the President's duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 3' includes a duty to
execute treaties. Therefore, the President must obtain congressional
authorization for any policy that contravenes a treaty provision that is
the law of the land. Third and finally, this Part considers the claim
that treaties regulating the conduct of warfare constitute a special
case, and that the President must have the constitutional authority to
violate such treaties insofar as they regulate conduct beyond the scope
of Congress's Article I powers. Part IV rejects this claim for two reasons. Even if this claim were valid, it would apply only to a small fraction of the Geneva Conventions because most of the Conventions'
provisions address matters within the scope of Congress's legislative
powers. Also, when the United States ratifies treaties regulating the
conduct of warfare, the act of ratification alters the allocation of
power between the President and Congress, thereby empowering
Congress to regulate matters that would otherwise be subject to the
exclusive control of the President as Commander in Chief.
Part V addresses the issue of constitutional separation of powers
as applied to the President and the courts with respect to treaty interpretation. The Bush Administration has suggested that the President
is not bound by the Geneva Conventions-at least not in any practical
sense-because the President has unfettered discretion to interpret
the treaties as he sees fit.40 Although the Geneva Conventions do present some treaty interpretation issues that raise nonjusticiable political
questions, Part V demonstrates that the Conventions also present
some treaty interpretation questions that are well within the scope of
judicial competence. Therefore, the President's power to interpret
the Conventions is subject to judicial control.

39

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

40

See infra note 506 and accompanying text.
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I
BACKGROUND

Part I contains two sections. The first section provides an introduction to the Geneva Conventions. The second section presents an
overview of Bush Administration policies that may be inconsistent with
U.S. obligations under the Conventions.
A.

The Geneva Conventions

The United States is party to several multilateral treaties that govern the conduct of war. Together, these treaties constitute the law of
war. 41 Because our argument directly addresses the legal status of
only one aspect of this law, it is important to provide some background on the law of war generally, and the specific contributions of
the Geneva Conventions. The law of war encompasses two distinct
bodies of rules. The jus ad bellum governs the lawful use of force,
while the jus in bello governs the conduct of war. 42 The jus in bello is
further subdivided into Geneva law and Hague law. 43 Comprised
principally of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions 44 and the two 1977
Additional Protocols, Geneva law is a detailed body of rules concerning the treatment of victims of armed conflict. 4 5 Embodied princi-

pally in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, Hague law prescribes
the acceptable means and methods of warfare, particularly with regard to tactics and general conduct of hostilities. 46 Though Geneva
law and Hague law overlap, the terminology distinguishes two distinct
41

See Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr & Commander Steve Gallotta, Legal Support in

War: The Role ofMilitary Lawyers, 4 CiII.J. INT'L L. 465, 465 n.2 (2003) (defining the law of
war as the "'part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities,'"
which encompasses "treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a

party, [as well as] applicable customary international law" (citation omitted)).
42
See INGRID DETrER, THE LAW OF WAR 156-58 (2d ed. 2000).
43
See id. at 158-59.
44 There are four Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention tor the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva 1I]; POW Convention, supra note 13; Civilian Convention, supranote 15.
45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol 11; see also Theodor Meron, The
Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Ari. J. INT'L L. 239, 243 (2000) (remarking that
"Geneva law... emphasizes protection of the victims of war, the sick, the wounded, prisoners, and civilians").
46 See, e.g., Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with
Annexed Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague IV]; see also Meron,
supra note 45, at 243 (describing Geneva law as governing the conduct of hostilities).
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regimes: one governing the treatment of persons subject to the enemy's authority (Geneva law), and the other governing the treatment
of persons subject to the enemy's lethality (Hague law). International
humanitarian law embraces the whole jus in bello, in both its Geneva
47
and Hague dimensions.
The four Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims
form the core of Geneva law. These treaties were drafted in 1949, in
the wake of World War II. The war revealed several important deficiencies in the law of war which the Conventions were designed to
address. Specifically, the conditions under which the rules applied
were poorly defined; the rules inadequately protected various categories of vulnerable persons subject to the authority of the enemy; the
rules failed to provide any protection in non-international armed con48
flict; and the rules were not adequately enforced.
First, the Geneva Conventions apply in all cases of armed conflict
between two or more states, regardless of whether either of the states
has issued a formal declaration of war. 49 That is, the treaties apply
whenever there exists a de facto state of armed conflict between states.
Moreover, parties to these treaties remain mutually bound, even if an
50
opposing state is not a party to the treaties.
Second, each of the four Conventions prescribes detailed rules
defining the proper treatment of one category of "protected persons"-the sick and wounded on land; the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked at sea; prisoners of war; and civilians. The central idea of
these treaties, as alluded to earlier, is to establish a minimum standard
for the treatment of persons subject to the authority of the enemy
(e.g., persons captured and detained by the enemy). For example,
under Geneva law, POWs have the following rights: (1) the right to
humane treatment while in confinement (including important limita-

47 See Meron, supra note 45, at 239 (noting that the term "international humanitarian
law" is "increasingly used to signify the entire law of armed conflict"); see also DEarER, supra
note 42, at 156-63 (surveying the bodies of law potentially applicable in situations of
armed conflict); Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
367, 370 n.10 (2004) (providing background and terminology on the law of war).
48

See generally GEOFFREv

BEST, WAR AND LAw SINCE

1945, at 80-114 (1994) (summariz-

ing the views of governments and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at
the Diplomatic Conference leading to the drafting of the four Geneva Conventions).
49
See Geneva 1, supra note 44, art. 2(1); Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 2(1); POW
Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(1); Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(1). The
Conventions also apply in all cases of "partial or total" military occupation. See Geneva I,
supra note 44, art. 2(2); Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 2(2); POW Convention, supra note
13, art. 2(2); Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(2).
5o
See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 2(3); Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 2(3); POW
Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(3); Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(3); see also
Meron, supra note 45, at 248-51 (examining the significance of this system of reciprocity).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:97

tions on coercive interrogation tactics) ;51 (2) due process rights if subject to disciplinary or punitive sanctions; 52 (3) the right to release and
repatriation upon the cessation of active hostilities;53 and (4) the right
to communication with (and the institutionalized supervision of) protective agencies. 54 The POW Convention also prohibits reprisals
against POWs 55 and precludes the use of POWs as slave laborers. 56 In
addition, the treaties define, with some precision, the categories of
57
persons protected by them.
Third, the Geneva Conventions specify fundamental humanitarian protections applicable to all persons subject to the authority of a
party to a conflict-even if the conflict is not international (e.g., a civil
war). These protections, first codified in common Article 3 of the
Conventions, govern the treatment of persons no longer taking active
part in the hostilities.18 All such persons are entitled to humane treatment and, in the case of criminal charges, to a fair trial by "a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 59
Finally, the Conventions establish an enforcement and implementation scheme with three important features: (1) states must impose criminal sanctions for grave breaches; 60 (2) warring parties must
designate a neutral state or organization as a "Protecting Power" empowered to monitor compliance with the treaties during armed conflicts; 6 ' and (3) states must provide substantial due process
protections designed to ensure some measure of judicial or adminis62
trative oversight of the treatment accorded war detainees.
In summary, the Geneva Conventions govern the treatment of detainees-and others subjected, in some formal way, to the authority of
the enemy-in times of armed conflict. These treaties outline modest
but important humanitarian guarantees, emphasizing rights to humane treatment, communication, due process, a fair trial, and repatriSee POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 13; see also id. arts. 17-19 (concerning
51
interrogation); id. arts. 21-48.
52
See id. arts. 99-108.
53
See id. arts. 117-118.
54
See id.arts. 8-11.
55
See id. art. 13.
56
See id. arts. 49-57.
57
See, e.g., POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 4; Civilian Convention, supra note 15,
art. 4.
58
See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 3(1); Geneva 11, supra note 44, art. 3(1); POW
Convention, supra note 13, art. 3(1); Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 3(1).
59
See Geneva 1, supra note 44, art. 3(1)(d); Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 3(1) (d);
POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 3(1)(d); Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art.
3(1) (d).
See, e.g., POW Convention, supra note 13, arts. 129-31.
60
See, e.g., id. art. 8.
61
62 See, e.g., id. arts. 5, 99-108, 129.
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ation. Compliance with the Conventions is to be monitored by
administrative and judicial tribunals in the detaining state, 63 as well as
by a neutral "Protecting Power. ' 64 Violations of the Conventions give
rise to individual criminal liability. 65 These features, taken together,
provide a viable legal framework that strikes the proper balance between military necessity and humanitarian ideals.
The Conventions entered into force on October 21, 1950, 6 6 and
the United States ratified all four Conventions in July 1955.67 In 1956,
the U.S. Army revised its Field Manual on the Laws of War 68 to reflect
the numerous important developments codified in the Geneva Conventions. 69 As of June 2004, over 190 states have ratified the
70
Conventions.
In 1977, two Additional Protocols to the Conventions were
opened for signature. These Protocols sought to elaborate, clarify,
and extend the protective schemes of the Geneva Conventions. 7 1 The
First Additional Protocol, governing international armed conflicts,
sought to resolve several important ambiguities in Hague law that governed the means and methods of warfare. 72 The Second Additional
Protocol sought to elaborate upon the rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 73 Although these treaties enjoy broad international participation, 7 4 the United States has not ratified either
75
Protocol.
63

See, e.g., id.

64
65
66

See, e.g., id. art. 8.
See, e.g., id. art. 130.

See Geneva I, supra note 44; Geneva II, supra note 44; POW Convention, supra note
13; Civilian Convention, supra note 15.
67
See Geneva I, supra note 44; Geneva II, supra note 44; POW Convention, supra note
13; Civilian Convention, supra note 15.
68
DEP'T OF THE ARMy, FM 27-10, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE (1956) [hereinafter DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10].
69 See id. (reprinting the Geneva Convention for use by U.S. army personnel).
70 See International Committee of the Red Cross, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols (June 6, 2004) (documenting 191 ratifications to the

1949 Geneva Conventions), at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party-gc.
71
See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOcois ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at

2-4 (1982).
72
See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 45, arts. 48-58 (requiring means of attack calculated
to reduce risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects); see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 71,
at 16 (noting that Part III of Protocol I "is concerned with methods and means of

warfare").
73

See Protocol II, supra note 45, art. 1; see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 71, at 604

(reporting that "[b]etter protection for the victims of non-international conflicts was one
of the main issues" contributing to promulgation of the Additional Protocols).
74 See International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 70, § 7 (documenting 161
ratifications of Protocol I and 156 ratifications of Protocol 1I).
75
The United States signed both Protocols in 1977. President Ronald Reagan transmitted Protocol II to the Senate for its advice and consent, but the Senate never consented
to the treaty. See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, Protocol II Addi-
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Possible Treaty Violations Since September 11

This Section argues that since September 11, the Bush Administration has adopted a range of policies and practices that are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions. 7 The
purpose of this Section is not to definitively prove this assertion, but
rather to demonstrate that several policies and practices pursued in
the War on Terror raise nontrivial concerns under the Geneva
Conventions.
tional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., at II (1987), reprinted
in 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 910 (1987). Nonetheless, the United States has acknowledged that it is
bound by portions of the Protocols "that constitute a codification of customary international law." W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CI. J. INT'L L.
493, 519 & n.55 (2003).
76 This Article emphasizes U.S. policy with respect to the treatment of detainees at
Guantanamo, notwithstanding the detainee abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TII MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
(Prepared by Major Gen. Antonio M. Taguba) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT], available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at
Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 2004, at 42. This Article focuses on Guantanamo for two
reasons. First, several aspects of the U.S. policy in Guantanamo are flatly inconsistent with
U.S. treaty obligations. See, e.g., Fact Sheet, supra note 16 (outlining the Bush Administration's policy with respect to detainees in Guantanamo); Press Briefing, supra note 22
(describing in great detail the evolution of U.S. policy regarding treatment of Guantanamo
detainees and announcing the release of many Administration orders and memoranda
defining and debating the contours of this policy). The Administration's orders and memoranda regarding the U.S. policy at Guantanamo are available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html.
Second, the precise contours of formal U.S. policy in Iraq are unclear. The Administration concedes that the conduct at Abu Ghraib violated the Geneva Conventions. See,
e.g., Pentagon Officials: Interrogation Techniques Lawful, AP NEWSWIRE, May 13, 2004 (quoting
Marine General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, both of whom acknowledge that the abuse constituted violations of the Geneva Conventions). The Administration maintains that this conduct was
contrary to U.S. policy. Cf Dep't of Defense, Defense Department Background Briefing
(May 14, 2004) (discussing the U.S. interrogation plan and insisting that U.S. policy was to
apply the Geneva Conventions in Iraq), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/trans
cripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html; Richard W. Stevenson, White House Says PrisonerPolicy
Set Humane Tone, N.Y. TimEs, June 23, 2004, at Al (same). Moreover, the military has
initiated criminal proceedings against several soldiers deemed directly responsible for the
abuse at Abu Ghraib. See Thom Shanker, At IraqiPrison, Rumsfeld Vows to PunishAbuse, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2004, at A10 (reporting statements by Secretary Rumsfeld suggesting that
the perpetrators would be tried in U.S. courts). Although some evidence strongly suggests
that U.S. policy concerning interrogation methods and conditions of detention in Iraq was
inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions, see, e.g., John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture,
NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 29; Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, NEw YORKER, May 9,

2004, at 38, there is insufficient information at the time of this writing to draw definitive
conclusions, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38. In
addition, there is good reason to think that any policy improprieties at the policy level
resulted from an ill-conceived strategy to transplant detainee policies in Gtantanamo into
on QuestioningLanded in Iraq, N.Y.
Iraq. See, e.g., DouglasJehl & Eric Schmitt, Afghan Policies
TIMES, May 21, 2004, at Al. In other words, sustained reflection on the legality of U.S.
practices in Guantanamo is, in an important sense, also an analysis of U.S. policy in Iraq.
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Potential violations can be divided into four categories. First, the
procedures utilized by the Bush Administration to classify war detainees are arguably deficient under Geneva law. Second, the merits of
these classification decisions are themselves questionable under the
terms of the treaties. Third, the treatment accorded the detainees in
Guantanamo is arguably inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions,
irrespective of whether the detainees are entitled to POW status.
Fourth, the contemplated trials by special military commissions are
arguably inconsistent with the Conventions' fair trial and due process
guarantees, again regardless of the detainees' "status." These four categories illustrate two types of potential violations. The first two categories consist of possible treaty violations arising from the U.S.
decision to deny POW status to the Guantanamo detainees. By contrast, the second two categories consist of possible violations arising
from the treatment accorded these detainees, however they are classified under Geneva law. The balance of this Section considers each
type of potential violation in more detail.
Some argue that the U.S. government improperly denied the
Guantanamo detainees POW status. 77 The official U.S. government
position is that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda fighters qualify as POWs
because they fail to satisfy international standards defining "lawful
combatants. 78 This position is arguably deficient under Geneva law
in at least two respects: (1) the U.S. determination that the detainees
are not POWs is flawed because it relies on a misreading of the POW
Convention; and (2) the U.S. must, irrespective of the merits of this
classification, treat the detainees as POWs until a "competent tribunal" has determined that they do not qualify for POW status. The first
criticism questions the U.S. interpretation of Article 4 of the POW
Convention, which identifies those persons entitled to POW status
(Article 4 issue),79 whereas the second criticism questions the U.S. in77
See, e.g., Gwyn Prins, 9/11 and the Raiders of the Lost Ark, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 611,
617-18 (2002) (asserting that the decision to set up independent tribunals, and the decision to let U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld unilaterally make this decision, were
incorrect); Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and
Human Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Spring 2002, at 6, 6
(remarking that "the [Bush Administration's] unilateral decision to deny all detainees
[POW] status ... snggest[s] the U.S. government has improperly interpreted its obligations under the Conventions").
78
See Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, Dep't of
Defense News Briefing (Feb. 8, 2002), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02
082002_t0208sd.html; Fact Sheet, supra note 16. For a summary of the government's position, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 461, 475-80 (2002); Mike Allen &John Mintz, Bush Shifts Position on
Detainees, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al.
79
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH.J. INT'L L. 1, 5 n.15 (2001) (discussing the applicability of the Article 4 criteria for
POW status to Taliban and al Qaeda fighters). Article 4 of the POW Convention identifies
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terpretation of Article 5 of the treaty, which establishes presumptive
POW status in all cases of doubt and prescribes the procedure for
determining the legal status of captured fighters (Article 5 issue).80 In
both respects, U.S. policy is arguably inconsistent with the minimum
requirements of the POW Convention.

several categories of persons protected by the Convention. See POW Convention, supra
note 13, art. 4. With respect to Article 4, one important question is whether the four
criteria expressly applied to "militia and other volunteer corps" in paragraph (A) (2) also
limit the scope of paragraph (A)(1) concerning members of the armed forces. There is
some question as to whether members of the regular armed forces must have a command
structure, wear uniforms, carry arms openly, and generally comply with laws of war to qualify for POW status. On the other hand, the text of (A)(1) does not make reference to
"regular" armed forces. Indeed, it extends coverage to "members of militia and other volunteer corps forming part of" the armed forces-and, inexplicably, this reference to "militia and other volunteer corps," unlike the reference in (A) (2), is not qualified by the four
criteria. This textual anomaly strongly suggests that the four criteria apply only to "militia
and other volunteer corps" not part of the "armed forces" of the state, and that captured
fighters covered by (A)(1) are POWs irrespective of whether they satisfy the four criteria.
See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 768-69
(1981) (arguing that Article 4(A) (2) criteria apply only to certain "irregular armed forces"
and asserting that "[m ] embers of regular, uniformed armed forces do not lose their [prisoner of war] entitlement no matter what violations of the law their units may commit, but
the guerrilla unit is held to a tougher standard").
80
See, e.g., Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-ofWar Status, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 571,
591 (2002); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Request for Precautionary
Measures, Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (IACHR March 12, 2002) (on file with
authors) (granting, in part, petitioners' request for precautionary measures, and urging
the U.S. "to take urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal" in accordance with Article 5 of the
POW Convention). The POW Convention establishes that captured combatants are presumptively entitled to POW status when their status is unclear. Specifically, Article 5
provides:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection
of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
POW Convention, supranote 13, art. 5. In response, the United States maintains that the
status of Taliban and al Qaeda detainees was not in doubt. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye,
DetaineesAre Not P.O. s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare,N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 28, 2002, at A6 (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that "[t]here is no ambiguity in this case"). Long-standing U.S. policy provides for Article 5 tribunals, however, whenever the detainee asserts
POW status or asserts facts that would entitle him to POW status. See U.S. ARMY, ARMY
REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CMLiAN INTERNEES

AND OTHER DETAINEES (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter APRMY REG. 190-8] (establishing procedures for the treatment of POWs, including procedures for conducting tribunals). In addition, substantial evidence suggests that, as an objective matter, there was some doubt as to
the status of these detainees. Several dozens of the detainees have been released over the
course of the last two years, and reports indicate that many more may be released in the
wake of the Supreme Court rulings in Iasul and Hamdi. In fact, the Defense Department
has now established "Combatant Status Review Tribunals" to determine the legal status of
the detainees. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Readying Review for Detainees in Cuba, N.Y. TiMEs, July
17, 2004, at A1O.
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The United States maintains that the Guantanamo detainees do
not qualify for POW status. The United States also maintains that the
assignment of POW status to these detainees would be bad policy.

Specifically, the U.S. argues that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees satisfy the express requirements of the POW Convention, and
that POW protections would impede the investigation and prosecution of suspected terrorists.8 Of particular concern are: (1) restrictions on the interrogation of POWs;2 (2) the criminal procedure
rights of POWs, which might preclude trial by special military commissions;83 and (3) POWs' right to release and repatriation following the
cessation of hostilities. 84 In short, the U.S. has denied POW status to
the detainees, at least in part, because the Administration views the
rights afforded to POWs under the Convention to be inconsistent with
U.S. policy objectives. 8 5 Irrespective of the merits of these concerns,
U.S. policy is manifestly inconsistent with Geneva law if the procedures utilized to classify these detainees were insufficient, or if the
classification determinations were inaccurate in fact or erroneous in
law.

81

See, e.g., Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 9.

82

Under the POW Convention, the detaining authority may not subject POWs to

coercive questioning, and POWs are required only to provide name, rank, and serial num-

ber to interrogators. See POW Convention, supra note 13, arts. 17-18; see also Jeremy
Rabkin, After Guantanamo: The War over the Geneva Conventions, NAT'L INTER.EST, Summer
2002, at 15, 19 (defending denial of POW status to Taliban and a] Qaeda detainees, in part,
on this ground); ef. Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
INTr'L L. 328, 335-36 (2002) (arguing that neither at Qaeda nor Taliban detainees should
be defined as POWs under the POW Convention and afforded all the protections of the
Convention); Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial, The Rules of War Can't Protect Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2001, at Al1 (same).
83 See Military Order, supranote 37. The POW Convention provides that POWs facing
criminal charges are entitled to trial by court-martial or regular civil court. See POW Convention, supra note 13, arts. 99, 102; Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, InternationalTribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1407, 1423-24 (2002); Neal K Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Militay Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1263-66 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis,
The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute IndividualsAccused of Terrorist Acts, 96 Am. J. INT'L
L. 320, 324-26 (2002); Diane F. Orenlichter & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to
War: ProsecutingTerroristsBefore Military Commissions, 25 HARV.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 653, 659-63
(2002). Under this view, denying POW status would leave open the possibility of trying
detainees before military commissions for violations of the law of war.
84
See POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 118 (recognizing the right to repatriation);Joan Fitzpatrick,Jurisdictionof Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism,
96 AM.

1.INT'L

L. 345, 353 (2002).

85 The internal memoranda on the issue indicate that there was some support for
assigning the detainees POW status. See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal
Advisor, Department of State, to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez, Comments on
Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Taft Memo] (arguing
that the United States should classify detainees as POWs irrespective of whether they satisfy
the formal requirements of the POW Convention).
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Furthermore, the treatment of these detainees is arguably deficient under the Geneva Conventions even if the U.S. has lawfully denied them POW status. Assuming the detainees are not POWs, they
are still "protected persons" under common Article 3, and many of
them are protected under the Civilian Convention. The Civilian Convention guarantees rights to "unlawful combatants" that are nearly
identical to the rights assured to POWs under the POW Convention. 86
Thus, by denying the protections of the POW Convention to the
Guantanamo detainees, the U.S. is violating many of the rights to
which they are legally entitled under common Article 387 and the Ci88
vilian Convention.
86
SeeJinks, supra note 47 (discussing the rights provided under both Conventions);
see also infra text accompanying notes 524-39 (assessing the Bush Administration's claim
that "unlawful combatants" are not protected by the Civilian Convention).
For example, common Article 3 prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carry87
ing out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 3; Geneva 11, supra note 44, art. 3; POW
Convention, supra note 13, art. 3; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 3. Thus, many of
the arguments against trial of POWs by military commission apply with equal force to persons protected under common Article 3. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
The President expressly determined that common Article 3 does not apply to the war on
terrorism because the conflict is "international in scope." See Bush Directive on Treatment
of Detainees, supra note 16; Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 9. Although an extended
analysis of this claim is beyond the scope of this Article, it suffices to say that it is plainly
incorrect as a matter of law. By its terms, common Article 3 applies to "armed conflict not
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties." See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 3; POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 3; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 3. In the Administration's view, this language makes clear that the provision governs only armed conflicts
confined to the territory of one state. The text, structure, and history of the provision,
however, demonstrate that it applies to all armed conflicts not involving two or more opposing states. See generallyDerekJinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28YALEJ. INT'L L. 1
(2003) (arguing that the laws of war, including common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, apply to noninternational armed conflicts, such as 9/11). Common Article 3 was
revolutionary because it regulates wholly internal matters as a matter of international humanitarian law. If the provision governs wholly internal conflicts, as the "one state" interpretation recognizes, then the provision applies a fortiori to armed conflicts with
transnational dimensions. The language of the provision limiting its application to the
"territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" simply makes clear that application of
the provision requires a nexus to the jurisdiction of a state party to the treaty. Id. at 41. In
addition, the Administration's interpretation produces several inexplicable regulatory
asymmetries. In the Administration's view, the Conventions would cover international
armed conflicts and wholly internal armed conflicts, but would not cover armed conflicts
between a state and an armed group with a transnational presence. The Conventions also
would not cover internal armed conflicts that spill over an international border into the
territory of another state. The only reasonable reading of the provision is that it applies to
all "armed conflicts" not covered by common Article 2-the provision defining international armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 38-41.
88 See, e.g., Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 31 (restricting interrogation inethods); id. arts. 65-76 (specifying criminal procedure rights); id. arts. 132-35 (providing for
release and repatriation). The Civilian Convention guarantees the detainees a right of
access to a canteen to purchase "foodstuffs and articles of everyday use, including soap and
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The claim that Geneva law does not protect the detainees provided the foundation for U.S. detention policy at Guantanamo. The
"interrogation rules of engagement" are the clearest-and perhaps
most controversial-aspect of this policy.8 9 Unencumbered by international legal obligation, the Administration has crafted an interrogation policy motivated solely by U.S. policy preferences. In Part V, this
Article analyzes in some detail the legality of the interrogation techniques authorized for use in Guantanamo. 9 1 It is sufficient here to
point out only that these "counter-resistance" techniques clearly violate the Geneva Conventions-if the Conventions do indeed protect
the detainees-in that they involve various forms of coercion and intimidation, including implied threats of violence and other forms of
gross mistreatment. 91
The POW Convention obligates the detaining power to protect
POWs "against [all] acts of violence or intimidation and against insults
and public curiosity."92 It also provides that "[n] o physical or mental
torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners
of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or
exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind.""5 Likewise, the Civilian Convention provides that protected
persons "shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against
insults and public curiosity." 94 This Convention also provides that
"[n]o physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected
persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third
parties. 9 5 Simply put, the techniques authorized by the Department
tobacco." Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 87. The Administration has explicitly
stated, however, that the detainees will not receive "access to a canteen to purchase food,
soap, and tobacco." Fact Sheet, supra note 16.
89 Military memoranda declassified in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal
referred to the interrogation policies as the "interrogation rules of engagement." See, e.g.,
R.Jeffrey Smith &Josh White, General GrantedLatitude at Prison,WASH. PosT,June 12, 2004,
at Al.
90 See infra Part V (analyzing interrogation policy as an illustration of the kind of Convention-based claims that might succeed in court).
91 See infra text accompanying notes 540-48 (describing and analyzing specific interrogation techniques).
92 POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 13.
Id. art. 17.
94 Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 27. This provision makes clear that the
protection against violence and threats of violence is part of the right to "humane treatment." Id. This is important for two reasons. First, Article 5 of the Civilian Convention
requires that all civilians, even "unlawful combatants," be treated humanely. Id. art. 5.
Second, common Article 3 requires that all enemy combatants be treated humanely in all
circumstances. Id. art. 3.
95 Id. art. 31; see also POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 17.
93
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of Defense (DOD) are plainly inconsistent with these obligations. 96
Indeed, the Secretary of Defense acknowledged, in his April 2003 Order authorizing these tactics, that several of the techniques are incon97
sistent with provisions of the POW Convention.
Finally, the contemplated criminal trials by an ad hoc military
commission arguably violate the fair trial rights recognized in the Geneva Conventions. 98 As discussed above, the procedures for trial by
military commission fail to satisfy POW Convention requirements. 99
Indeed, there is little room for meaningful disagreement on this
point, because the POW Convention unqualifiedly requires the detaining state to "assimilate" POWs into the legal regime governing its
own armed forces. 100 Specifically, the POW Convention requires that
POWs be tried before the same courts and according to the same procedures as members of the detaining state's armed forces. '1 1 Thus,
POWs detained and charged by the United States must be tried by
regular courts-martial.'0 2 Accordingly, the POW Convention prohibits trial by ad hoc military commissions-regardless of whether the
procedures utilized therein satisfy basic due process requirementsbecause the right to assimilation precludes the use of special
procedures.
In addition, the procedures that the DOD has prescribed for trials by military commission may fall short of the minimum guarantees
recognized in the Geneva Conventions.1 0 The Conventions ensure
substantial fair trial rights to all detainees. Indeed, the Civilian Convention provides due process rights that mirror in most respects those

96 See infra text accompanying notes 540-48 (assessing the interrogation techniques
authorized by the Department of Defense (DOD) under Article 31 of the Civilian
Convention).
97
See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to the Commander, US Southern Command, Counter-Resistence Techniques in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Rumsfeld April 2003 Memo], available at http://www.de
fenselink.mil/news/un2004/d20040622doc9.pdf.
98 Fifteen detainees have been designated for trial by military commission. See Press
Release, Dep't of Defense, Presidential Military Order Applied to Nine More Combatants
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040707-0987.
html. Charges have been referred in several of these cases. See, e.g., John D. Banusiewicz,
Yemeni Detainee to Face Military Commission, Am. FORCES INFO. SERVICE, July, 14, 2004,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/nO7142004_2004071406.html; K.L.
Vantran, Guantanamo Detainees Charged with Conspiracy to Commit War Crimes, Am.
FORCES INFO. SERVICE, Feb, 24, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb
2004/n02242004200402246.html.
99 See sources cited supra note 83 (summarizing this point).
100
See POW Convention, supra note 13, arts. 82-106.
101

Id. art. 102.

102

See, e.g., Paust, supra note 79, at 17 n.39.
See DOD Order, supranote 38 (outlining trial procedures).
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provided by the POW Convention. 10 4 Moreover, the Conventions establish minimum procedural rights for any person charged with serious violations of their substantive rules, irrespective of that person's
status under the Conventions. 10 5 As a result, any person prosecuted
for Geneva Convention violations, regardless of that person's status as
a "protected person," must be provided with "safeguards of proper
trial and defence, which shall not be less favorable than" those outlined in the POW Convention. 10 6 Specifically, Article 105 of the POW
Convention provides for basic fair trial rights, including the right to
counsel of the defendant's choice, the right to confer privately with
10 7
counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to an interpreter.
Likewise, Article 106 grants accused persons the same right of appeal
10 8
as that available to members of the detaining power's armed forces.
The DOD procedure also violates common Article 3, which applies to all war detainees. Common Article 3 prohibits "the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples."1 0 9 Although this rule is somewhat abstract, it clearly prohibits punishment without a "previous judgment,"' 1 0 suggesting that formal adjudication is required. Moreover, the body pronouncing this
'
judgment must be "regularly constituted,"1 11
which suggests that it
must be established in law and not specially convened for punishment
of the adversary. Furthermore, the adjudicating body must be "a regularly constituted court,"'1 12 which implies that there must be adequate
safeguards in place to ensure the impartiality, independence, and fairness of the institution issuing the judgment. Finally, common Article
3's reference to 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispen-

104

The Civilian Convention does not include "assimilation" rights, but the specific fair

trial rights recognized in the Convention are identical to those found in the POW Conven-

tion. See Civilian Convention, supra note 15, arts. 64-76, 126, 146-47.
105
See, e.g., Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 146. This is an important source of
fair trial rights in this context, because the Administration asserts the authority to try by
military commission only those persons accused of violations of the laws of war. See, e.g.,
Alberto Gonzales, MartialJustice, Full and Fair,N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (maintaining that persons subject to trial by military commission "must be chargeable with offenses

against the international laws of war").
106
Geneva 1, supra note 44, art. 49; Geneva II, supranote 44, art. 50; POW Convention,
supra note 13, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 146.
107
POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 105.
108
See id. art. 106.
109
Id. art. 3.
110

Id.

111

Id.
Id.

112
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sable by civilized peoples"' 13 establishes an evolving standard that, by
design, tracks relevant customary international law." 4
The military commission procedures arguably fail to satisfy the
requirements of common Article 3 in several respects. For example,
the commissions themselves arguably do not constitute impartial, independent tribunals, 115 nor do they qualify as "tribunals established
by law" or as "regularly constituted courts."" 16 In addition, the DOD
17
procedures deprive defendants of any meaningful right to counsel'
and limit defendants' ability to mount an effective defense by restricting the right to confront witnesses and compel process.' 1 8 Finally, the
procedures do not recognize a right to appeal to a higher regularly
9
constituted tribunal."1
113

Id.

See, e.g., LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 86-88 (2002). Common Article 3 arguably requires that all war detainees be accorded the basic fair trial rights
recognized in major human rights treaties. Id.; see International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9, 14, & 15, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175-77 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, arts. 3, 6, & 7,
1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 246-47; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 7,
8, & 9,9 I.L.M. 673; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 5, 6, & 7, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol No. 3,
E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. arts. 9-11, at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
114

115

See,

e.g.,

LAWYERs

COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER: A

GUIDE TO THE FINAL RULES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 9-10 (2003) [hereinafter
LCHR, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER] (arguing that the military commission scheme is
"particularly susceptible to abuse because the entire process is limited to one branch of
government (the executive) with no meaningful independent oversight or review by either
the judiciary or the legislature, and none of the participants has both standing and an
interest to challenge possible abuses").
116 SeeJordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 687-90 (2002).
1 17 One problematic aspect of the rules is that civilian counsel (i.e., the counsel chosen by the accused) can be excluded from "closed Commission proceedings" and denied
"access to any information protected under [the procedure's security exclusion]." DOD
Order, supra note 38, §§ 4(C)(3), 6(B)(3), 6(D)(5); see also Paust, supra note 116, at 690
(warning that "[t]he right of an accused to legal counsel of choice might be injeopardy" as
a result of DOD rules).
118 The procedures drastically curtail the right of confrontation. Cross-examination of
witnesses by the accused is authorized only with respect to witnesses "who appear before
the Commission." DOD Order, supranote 38, § 5(1). Witnesses can also provide testimony
"by telephone, audiovisual means, or other means," by "introduction of prepared declassified summaries of evidence," "testimony from prior trials and proceedings," "sworn [and
even] unsworn written statements," and "reports." Id. § 6(D); see Paust, supra note 116, at
688-89.
119 Verdicts issued by the military commissions may be appealed to specially established "Review Panels." See DOD Order, supra note 38, § 6(H)(4); see also LCHR, TRIALS
UNDER MILITARY ORDER,

supra note 115, at 4 (criticizing the absence of a right to appeal

guilty verdicts to a civilian court); Paust, supra note 116, at 685-86 (discussing the deficien-

cies of the appellate process under the DOD rules).
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II
THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

This Part addresses the argument that the President is not bound
by the Geneva Conventions because the Conventions lack the status of
law within the domestic legal system. The analysis is divided into two
sections. The first section demonstrates that the Geneva Conventions
were the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause before September 11, 2001. The second section shows that Congress has not enacted legislation since September 11, 2001 that supersedes the
Conventions as a matter of domestic law.
A.

The Domestic Status of the Conventions Before
September 11

President Truman transmitted the Geneva Conventions to the
Senate on April 25, 1951,120 the Senate gave its consent to ratification
on July 6, 1955,121 and the United States formally ratified the treaties
on July 14, 1955.122 This section demonstrates that the Conventions
had the status of supreme federal law within the domestic legal system
prior to September 11. The first subsection addresses those portions
of the Conventions for which implementing legislation is constitutionally required. The second subsection addresses those provisions for
which implementing legislation is not constitutionally required.
1.

Provisionsfor Which Implementing Legislation Is Constitutionally
Required

Some provisions of the Conventions require implementing legislation under the Constitution. For example, most scholars agree that
a treaty provision "requiring states parties to punish certain actions...
could not itself become part of the criminal law of the United States,
but would require Congress to enact an appropriate statute before an
individual could be tried or punished for the offense."12 3 Certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions obligate the United States to impose criminal sanctions for conduct that constitutes a "grave breach"
of the Conventions. 24 Thus, implementing legislation may be consti120

SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION

OF WAR VICTIMS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 84-9 (1955), reprinted in 84 CONG. REC. 9958, 9963

(1955) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
121
122

123

See id. at 9972-73.
See POW Convention, supra note 13, intro.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 20, § 111 cmt. i. A minority view holds that im-

plementing legislation is not constitutionally required to give domestic legal effect to treaty
provisions requiring criminal sanctions. SeeJORDAN J. PAUST, IN-rERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 59-62 (1996).
124
See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 49 (obligating states "to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be commit-
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tutionally required to give domestic legal effect to the "grave
breaches" provisions.
Nonetheless, when the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions, the Executive Branch expressed the view that it was unnecessary
to enact new implementing legislation for the grave breaches provisions, because "it would be difficult to find any of these [grave
breaches] which, if committed in the United States, are not already
violations of the domestic [criminal] law of the United States."' 125 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed with this assessment. 126
Thus, at the time of ratification, the political branches agreed that the
constitutional requirement for implementing legislation was satisfied
by preexisting criminal legislation. Forty years later, however, the political branches decided that existing legislation was inadequate. As a
result, Congress enacted the War Crimes Act of 1996 to impose federal criminal sanctions for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 12 7 Thus, since 1996, the U.S. treaty obligation to impose
criminal sanctions for grave breaches has been fully incorporated into
domestic law by virtue of a combination of federal statutes that implement various provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 128
Aside from the grave breaches provisions, there is one other aspect of the Geneva Conventions for which implementing legislation
may be constitutionally required. Article 74 of the POW Convention
and Article 110 of the Civilian Convention provide that relief shipted, any of the grave breaches of" Convention I, which are defined in Article 50); Geneva
II, supra note 44, art. 50 (imposing a similar obligation with respect to grave breaches of
Convention II, which are defined in Article 51); POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 129
(imposing a similar obligation with respect to grave breaches of Convention III, which are
defined in Article 130); Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 146 (imposing a similar
obligation with respect to grave breaches of Convention IV, which are defined in Article
147).
125
Geneva Conventionsfor the Protectionof War Victims: Heatingon Executives D, E, F and G
Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 84th Cong. 24 (1955) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Richard R. Baxter, Office of the General Counsel, Dep't of Defense).
126
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 9970 (
The committee is satisfied that the obligations imposed upon the United
States by the "grave breaches" provisions are such as can be met by existing
legislation enacted by the Federal Government within its constitutional
powers. A review of that legislation reveals that no further measures are
needed to provide effective penal sanctions ....
Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996)
Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances described
in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or
any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be
subject to the penalty of death.
). One year later, Congress amended the statute to establish criminal liability for other war
crimes, in addition to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. See Pub. L. No. 105-118,
§ 583, 111 Stat. 2436 (1997) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2004)).
128 See War Crimes Act of 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 3-7 (1996).
127
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melits for POWs and civilian internees shall be exempt from import
duties.129 The Constitution provides that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."' 30 Some authority suggests that this constitutional provision may preclude use of the
treaty power to amend preexisting laws that impose duties on imports. 31 Even if implementing legislation is constitutionally required
to give domestic effect to these articles, legislation enacted prior to
U.S. ratification of the Conventions provided the President with the
requisite statutory authority to implement these provisions. 132 In sum,
there are a few articles of the Geneva Conventions for which implementing legislation may be constitutionally required. Nevertheless,
those articles have the status of supreme federal law within the domestic legal system because Congress has enacted appropriate legislation
to incorporate them into domestic law.
2.

Provisionsfor Which Implementing Legislation Is Not
Constitutionally Required

The Supremacy Clause provides that "all Treaties made ...under
the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."' 33 This provision means that all treaties the United States ratifies have the status of supreme federal law, unless a particular treaty
provision exceeds the scope of the treaty-makers' domestic lawmaking
powers, or a subsequent inconsistent treaty or statute supersedes the
treaty provision at issue. 13 4 Most provisions of the Geneva Conven129

See POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 74; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art.

110.
1 30

U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl.1.

See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 183-99 (John
Byrne & Co. 1916) (1904) (documenting the fact that, by the middle of the 19th century,
the political branches had developed a tacit understanding that treaties involving concessions in tariff duties would not have domestic effect in the absence of implementing
legislation).
132 See Senate Hearing, supra note 125, at 59 (Letter from Assistant Attorney General to
Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee) (noting that 19 U.S.C. § 1318 "provides
that during a war or national emergency the President may authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to permit the duty-free importation of food, clothing, and other supplies for use
in emergency relief work"). The letter adds that "it may be appropriate to revive" a World
War II statute that specifically authorized duty-free importation of "articles addressed to
prisoners of war and civilian internees in the United States." Id. However, Congress apparently decided that it was not necessary to revive that statute, because Congress never enacted any such legislation.
131

133

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.

134 For a detailed exposition of this interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, see David
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy, 36 U.C. DAvis L. RFv. 1,
46-55 (2002). A competing interpretation of the Supremacy Clause holds that a treaty
provision has the status of supreme federal law, unless the treaty-makers intended to prevent a particular provision from having domestic legal effect. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. IN-T'L L. 695, 700-710 (1995).
Even under this interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, however, most provisions of the
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tions are well within the scope of the treaty-makers' domestic lawmaking powers.' 3 5 For such provisions, the Constitution does not require
implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation.' 3 6 Even so, the various provisions of the Geneva Conventions for
which there is no implementing legislation have the status of supreme
federal law because the Supremacy Clause grants them that status.
One might object that a treaty has the status of supreme federal
law only if the treaty-makers intended it to have that status. 137 As a
matter of constitutional law, this objection is misguided because a
treaty's status as supreme federal law is determined by the Constitution. The treaty-makers lack the power to alter the relevant constitutional rules by manifesting their intent to deprive a treaty of its status
as "Law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause.138 Nonetheless,
for present purposes, the authors will assume that the treaty-makers'
intentions bear some relevance to the question of whether the Geneva
Conventions are the law of the land. Given this assumption, analysis
of the domestic legal status of treaty provisions for which there is no
implementing legislation requires discussion of whether the treatymakers intended the Geneva Conventions to be self-executing.
The Senate record associated with ratification of the Geneva Conventions does not contain any general statement by either the Senate
Geneva Conventions are supreme federal law because there is no evidence that the treatymakers intended to prevent them from having domestic effect. For further discussion of
this point, see infta notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
135
This statement is based on two assumptions: (1) most provisions of the Conventions address matters that fall within the scope of Congress's Article I powers; and (2) the
treaty-makers have the power to create domestic law within the scope of Article I because
most of Congress's Article I powers are concurrent, not exclusive powers. A detailed defense of the first assumption appears in Part IV.C below. Most scholars agree with the
second assumption, but Professor Yoo has argued that the treaty-makers cannot utilize the
Article II treaty process to create domestic law within the scope of Congress's Article I
powers. SeeJohn C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]; John
C. Yoo, Treaties andPublic Lawmaking: A Textual and StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
COLUM L. REV. 2218 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Rejoinder]. For detailed criticism of Yoo's
thesis, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: HistoricalScholarship, Original Understanding,
and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999), and Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999).
1346
When the Senate consented to the Conventions' ratification, the Senate report
stated explicitly "that very little in the way of new legislative enactments will be required to
give effect to the provisions contained in the four conventions." SFNATF RFPoRT, supra
note 120, at 9971. The report then recommends a few minor changes in federal statutes.
Id. Apart from these few items and the war crimes legislation noted above, see supranotes
127-28 and accompanying text, there has not been any legislation to implement the
Conventions.
137

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 111(4) (a) (stating that a treaty is

non-self-executing and, therefore, will not be given effect as law in the absence of implementing legislation, "if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation").
"g8 For a detailed defense of this position, see Sloss, supra note 134.
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or the executive branch suggesting that the Conventions, as a whole,
are either self-executing or non-self-executing. There are a few statements indicating that particular provisions of the Conventions are
non-self-executing,' 3 9 from which one might infer that the treaty-makers considered the vast majority of Convention provisions to be selfexecuting. The fact that both the Senate and the executive branch
stated that most of the Conventions' provisions could be implemented
without enacting new legislation reinforces this inference. 140 Even so,
aside from the few provisions explicitly said to be non-self-executing,
the Senate record as a whole otherwise provides weak evidence of the
treaty-makers' intentions regarding the self-executing or non-self-executing character of the Conventions.
In contrast, the subsequent practice of the U.S. military provides
fairly strong evidence that the executive branch has understood the
Conventions to have the status of supreme federal law. On October 1,
1997, the government published Army Regulation 190-8, which establishes policies and procedures "for the administration, treatment, employment, and compensation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW),
retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees
(OD) in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces." 14 1 Notably, this regulation cites the Geneva Conventions, rather than any federal statute,
as the legal basis for the military's authority to promulgate the regulation. 142 Moreover, the regulation states that "[i]n the event of conflicts or discrepancies between this regulation and the Geneva
Conventions, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions take precedence."1 43 In short, the U.S. military has expressly stated that the Geneva Conventions are directly binding on all U.S. military forces as a
matter of domestic law, even where they conflict with the military's
own regulations.
Some courts have concluded that language in the Geneva Conventions calling for implementing legislation demonstrates that the

139

See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 9970 ("It should be emphasized, in any

event, that the grave breaches provisions cannot be regarded as self-executing .... ); id. at
9969-70 (discussing Articles 53 and 54 of Geneva I, which concern the use of the Red
Cross symbol by private parties, and noting that "[i]t is the position of the executive branch
that the prohibition of articles 53 and 54 is not intended to be self-executing").
140 See Senate Hearing, supranote 125, at 59 (letter from Assistant Attorney General to
Senatoi George) (stating that, upon ratification of the Conventions, "the United States will
be required to enact only relatively minor legislation" to implement the Conventions);
SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 9971 ("From information furnished to the committee it
appears that very little in the way of new legislative enactments will be required to give
effect to the provisions contained in the four conventions.").
141
ARMY REG. 190-8, supra note 80, § 1-1(a).
142
Id. § I-l(b).
143
Id. § 1-1(b)(4).
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treaty drafters intended the Conventions to be non-self-executing.1 44
This argument is mistaken for two reasons. First, the treaty language
at issue merely calls for legislation "to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing" grave breaches. 14 5 Thus, at most, this
language suggests that the treaty drafters intended the grave breaches
provisions to be non-self-executing 46 The language does not manifest an intention that the Conventions as a whole would be non-selfexecuting. Moreover, the Conventions obligate parties "to enact any
legislation necessary" to achieve certain ends. 147 The phrase "any legislation necessary" is intended to accommodate differences between
domestic legal systems that always require implementing legislation
for treaties (dualist systems) and domestic legal systems that never require implementing legislation for treaties (monist systems). 148 The
language does not actually manifest a specific intention for the grave
breaches provisions to be non-self-executing. Rather, it manifests the
treaty-makers' recognition that broad-based multilateral treaties must
be drafted in a manner that accounts for the variety of domestic legal
systems in which the treaty is to be implemented.
Judicial opinion is divided on the question of whether the Geneva
Conventions are self-executing. Two district courts have expressly
held that at least some provisions of the Geneva Conventions are self144
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (stating that the POW Convention and the Civilian Convention "expressly call
for implementing legislation" and that "[a] treaty that provides that party states will take
measures through their own laws to enforce its proscriptions evidences its intent not to be
self-executing"); Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("The Geneva Conventions expressly call for implementing legislation, and therefore ...

are not self-executing."), revd, 963 F.2d 332 (11 th Cir. 1992).
See Geneva 1, supra note 44, art. 49; Geneva II, supranote 44, art. 50; POW Conven145
tion, supra note 13, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 146. There are a few
other articles of the Conventions that call for legislation dealing with specific aspects of the
Conventions. See, e.g., Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 54 ("The High Contracting Parties
shall, if their legislation is not already adequate, take measures necessary for the prevention and repression, at all times, of the abuses referred to under Article 53."). However,
there is no general provision requiring implementing legislation for the Conventions as a
whole.
146
As noted above, under U.S. constitutional law, the "grave breaches" provisions
would be non-self-executing in any event, because implementing legislation is constitutionally required for a treaty provision that obligates the United States to impose criminal
sanctions for designated conduct. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 49; Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 50; POW Conven147
tion, supra note 13, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 146.
For example, the Netherlands has a monist legal system, so treaties never require
148
implementing legislation. See Pieter van Dijk & Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, ParliamentayParticipalion in the Treaty-Making Process of the Netherlands, 67 CHI.-KEasr L. REv. 413, 418 (1991). In

contrast, the United Kingdom has a dualist system, in which treaties always require implementing legislation. See Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament,67 CHI.KE-'-n L. REv. 459, 481-83 (1991) (discussing differences in incorporation of treaties into
domestic law in both "monist" and "dualist" systems).
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executing. 149 In contrast, the majority of courts that have explicitly
addressed the question have held that the Conventions are not selfexecuting.150 A simplistic division into majority and minority views,
however, obscures more than it clarifies. The cases supporting the
view that the Conventions are not self-executing generally claim that
the Conventions are non-self-executing because they do not create a
private right of action. 15 1 Nevertheless, the conclusion that the Conventions do not create a private right of action is entirely consistent
with the proposition that the Conventions have the status of supreme
federal law. In American InsuranceAssociation v. Garamendi,15 2 the Supreme Court enjoined the enforcement of a California statute that
required insurance companies to disclose information about "insurance policies issued to persons in Europe, which were in effect between 1920 and 1945."15s The Court held that certain bilateral
agreements between the United States and European governments
preempted the California law. 154 Despite the fact that none of the
149 See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that
"the [POW Convention], insofar as it is pertinent here, is a self-executing treaty"); United
States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Ha. 1992) ("[G]iven the opportunity to
address this issue in the context of a live controversy, the Court would almost certainly
hold that the majority of provisions of Geneva III are, in fact, self-executing."), afj'd 117
F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
150
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (stating that the first and second Geneva Conventions are not self-executing),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (determining that the POW Convention is not
self-executing); Tel-Oren v. I.ibyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-09 (D.C. Cii. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (concluding that neither the POW Convention, nor the Civilian
Convention is self-executing); Huynh Thi Anh v. L.evi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting child custody claim based on Articles 24 and 49 of the Civilian Convention because "there is no evidence that any of the general language relied upon by plaintiffs was
intended to be self-executing"); United States v. Fort, 921 F. Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that the POW Convention is not self-executing); Linder v. Calero Portocarrero,
747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462-63 (S.D. Ha. 1990) (denying claim based on common Article 3
and stating that "the Geneva Conventions are not self-executing"); Handel v. Artukovic,
601 F. Supp. 1421, 1424-26 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (rejecting claim based on the 1929 Geneva
Convention, in part because the 1949 POW Convention is not self-executing).
151
See, e.g., Handi, 316 F.3d at 468 (holding that the POW Convention is not selfexecuting, because "the document, as a whole, [does not] evidence an intent to provide a
private right of action" (quoting Goldstar (Panama) v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968
(4th Cir. 1992))); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring) (finding that the Conventions do not create a private right of action); Huynh Jhi Anh, 586 F.2d at 629 (stating
that there is no evidence that the Civilians Convention "was intended to be self-executing
or to create private rights of action in the domestic courts of the signatory countries");
Handel, 601 F. Supp. at 1425 ("In the absence of authorizing legislation, an individual may
enforce a treaty's provisions only when it is self-executing, i.e., when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.").
152
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
153

Id. at 409.

Id. at 420-27. The Court's preemption analysis relies primarily on three bilateral
executive agreements: Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,"July 17, 2000, U.S.-F.R.G., 39 I.1.M. 1298 [hereinafter U.S.-Germany
154
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bilateral agreements created a private right of action, 15 5 the Court
granted relief to private plaintiffs on the grounds that the agreements
preempted California law under the Supremacy Clause. 156 Thus,
Garamendi supports the proposition that international agreements of
the United States have the status of supreme federal law under the
Supremacy Clause, regardless of whether they create a private right of
action. 157
Only three published judicial opinions have explicitly addressed
the question of whether the Geneva Conventions qualify as supreme
federal law under the Supremacy Clause, and all three agree that the
Conventions are the law of the land.158 In contrast, none of the cases
Agreement]; Agreement Concerning the Austrian Fund "Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation," Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Aus., 40 I.L.M. 523; Agreement Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Jan. 18, 2001, U.S.-Fr., Temp. State Dep't No.
01-36. All three agreements acknowledge the creation of certain funds or foundations by
European governments designed to compensate victims for harms suffered during World
War II. All three agreements provide that the designated funds or foundations are the
exclusive remedy for victims. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Agreement, supra, art. 1(1) ("The
parties agree that . . it would be in their interests for the Foundation to be the exclusive
remedy and forum for the resolution of all claims that have been or may be asserted
against German companies arising fiom the National Socialist era and World War II.").
155 The bilateral agreements manifest the drafters' expectations that the agreements
may be invoked defensively in U.S. courts. See U.S.-Germany Agreement, supra note 154,
art. 2(1) (
The United States shall, in all cases in which the United States is notified
that a claim described in article 1(1) has been asserted in a court in the
United States, inform its courts . . . that it would be in the foreign policy

interests of the United States for the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy
and forum for resolving such claims asserted against German companies...
and that dismissal of such cases would be in its foreign policy interest.
). In Garamendi, however, the insurance companies did not invoke the bilateral agreements defensively. Rather, they sued the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California to enjoin enforcement of the California law. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 412. There is
nothing in the language of any of the agreements to suggest that the drafters anticipated,
or intended to authorize this type of private lawsuit. Thus, the plaintiffs in Garamendi implicitly relied on the Supremacy Clause as a basis for a private right of action to enforce
international agreements that did not create a private right of action. See David Sloss, Ex
parte Young and FederalRemedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1103,
1194-97 (2000) (contending that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied private right of
action for some treaty-based preemption claims against state officers).
156 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 427-29.
157
One could argue that Garamendiwas wrongly decided insofar as it equated sole
executive agreements with treaties. See David Sloss, InternationalAgreements and the Political
Safeguards of Federalism,55 STAN. L. REv. 1963 (2003) (elaborating the differences between
various categories of international agreements). Regardless, the central point here is that
a treaty that does not create private rights of action, might still have the status of supreme
federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
158 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating
that the POW Convention "under the Supremacy Clause has the force of domestic law"),
rev'd sub norn. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. - ,124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); United States v.
Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553-54 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that the provisions of the
POW Convention at issue in the case "are a part of American law and thus binding in
federal courts under the Supremacy Clause"); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791,
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holding the Conventions to be non-self-executing explicitly address
the status of the Conventions under the Supremacy Clause. Thus,
unanimous judicial precedent supports the proposition that the Geneva Conventions, at least in substantial part, have the status of supreme federal law under the Constitution.
In sum, with respect to the vast majority of Convention provisions
for which implementing legislation is not constitutionally required,judicial precedent supports two conclusions. First, the Conventions are
non-self-executing in the sense that they do not create a private right
of action. Second, and most important for the purposes of this Article, the Conventions are self-executing in the sense that they have the
status of supreme federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
B.

Legislation Since September 11

One could argue that, in the wake of September 11, Congress has
authorized violations of the Geneva Conventions. This section refutes
that argument. At the outset, it is important to emphasize that Congress has not expressly authorized the President to violate the Geneva
Conventions. Nevertheless, it might be argued that two congressional
acts implicitly authorized violations of the Conventions: the joint congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks (Joint Resolution) and the
USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Patriot Act). This section demonstrates that
the authorization to use force does not implicate U.S. obligations
under the Geneva Conventions, and the Patriot Act, at most, enacts a
few modest qualifications of U.S. obligations under the Civilian
Convention.
1.

The Joint CongressionalResolution Authorizing the Use of Force

The Joint Resolution does not authorize the President to violate
the Geneva Conventions. By its terms, the Joint Resolution authorizes
the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons.' 59
794 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that the POW Convention "is undoubtedly a valid international agreement and 'the law of the land' in the United States"), aff'd 117 F.3d 1206 (11 th
Cir. 1997).
159 Joint Resolution: To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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The Joint Resolution characterizes the attacks as "armed attacks"
against the United States in order to justify the use of force in selfdefense.'6' Indeed, the Joint Resolution arguably characterizes the
attacks as inherently unlawful acts of war, or "war crimes."' 6 1 Thus,
the language of the Joint Resolution clearly contemplates executive
action aimed at attacking and killing those responsible for the September 11 attacks, or capturing, detaining, and punishing any such
persons. In this sense, it is clear that Congress contemplated the direct, severe application of U.S. power against a foe formally characterized as the enemy. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the
Joint Resolution directly or implicitly authorizes the President to engage in conduct contrary to the Geneva Conventions.
Although the Joint Resolution does not expressly mention the
Geneva Conventions, it may still implicitly authorize the President to
violate the treaties. There are two versions of this argument: (1) by
authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force,"
the Joint Resolution authorizes the use of any tactics deemed essential
to prevent further attacks; and (2) the Resolution triggers the application of a network of laws (statutes, treaties, common law, and regulations) governing the use of force, which, in turn, authorizes the
President to violate the Geneva Conventions. While the second argument is plausible, the first argument is not.
The first view does not withstand even casual scrutiny. The Joint
Resolution is not a blanket authorization for the President to wage the
War on Terror in any manner he sees fit. Although the Resolution
authorizes the President to use "all necessary and appropriate
force,"' 62 this phrase is best understood as an authorization to deploy
U.S. forces in a range of operational settings, up to, and including,
operations that constitute an armed conflict or war against another
sovereign state. In other words, the Joint Resolution authorizes the
President to take military action short of war, or, if necessary, to commit U.S. troops to war. Indeed, the language used in the Resolution
mirrors that of previous and subsequent resolutions authorizing the
use of force.
To read the Joint Resolution more broadly would be inconsistent
with several important interpretive considerations. First, U.S. law
criminalizes many violations of the Geneva Conventions. 63 It would
be difficult to sustain a claim that Congress impliedly repealed various
provisions of the U.S. penal code and the Uniform Code of Military
160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

See The War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (defining and setting penalties for war

crimes),
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Justice (UCMJ)1 6 4 with a single, sweeping resolution. Second, given
U.S. treaty obligations and the statutes and regulations incorporating
them, the best reading of the Joint Resolution is that the law of war
delimits the scope of "appropriate" force. No evidence suggests that
the executive sought-or suggested the necessity of-discretion to
conduct military operations in a manner inconsistent with U.S. treaty
obligations. On the contrary, substantial evidence suggests that the
U.S. military believes that it is in the strategic interest of the United
States to comply with the laws of war.16 5 Moreover, long-standing U.S.
military regulations require all operations to be conducted in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. 166 This dense network of regulations, which is tightly coupled to the statutory provisions of the UCMJ,
constitutes an important part of the backdrop against which Congress
issued the Joint Resolution.
The second variant of this claim, although more plausible, is nevertheless flawed. According to this view, the Joint Resolution, in conjunction with some other source or sources of authority, empowers the
President to take actions inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations.
This variant acknowledges that the Joint Resolution could not, by its
own force, authorize the President to suspend statutes and treaties
that might otherwise condition the exercise of the war-making power.
Nevertheless, the Joint Resolution may constitute sufficient congressional authorization to activate other presidential powers, arising from
specific statutes or the Constitution itself, which might allow the President to derogate from specific treaty obligations. The most salient
example is the assertion that Congress has, in times of war, authorized
the use of military commissions, and, insofar as the use of these special tribunals is inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions, Congress
167
has authorized violations of the Conventions.
164
165

10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, DEP'T OF ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW

HANDBOOK 10 (2003) (suggesting that it is DOD policy to comply with the "principles and
spirit" of the "Law of War" in the conduct of all military operations); DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
DIR. 5100.77, LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (Dec. 9, 1998) (establishing that, as a matter of U.S.
policy, U.S. forces are to observe the law of war).
166 See, e.g., DE,-r OF ARMy, FM 27-10, supra note 68; AR., REG. 190-8, supra note 80,

§ 1.1 (b)(4) (stating that, should conflicts arise, the Geneva Conventions take precedence
over the regulation).
167
To be clear, the argument is not that further congressional authorization is unnecessary. Rather, the argument is that the Joint Resolution constitutes wholly sufficient authorization for the use of military commissions, The two variants of this claim both assume
that Congress, by authorizing the use of force, implicitly sanctioned the establishment of
military commissions-even absent any other constitutional or statutory source of authority-because: (1) the resolution necessarily authorizes any action short of armed force in
dealing with the 9/11 attackers in that the greater power includes the lesser; or (2) the use
of military commissions itself constitutes the "use of force" within the meaning of the resolution. These are obviously strained readings of the resolution. After all, the resolution

triggers a narrower range of emergency powers than would a formal declaration of war. In
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From this perspective, the Joint Resolution arguably empowers
the President to invoke the "Articles of War," including the provisions
authorizing the use of military commissions.1 68 Indeed, the central
question driving the vigorous, ongoing debate over the President's
power to issue the Military Order is whether the Joint Resolution is
sufficient to trigger these other powers, or whether a formal declaration of war is necessary.1 69 For the purposes of this Article, the important point is that the Joint Resolution arguably authorizes the use of
military commissions only insofar as it activates the other sources of
authority cited in the Military Order-namely Sections 821 and 836 of
the UCMJ.

170

Section 821 provides:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals. 171
By its terms, this provision does not appear to authorize the establishment of military commissions. 172 Nevertheless, in Ex Parte Quiin, the
Supreme Court held that "Congress[, in what is now § 821,] has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the
addition, the Constitution, as well as some treaties and statutes, govern the exercise of the
President's war-making power and might prohibit or authorize the use of specific institutions such as military commissions. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court in
Quirin did not sanction the use of commissions based solely on the fact that the Congress
had declared war on Germany. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1942) (identifying
two potential sources of authority to establish commissions: statute and the Commander-inChief power). Of course, some commentators argue that the Court's reasoning in Quiin
suggests that a formal declaration of war is a necessary condition for the invocation of
either basis. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 83, at 1280-83. The rather clumsy arguments outlined above must, therefore, be distinguished from the more plausible claim that
the resolution read in conjunction with another power (the Commander-in-Chief power,
for example) establishes the President's authority to convene military commissions. See
infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
168 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-821, 904, 906.
169 Compare Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002), with Katyal & Tribe, supra note 83.
170 See Military Order, supra note 37, pmbl.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (stating that
the jurisdiction of courts-martial is not exclusive); id. § 836 (authorizing the President to
prescribe all pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures for military commissions).
171
10 U.S.C. § 821.
172 See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 83, at 1285-87; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 169, at 252 (suggesting that the terms of the statute appear to "recognize[ I a preexisting non-statutory authority in the President"); David J. Bederman, ArticeIICourts, 44
MERCER L. REv. 825, 834 (1993) ("Although federal statute recognizes military commissions, it is clear that Congress considers them established . . .under the laws of war.").
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law of war in appropriate cases"' 7 and that "Congress[, in what is now
§ 821,] has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before
174
such commissions."
Many commentators argue that the Court's reasoning in Quiin is
closely tethered to the facts of the case and should not apply outside
of those unique circumstances. 7 5 Some also maintain that the
1 76
Court's interpretation of the predecessor of § 821 is implausible, 177
implying that the Supreme Court should perhaps revisit the issue.
173
174

ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
Id. at 29; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,

DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,

HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURIS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTrEM 408-15 (5th ed. 2003);
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, DEP'T OF ARMY, LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK

206 (2000) (stating that UCMJ "[a] uthorizes the use of military commissions, tribunals, or
provost courts to try individuals for violations of the law of war" (emphasis added)); Brad-

ley & Goldsmith, supra note 169, at 252-53 ("Although by its terms this provision recognizes a pre-existing non-statutory authority in the President, the Supreme Court in Quirin
held that this provision also constitutes congressional authorizationfor the President to create military commissions."). In fact, many critics of the result in Quirin acknowledge that

the Court interpreted Article 15 of the Articles of War as congressional authorization for
Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The
military commissions. See, e.g.,
Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REv. 59, 82 (1980); David J.
Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1J. S. CT. HIST. 61, 73 (1996). It is important to note that in
Quirin the government also charged the German saboteurs under Article 82 of the Articles
of War, a provision that authorized military commissions to try the offense of spying. See
Quirin,317 U.S. at 23. The Court, however, examined only the "law[s] of war" charges,
and had "no occasion to pass on" the other charges. See id. at 46. In Yamashita, the Supreme Court, relying in part on Quirin, once again read the predecessor of § 821 as explicit congressional authorization for military commissions to try offenses against the laws
of war. See In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 46 (1946); see also Bederman, supra note 172, at 836
n.55 (discussing the use of special military commissions over civilians in peacetime).
175 The unique circumstances of the case included that the case was decided in the
context of a formally declared, "total" war, that the charges were levied against only eight
identified defendants, that the charges were supported by irrefutable evidence, and that
the list of charges included alleged violations of statutes clearly assigning jurisdiction to
military commission. See Dep't of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Dejending
Against Terrorism:HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 79-80 (2001)
(statement of Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National
Security, Duke University School of Law); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 83, 1280-83.
176
See Belknap, supra note 174, at 88; Danelski, supra note 174 at 79-80; Katyal &
Tribe, supra note 83, at 1283.
177
See, e.g.,
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 83, at 1290-91 (advocating an overruling of
Quirin). One difficulty with this view is that, for obvious reasons, courts do not lightly
abandon stare decisis in the context of statutory interpretation. See Hohn v. United States,
524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (stating that "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in
the area of statutory interpretation" (citation omitted)); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative orjudicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change."); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (outlining why heightened rules of stare decisis apply in statutory settings); 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 1-16, 3-3, at 84 & n.42, 251-54
(3d ed. 2000). Moreover, it appears that Congress ratified the holding in Quirin when
reenacting § 821. See ESTARI SHING A UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, S. REP. No. 81486, at 13 (1949) ("The language of [Article of War] 15 has been preserved because it has
been construed by the Supreme Court. (Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942))."); accord UNI-
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Irrespective of the merits of these contentions, the applicability of
§ 821 to the present circumstances turns, in substantial part, on
whether individuals subject to the Military Order may, under the laws
of war, be tried by special military tribunal. Even under the Quifin
Court's reasoning, the statute authorizes the use of military commissions only insofar as the laws of war permit it. Therefore, to the extent
that such tribunals violate the Geneva Conventions, this statutory pro178
vision does not authorize their use.
2.

The PatriotAct of 2001

Like the Joint Resolution, the Patriot Act 79 does not expressly authorize the President to violate the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, some of the Patriot Act's provisions may have this effect because
they are inconsistent with some of the United States's obligations
under the Geneva Conventions, particularly when the Act's provisions
target certain persons at certain times. Still, the Act implicates only a
very narrow swath of Geneva law. Accordingly, this section contends
that the Act, at most, derogates from a few rules established by the
Civilian Convention concerning the treatment of enemy aliens on
U.S. territory during armed conflict.
For the most part, the Patriot Act does not concern matters governed by the Geneva Conventions. This is not to say that the Act has
little impact on the civil rights of persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, because it does. Nevertheless, the law enforcement
powers augmented by the Patriot Act do not concern matters regulated by the laws of war. For example, the Act substantially expands
the information-gathering and surveillance capacity of federal law enforcement and broadens the definition of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses, with the effect of increasing the available penalties for
many federal crimes. In addition, the Patriot Act formalizes several
modes of cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Although
17 (1949); see also Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 169, at 253 ("Congress in effect affirmed the [Quinn] Court's construction [of the statute] when, in 1950, it recodified Article 15 into 10 U.S.C. § 821 against
the backdrop of the Court's construction.").
178
The statute does suggest, however, that other statutes might authorize trial by military commission, irrespective of whether the laws of war would authorize such trials in
other circumstances. This is an important point because the UCMJ does authorize the use
of military commissions in some specific circumstances. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2002)
(providing that military commissions may impose the death penalty for the crime of "aiding the enemy"); id. § 906 (2002) (stating that military commissions may try the crime of
spying during wartime); Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, S.1941, 107th Cong.
§ 3(b) (2002) (establishing military tribunal jurisdiction over "crimes against humanity
targeted against United States persons").
179
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No, 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
FORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, H.R. REP. No. 81-491, at
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there may be other grounds for objecting to such provisions, they do
not violate U.S. treaty obligations under the laws of war.
Nonetheless, the "enhanced immigration" provisions in the Patriot Act are problematic, because they dramatically expand the power
of federal law enforcement to detain non-citizens. Section 412 of the
Act grants the Attorney General the authority to detain any alien
whom he has "reasonable grounds to believe" has engaged in "activity
that endangers the national security of the United States."'",, This
Section requires the Attorney General either to begin removal proceedings against such an alien, bring criminal charges against the
alien within seven days, or release the alien from custody.,,' Nevertheless, any alien found to be removable, but whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained for
additional periods if the Attorney General certifies that release of the
alien will "threaten the national security of the United States or the
safety of the community or any person."' 82 Furthermore, this latter
provision sharply limits the scope of judicial review available to any
18 3
alien detained according to its terms.
When applied to nationals of a state with which the United States
is at war, this provision may violate the Geneva Conventions because
the detention of such individuals may constitute an unlawful deprivation of liberty under the Civilian Convention. The Civilian Convention authorizes states to detain enemy aliens present on their territory
only if the alien directly participated in the hostilities, or if detention
is otherwise necessary to preserve the national security of the detaining state.'8 4 In addition, countries party to a conflict must grant enemy aliens present on their territory the right to depart the enemy's
territory voluntarily. 185 Despite these possible inconsistencies, one
point is clear: the Patroit Act does not constitute general congressional authorization to violate these treaties.
III
THE PRESIDENT AS LAw-MAKER
As discussed above, certain DOD regulations and policies
adopted to implement President Bush's Military Order may conflict
with some provisions of the Geneva Conventions.8 6 In light of these
apparent conflicts, the question arises whether the Military Order su180
181

Id, § 412.
Id.

182

Id.

183

Id.
Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 42.
Id., art. 35.
See supra Part I.B.

184

185
186
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persedes conflicting provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a matter
of domestic law. Although the Military Order relies in part on statutory authorization, the statutes which the Order invokes do not grant
18 7
the President the authority to violate the Geneva Conventions.
Nevertheless, one could still argue that the Military Order supersedes
the Geneva Conventions, because the President possesses the independent constitutional authority to issue a unilateral executive order "88
' superseding a prior inconsistent treaty that is the supreme law
of the land. This Part evaluates the merits of this argument.
It is well established that Congress can enact legislation that supersedes a previously ratified treaty as a matter of domestic law. 189
Thus, the precise issue under consideration here is a question of the
constitutional distribution of power between the legislative and executive branches. Given that Congress undisputedly has the power to enact legislation that supersedes a previously ratified treaty, does the
President also have an independent power to issue a unilateral executive order that supersedes a previously ratified treaty as a matter of
domestic law? The first section below presents the argument in favor
of a presidential power to promulgate orders that supersede prior inconsistent treaties. The second section explains why that argument is
ultimately unpersuasive.
A.

The Case for Presidential Lawmaking Power

In his famous concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer,' 90 Justice Jackson identified three categories of presidential
action. The first category of presidential action includes presidential
"acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress"'19 1
(Category One lawmaking). The second category consists of presidential actions undertaken without "either a congressional grant or
denial of authority"19 2 (Category Two lawmaking). The third category
encompasses presidential actions that are "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress"' 19 3 (Category Three lawmaking).
187

See supra Part II.B.

In this Article, the term "unilateral executive order" refers to an executive order
issued by the President on the basis of his independent constitutional authority. This category does not include executive orders that require express or implied congressional authorization. Since Congress has not authorized the President to violate the Geneva
Conventions, the Military Order is unilateral, insofar as it purports to authorize policies
that are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Conventions.
18 ) See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-602 (1889); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
190 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
191 Id. at 635 (JacksonJ, concurring).
192
Id. at 637 (JacksonJ, concurring).
19"1 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
188

20041
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Even before the rise of administrative agencies during the New
Deal, the President and his subordinates routinely created law pursuant to express congressional authorization.' 94 Currently, the Code of
Federal Regulations contains thousands of pages of regulations
promulgated by the executive branch on the basis of congressional
authorization. Such regulations have the status of supreme federal
law, at least insofar as the regulators are acting within the scope of
legislative authorization. 19 5 In short, Category One presidential lawmaking has become so firmly entrenched in our legal system that its
constitutionality cannot seriously be challenged.
Whereas the products of Category One lawmaking are often
called "regulations," Category Two lawmaking yields "unilateral executive orders." 9 6 These executive orders are properly termed "unilateral," because they are adopted by the President without legislative
authorization. Like Category One lawmaking, Category Two lawmaking has deep historical roots, 97 but its constitutional validity is less
firmly established.19 Accordingly, Justice Jackson concluded that the
constitutionality of Category Two lawmaking "is likely to depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than on abstract theories of law." 199
Sole executive agreements exemplify the longstanding practice of
Category Two lawmaking. A "sole executive agreement" is an international agreement concluded by the President on the basis of his inde20 0
pendent constitutional authority, without legislative authorization.
194

See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RJCHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE

§ 1.4 (3d ed. 1994) (describing the historical development of administrative law prior to

World War II).
195
See, e.g, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715-16 (1984) (holding
that FCC regulations preempt Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages on cable television).
196
An executive order backed by congressional authorization would be considered
Category One lawmaking. In contrast, an executive order promulgated by the President
on the basis of his independent constitutional authority (i.e., a unilateral executive order)
would be considered Category Two lawmaking. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (jacksonJ., concurring).
197 Professor Corwin provides a detailed account of President Roosevelt's Category
Two lawmaking before and during World War II. See CORWN, supra note 2, at 47-50 (discussing seizure of private companies to ensure continued production of war material in the
face of actual or threatened labor strikes); id. at 50-55 (discussing Presidential orders establishing administrative agencies that lacked legislative authorization); id. at 55-62
(describing the Roosevelt Administration's use of "administrative sanctions," which according to Professor Corwin "were in fact nothing short of blackmail"). In light of the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Youngstown, some of Roosevelt's unilateral Presidential orders were probably unconstitutional.
198
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (JacksonJ., concurring) (describing Category Two lawmaking as a "zone of twilight").
t99
Id. Uackson, J.,concurring).
200
Terminology related to executive agreements is not entirely uniform. Commentators generally distinguish between "congressional-executive agreements," which are inter-
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Between 1789 and 1989, the United States concluded more than
12,000 nontreaty international agreements, including 1182 such
agreements before 1939, some of which were sole executive agreements.2 0 1 The Supreme Court has consistently held that sole executive agreements have the status of domestic law and therefore
supersede inconsistent state law.2 112 Thus, notwithstanding the original constitutional design,20 3 it is now firmly established that the President has some independent authority to create domestic law by means
of sole executive agreements.
Advocates of broad presidential powers could cite Supreme Court
precedent involving sole executive agreements in support of a unilateral presidential power to supersede treaties domestically. In United
States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court suggested that "all international
compacts and agreements," including sole executive agreements, have
the status of supreme federal law. 204 Five years later, in United States v.
Pink, the Court reiterated that "[a] treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under
the supremacy clause ....
[and that] [s]uch international compacts
and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment [a sole executive agreement] have a similar dignity." 20 5 Since sole executive agreements
"have a similar dignity" as treaties, a later sole executive agreement
2°
arguably supersedes an earlier treaty under the later-in-time rule.
national agreements authorized in some fashion by Congress, and "sole executive
agreements," which are international agreements concluded by the President on the basis
of his independent constitutional authority. See HENKIN, supra note 23, at 215-224. Some

commentators distinguish a third category of executive agreements that derive their authority from an earlier treaty. See, e.g., TRiMBLE, supra note 32, at 113-15.
201

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 103D CONG., TREATIES

AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGRFFMENTS:

THE

ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 14

(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter CRS STUDY]. Due in part to problems in distinguishing
between sole executive agreements and congressional-executive agreements, it is unclear
how many of these were sole executive agreements.
202 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that sole executive
agreements with Germany, France and Austria preempt California statute); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 655-56, 659-60 (1981) (holding that sole executive agreement with Iran preempts state law breach of contract claims); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 223-24 (1942) (holding that sole executive agreement with Russia preempts New
York common law rules governing relative priority of competing creditors); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937) (same).
203
Professor Michael Ramsey has argued that the Framers did not intend to grant the
President independent authority to create domestic law by means of sole executive agreements. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REv.
133 (1998).
204
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
205
Pink, 315 U.S. at 230; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 115 n.5 ("A
sole executive agreement made by the President on his own constitutional authority is the

law of the land and supreme to State law.").
206

The later-in-time rule holds that a later-in-time statute that conflicts with a previ-

ously ratified treaty trumps the earlier treaty for purposes of domestic law. See RESTATE,MENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 115(l)(a) ("An act of Congress supersedes an earlier ...
[treaty provision] as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the
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Moreover, one could argue, there is no reason to distinguish between
unilateral executive orders and sole executive agreements in this respect, because both are unilateral presidential acts.
Even in a purely domestic context, the Court has periodically upheld the validity of Category Two lawmaking. For example, in United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 20 7 Congress had enacted a statute declaring
that public lands containing petroleum would be "free and open to
occupation, exploration, and purchase by citizens of the United
States."208 Subsequently, the President issued an executive order making certain public lands temporarily unavailable for exploration and
purchase to ensure "the conservation of a proper supply of petroleum
for the government's own use." 209 The Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the executive order, despite the fact that it was issued without statutory authorization. 2 10 In so doing, the Court relied heavily
on the previous practice of the political branches as a guide to constitutional interpretation. 21 1 The Court noted that, prior to 1910, various Presidents had issued "at least 252 Executive orders making
reservations [of public lands] for useful, though nonstatutory, purposes."2 12 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress had acquiesced
in this practice, and that its previous consent "operated as an implied
grant of power. ' 213 Thus, Midwest Oil stands for the proposition that
the President has limited power to engage in Category Two
21 4
lawmaking.
In sum, Supreme Court precedent involving both sole executive
agreements and unilateral executive orders supports the claim that
the President has independent constitutional authority to create supreme federal law by means of unilateral executive action. In The Federalist,John Jay stated that "[a]ll constitutional acts of power, whether
in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal
earlier . . . provision is clear or if the act and the earlier . . . provision cannot be fairly

reconciled."). Under the later-in-time rule, a subsequent treaty also supersedes a prior
inconsistent statute. See id. § 115(2).
207
236 U.S. 459 (1915).
208

Id at 466 (quoting from Act of February 11, 1897).

209

Id. at 467.
Id. at 483.

210

211
See id. at 473 (stating that "in determining the . . . existence of a [constitutional]
power, weight shall be given to the usage itself, even when the validity of the practice is the

subject of investigation").
213

Jd. at 471.
Id. at 475.

214

Some may disagree with the assertion that Midwest Oil supports the existence of a

212

presidential lawmaking power, because the presidential order in that case was "executive,"
rather than "legislative." Granted, the executive order was "executive" in a formal sense,

because it emanated from the President. It was "legislative" in a functional sense, however,
because it had precisely the same effect as a statute limiting occupation and exploration of
public lands. Therefore, Midwest Oilsupports presidential lawmaking in a functional sense.
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validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature."' 2 15
If, as Jay suggests, a unilateral executive order has as much legal validity as a statute, then one could argue that a unilateral executive order
supersedes a prior inconsistent treaty, just as a federal statute supersedes a prior inconsistent treaty under the later-in-time rule. The following section explains why this argument is flawed.
B.

The Limits on Presidential Lawmaking Power

A careful reading of the Constitution's text suggests that the
Framers did not intend to grant the President the authority to create
law without the participation of the legislative branch. The text grants
the President "[t]he executive power." 216 Additionally, the President
is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, '217 has the "Power
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United
States, '218 and has the power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers."2 19 These textual provisions, construed in accordance
with their ordinary meaning, do not appear to grant the President any
lawmaking authority. While the President has the power to make treaties, 220 which are supreme federal law, a treaty does not become fed22
eral law unless it is approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate. '
Thus, the Treaty Power grants the President the authority to create
law in conjunction with the Senate, but not by unilateral executive
action.
Article I states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States. ' 222 The Framers' decision to use the word "all" to modify the phrase "legislative Powers"
reinforces the conclusion that they did not intend to grant the President an independent lawmaking power. Although contemporary
scholars of U.S. foreign relations law hold sharply differing views
about the scope of the President's constitutional foreign affairs powers, they generally agree that the Framers did not intend to grant the
President an independent lawmaking power with regard to foreign
223
affairs.
215
216
217
218
219

THE FFDFRAi 1sT No. 64, at 378 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl.1.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
Id.
Id. art. 11, § 3.

220

Id. art. I, § 2, cl.2.

221

Id.

222 Id. art. I, § 1.
223 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The ProtectivePower of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 10-11 (1993) (claiming that the President has "a general authority to protect and defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States from harm," but
that "the President not only cannot act contra legem, he or she must point to affirmative
legislative authorization when so acting"); id. at 49 ("[P]residential authority [in the for-
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Even so, all but the most rigid formalists must acknowledge that a
fine line separates the functions of executing existing law and creating
new law. Indeed, the difficulty of drawing bright lines distinguishing
legislative and executive functions provides a partial explanation for
the Supreme Court decisions approving presidential lawmaking
through unilateral executive action. Despite the Court's past approval
of presidential lawmaking, however, the analysis in this section shows
that Supreme Court precedent is generally consistent with the following proposition: Although valid federal law created through unilateral
executive action is supreme over state law, unilateral executive action
that conflicts with a federal statute or treaty is invalid, unless the President is acting within the scope of his exclusive constitutional
authority.

224

This proposition is consistent with the overall structure of the
Constitution, which purposefully divides power among the three
225
branches of the federal government to limit the power of each.
The President has a constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed;" 22 6 this duty applies not only to statutes enacted by
Congress but also to ratified treaties. 22 7 If the President had the
power to adopt a unilateral executive order that superseded federal
statutes or treaties, his duty under the Take Care clause would be illueign affairs context] stops well short of an independent, free-standing law-making authority."); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
111 YALE L.J. 231, 234-35 (2001) (contending that the constitutional grant of "executive
power" gives the President a "'residual' foreign affairs power," but that "the President is
not a lawmaker, even in foreign affairs"); cf H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority
over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 529, 543, 560,
566 (1999) (acknowledging that there are "'autonomous' presidential powers," which Congress cannot lawfully regulate, including the power to "conduct foreign affairs and [protect] the national security" and the power to enter into sole-executive agreements, but
noting that "although a sole executive agreement may well have international law implications, its legal force from the standpoint of the United States legal system seems debatable"
because "[t]he President has no means beyond diplomacy to protect national security except for those instruments that congress sanctions and supports").
224
If the President acts pursuant to his exclusive constitutional authority, any conflicting federal statute would be invalid, because Congress lacks the power under Article I to
legislate in areas constitutionally committed to the President's exclusive control. In contrast, there is no authority to suggest that the treaty-makers, acting pursuant to Article II,
lack the power to create domestic law in areas within the scope of the President's exclusive
constitutional authority. This Article considers whether the President has the constitutional authority to violate treaty provisions addressing matters within the scope of his exclusive authority as Commander in Chief. See infra Part V.C.
22-5
See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1763-64
(1996) (discussing excessive concentration of power in state legislatures during the preConstitutional period); id. at 1767 (concluding that the Framers "understood that governmental power needed to be separated sufficiently to ensure that no one branch would ever
again become as powerful as the state legislatures had").
226
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
227

See infra notes 319-38 and accompanying text.
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sory.2 28 Whenever the President did not want to execute a particular
statute or treaty, he could simply issue a unilateral executive order to
supersede the statute or treaty in question. Such a possibility would
destroy the balance between the legislative and executive branches
that the Framers wove into the constitutional structure.
1.

Limits on Sole Executive Agreements

The Supreme Court has never held that sole executive agreements have the same rank as statutes and treaties in the domestic constitutional order. Supreme Court decisions involving sole executive
agreements have all involved conflicts with state law, not federal
law. 229 Both Belmont and Pink involved conflicts between the Litvinov
Agreement, a sole executive agreement with Russia, and New York
common law rules governing the relative priority of competing creditors. 2 30 Dames & Moore involved a sole executive agreement with Iran,
which effectively terminated the petitioner's state law breach of contract action against the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and transferred venue to a specially constituted arbitration tribunal. 23 1 More
recently, Garamendi involved a conflict between a California statute
2 32
and sole executive agreements with Germany, France, and Austria.
In none of these cases did the Supreme Court decide the relationship
233
between sole executive agreements and federal statutes or treaties.
While Belmont and Pink contain dicta suggesting that sole executive agreements have the same status as statutes and treaties, 23 4 such
228
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.& 579, 587 (1952) ("in the
Framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.").
229 Franklin Roosevelt concluded an executive agreement with Great Britain in 1940involving the delivery of fifty overage destroyers to Britain in exchange for the lease of sites
for naval bases-that "was directly violative of at least two [federal] statutes." See EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 273 (5th rev. ed. 1984). Attor-

ney General Jackson (later justice Jackson) defended the agreement on the basis of the
President's Commander-in-Chief power. Id. The constitutionality of the agreement was
never tested in court.
230 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 324 (1937).
231 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981).
232 SpeeAm. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
233 Professor Phillip R. Trimble contends that, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court
authorized the use of a sole executive agreement to supersede the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). See TRIMBLE, supra note 32, at 138-39 (2002). However, this is an
excessively broad reading of Dames & Moore. The Dames & Moore Court never explicitly
stated that the executive agreement at issue superseded the FSIA. See Dames & Moore, 453
U.S. at 684-86. Moreover, Trimble's interpretation is inconsistent with the Court's stated
intention "to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case."
I. at 660.
234 See, e.g., Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (stating that a treaty is "a 'Law of the Land' under the
supremacy clause" and that sole executive agreements "have a similar dignity"); Belmont,
301 U.S. at 331 (stating that the Supremacy Clause establishes the supremacy of treaties
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dicta are noticeably absent from both Dames & Moore and
Garamendi.2-15 Moreover, most lower courts that have explicitly addressed the issue concluded that sole executive agreements do not
23 6
supersede prior inconsistent statutes.
The Supreme Court has also held, in numerous cases, that an
administrative regulation that conflicts with a previously enacted statute is invalid. 23 7 These cases are instructive because the Court has
also held that valid federal regulations, like valid executive agreements, preempt conflicting state law. 238 In effect, the Supreme Court
treats administrative regulations as equivalent to federal statutes for
the purpose of resolving conflicts between federal and state law, but
views such regulations as subordinate to federal statutes when resolving conflicts between federal statutes and regulations. This approach
makes sense. Statutes have a higher status than regulations within the
hierarchy of federal law because statutes require the joint action of
the legislative and executive branches, whereas a regulation is necessa239
rily the product of unilateral executive action.
over state law, and "the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts and
agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national government").
23-5
See Garamendi,539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
236
See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding
that an "executive agreement was void because it was not authorized by Congress and contravened provisions of a statute"); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D.
Colo. 1983) (stating that "executive agreements do not supersede prior inconsistent acts of
Congress because, unlike treaties, they are not the 'supreme Law of the Land"'); Seery v.
United States, 127 F.Supp. 601,606-07 (Ct.C1. 1955) (rejecting Government's contention
that an executive agreement is equivalent to a treaty under the Supremacy Clause). But see
Edimar Societe Anonyme of Casablanca v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 191 (Ct. Cl. 1952)
(suggesting that an executive agreement might supersede an earlier act of Congress) The
proposition in Etlimar that an executive agreement has the same force of law under the
Supremacy Clause as a treaty approved by the Senate was overruled by Seery, See Seery, 127
F. Supp. at 601-07.
237
See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (invalidating FDA regulations that conflicted with Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); MCI
Telecomm. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994) (invalidating FCC rule that
conflicted with Federal Communications Act); City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S.
328, 339 (1994) (invalidating EPA rule that conflicted with Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act).
238
See, e.g.,
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 704-05 (1984) (holding
that FCC regulations preempted Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages on cable television).
2-19
Statutes are the product ofjoint legislative and executive action, because the President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, and in turn, Congress has the
power to override a presidential veto. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 7, cl.2; see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("The President is a participant in the law-making process by
virtue of his authority to veto bills enacted by Congress."). Likewise, a valid regulation
typically involves the participation of both legislative and executive branches: Congress
enacts a statute to authorize presidential rulemaking. But the existence of a conflict between a statute and regulation necessarily implies that the regulation was not authorized by
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Treaties, like statutes, require the joint action of the legislative
and executive branches.2 40 In contrast, sole executive agreements,
like regulations, involve unilateral executive action. Therefore, although sole executive agreements preempt conflicting state law, such
agreements should be subordinate to treaties when resolving conflicts
between two international agreements. 24' Moreover, if a sole executive agreement does not supersede a prior inconsistent treaty, it follows that a unilateral executive order cannot supersede a prior
inconsistent treaty.
2.

Limits on UnilateralExecutive Orders

Even if one assumes that sole executive agreements have the
same status as statutes and treaties, it does not necessarily follow that
unilateral executive orders have an equivalent status. Sole executive
agreements arguably deserve a higher status than unilateral executive
orders, because sole executive agreements implicate the international
legal obligations of the United States. 242 In contrast, unilateral execu243
tive orders are entirely creatures of domestic law.
Despite the fact that a valid executive order is supreme over state
law, 244 a unilateral executive order can never supersede a prior inconsistent statute because a unilateral executive order that conflicts with a
valid federal statute is per se invalid.2 45 Little v. Barrem 246 illustrates
this point. In 1799, during ongoing hostilities with France, Congress
enacted a statute designed to suspend commercial intercourse beCongress, which means that the President was acting unilaterally with respect to the invalid
portion of the regulation.
240
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
241
From the standpoint of international law, there is no difference between a treaty
and a sole executive agreement; both are considered "treaties." Thus, a sole executive
agreement could supersede a prior inconsistent treaty for the purposes of international
law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30(3), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 ("When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty...
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of
the later treaty."). However, in terms of domestic law, the better view is that a sole executive agreement cannot supersede a prior inconsistent treaty, for the reasons explained
above.
242 Professor Henkin makes a similar argument. See HENKIN, supra note 23, at 504
n.198.
At times, Presidents have adopted unilateral executive orders for the purpose of
243
implementing sole executive agreements. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
660 (1981) (explaining that the "dispute involve[d] various Executive Orders and regulations by which the President nullified attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United
States .... to comply with an Executive Agreement between the United States and Iran").
244
See CORWIN, supranote 229, at 440 n. 10 (stating that executive laws are "endowed as
against state authority with the supremacy of national law").
Id. at 439 n.10 ("Such regulations may not, of course, transgress the constitutional
245
acts of Congress.").
246
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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tween the United States and France. 24 7 The statute authorized the
President to seize "any ship or vessel of the United States on the high
sea... bound or sailing to any place within the territory of the French
republic or her dependencies." 248 Although the statute covered only
vessels sailing to France, the President subsequently issued an executive order authorizing seizure of vessels "bound to or from French
9
ports" 2 4 Acting pursuant to the executive order, Captain Little, the
commander of an American warship, seized a ship sailing from a
French port.250 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall held
that the seizure was unlawful, even though it was consistent with the
executive order, 25 ' because the executive order could not authorize
2 52
action contrary to the statute.
The Court's conclusion is especially noteworthy because Chief
Justice Marshall suggested that the President, as Commander in Chief,
might have had the constitutional power to authorize the seizure if
Congress had not enacted legislation. 25 3 Hence, by enacting legislation authorizing the seizure of vessels sailing to France, Congress effectively precluded the President from exercising his Commander-inChief power to order the seizure of vessels sailing from France. In
short, an executive order that would have been constitutional under
Category Two, if undertaken without "either a congressional grant or
denial of authority,"2 54 was invalid under Category Three, because it
255
was "incompatible with the ... implied will of Congress.
The conclusion that a unilateral executive order can never supersede a prior inconsistent statute implies that conflicts between an earlier-in-time treaty and a later-in-time executive order must also be
resolved in favor of the treaty, at least insofar as the treaty is the law of
the land. The Supreme Court has consistently held that treaties and
247

Id. at 177.

248

Id.

Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
Id. at 176, 178.
The Court assumed, for the purpose of its analysis, that the seizure was consistent
251
with the executive order. See id. at 178.
252
See id. at 177-79. As a matter of statutory interpretation, one could have made a
plausible argument that the executive order was supplementary to the statute, not contrary
to the statute. However, that was not how the Court construed the statute.
249
250

253

See id at 177 (

It is by no means clear that the president ...who is commander in chief of
the armies and navies of the United States, might not, without any special
authority for that purpose, in the then existing state of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to seize
and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which were forfeited
by being engaged in this illicit commerce.
254 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
255

Id.
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statutes have equal rank within our constitutional system, and, in the
event of a conflict between a statute and a treaty, the later in time
prevails. 256 Since treaties and statutes are of equivalent rank, and statutes rank higher than unilateral executive orders, it follows that treaties also rank higher than unilateral executive orders. Therefore, a
unilateral executive order can never supersede a prior inconsistent
treaty that is the law of the land.
Core principles of democratic theory reinforce the soundness of
this conclusion. In our democratic system of government, political
power ultimately belongs to the people. Lawmaking by statute or
treaty requires the participation of both the legislative and executive
branches. 257 The participation of both branches is intended to ensure
that neither treaties nor statutes become law without a certain degree
of popular support. In contrast, when the President creates law by
means of a unilateral executive order, the safeguard of a legislative
check on presidential authority is absent, thus a greater danger of creating law at odds with the will of the people exists. Inasmuch as unilateral executive orders have less democratic legitimacy than federal
statutes or treaties, it is entirely appropriate that they rank lower in
the hierarchy of federal law.
IV
THE PRESIDENT AS LAw-BREAKER

Presidents and their subordinates have often claimed that the
President is free to disregard (i.e., violate) statutes, treaties, and even
the Constitution itself in certain emergency situations.2 58 In a recent
memorandum, Justice Department lawyers have asserted that President Bush has unlimited discretion to determine the appropriate
means for interrogation of enemy combatants detained in the War on
Terror.259 The memorandum further contends that treaties and statutes prohibiting torture-if applied to interrogation of enemy combatants-would be an unconstitutional infringement on the
President's Commander-in-Chief powerY26
256
257

See cases cited supra note 189.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.

258 See Monaghan, supra note 223, at 24-32 (discussing claims advanced by various
Presidents in support of a Presidential power to violate the law in an emergency).

See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 39 ("Any effort by Congress to regulate the inter259
rogation of battlefield combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President.").
260
Id. at 31-39. It bears emphasis that the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibit
torture of both POWs and civilians. See POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 130; Civilian
Convention, supranote 15, art. 147. Common Article 3 also prohibits torture. See Geneva
I, supra note 44, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 3; POW Convention, supra note 13,
art. 3; Civilian Con'ention, supra note 15, art. 3.3
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Part IV addresses the claim that the President has the constitutional authority to violate the law for the sake of protecting national
security. The first section rebuts the argument that the President has
the legal authority to violate constitutional and/or statutory law in
emergency situations. The second section contends that the President's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 26 1 includes a duty to execute treaties that have the status of
supreme federal law. Therefore, the President lacks the unilateral authority to violate treaties, and he must obtain congressional authorization to violate a treaty that is law of the land.
The final section of Part LV considers whether the President's
general duty to execute treaties applies to law-of-war treaties that impinge upon the President's Commander-in-Chief power. Although
there are plausible arguments for exempting such law-of-war treaties
from the President's general duty under the Take Care Clause, this
section concludes that the President's duty to execute the law applies
with equal force to law-of-war treaties that have the status of supreme
federal law. Therefore, as a matter of constitutional law, the President
must obtain congressional authorization if he wishes to violate such
treaties. However, as a matter of constitutional fact, the President and
his subordinates are unlikely to face sanctions for violating treaties if
Congress and the public determine the violation was necessary to protect national security.
A.

Presidential Emergency Power
1.

Historical Support for an Emergency Power

Before any person can become President, he is required to take
an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." 262 Relying in part on this oath, several Presidents have
claimed a power to violate the law in situations where national survival
is at stake. For example, Thomas Jefferson once wrote:
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to assume
authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, but
sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it
of savis not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation,
263
ing our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.
Jefferson added that "[t]o lose our country by a scrupulous adherence
to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, and
261

U.S.

262
263

U.S. CONST. art. II,

CONST.

art. II,

§ 3.
§ 1, cl.8.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), reprinted in 9 THE

WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFERSON 279 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,

1898).
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property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the ends to the means. ' 264 Thus, even Thomas Jefferson,
who was more wary than most Presidents of the dangers of unchecked
executive power, recognized a presidential power to violate the law in
order to protect and defend the nation.
Fifty years later, Abraham Lincoln sounded a similar theme. During a ten-week period in 1861, when Congress was not in session:
[President Lincoln] added 23,000 men to the Regular Army and
18,000 to the Navy, paid out two millions from unappropriated
funds in the Treasury to persons unauthorized to receive it... suspended the writ of habeas corpus in various places, caused the arrest and military detention of persons "who were represented to
him" as being engaged in or contemplating "treasonable practices"-and all this for the most part without the least statutory
26 5
authorization.
Lincoln defended his actions in a speech to a special session of Congress on July 4, 1861.266 During that speech, Lincoln posed the question: "[A] re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" 267 As Professor Corwin
noted, this question "logically implies that the President may, in an
emergency thought by him to require it, partially suspend the Constitution." 268 Lincoln himself made a similar point: "I felt that measures,
otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now
avow it. ' ' 2 6 9 Thus, faced with a choice between his duty to execute the
law and his duty to maintain national integrity, President Lincoln asserted that his duty to preserve national unity was paramount.
Similarly, in the period before and during World War 11, President Roosevelt advanced broad claims of presidential power. In September 1942, Roosevelt urged Congress to repeal an offending
provision of the Emergency Price Control Act (EPCA). 2 70 Additionally, Roosevelt made clear his intention to violate the provision if it
was not repealed: "In the event that the Congress should fail to act,

Id. at 279.
CORWIN, supra note 2, at 16-17.
266
See Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprinted inA
COLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 594-609 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
267
Id.at 601.
268
CORWIN, supra note 2, at 16-17.
269 AlexanderJ. Groth, Lincoln and the Standardsof Presidential Conduct, XXII
TriALSTUD. Q. 765, 766 (1992) (quoting President Lincoln).
270
See CORWIN, supra note 2, at 62-64.
264
265

HAm LIN-

PRESIDEN-
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27
and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act." '

Professor Corwin analyzed Roosevelt's message to Congress as follows:
The Message of September 7 can only be interpreted as a claim of
power on the part of the President to suspend the Constitution in a
situation deemed by him to make such a step necessary. The claim
was not a totally unprecedented one ...[referring to Lincoln]. But
Mr. Roosevelt was proposing to set aside, not a particular clause of
the Constitution, but its most findamental characteristic, its division of power between Congress and President, and thereby gathering into his own hands the combined power of both. He was
suggesting, if not threatening, a virtually complete suspension of
the Constitution.

272

In the end, there was no opportunity to test the validity of
Roosevelt's asserted presidential power to violate EPCA, because Congress enacted legislation to supersede the relevant portions of the
statute.

2 73

Building on these precedents, President Nixon went even further
than any of his predecessors in advancing the claim that the President
is above the law. Consider the following interview with David Frost:
FROST: So what, in a sense, you're saying is that there are certain
situations, . . . where the President can decide that it's in the best

interests of the nation or something, and do something illegal.
NIXON: Well, when the President does it, that means that it is not
illegal.
FROST: By definition.
NIXON: Exactly. Exactly. If the President, for example, approves
something because of the national security, or in this case because
of a threat to internal peace and order of significant magnitude,
then the President's decision in that instance is one that enables
violating a law. Otherthose who carry it out, to carry it out without
27 4
wise, they're in an impossible position.

In short, Nixon claimed that if the President determines that a specified action is necessary to protect national security, then the action is
lawful, even if it is prohibited by a federal statute.
In sum, lawyers within the Bush Administration can cite substantial executive branch precedent in support of their claim that the
88 CoNG. REC. 7044 (1942). Roosevelt did not make the threat idly. The Dean of
271
the Oregon Law School had previously told him that "if you decide that a certain course of
action is essential as a war measure, it supersedes congressional action." Monaghan, supra
note 223, at 29.
272
CORWIN, supra note 2, at 64-65.
See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTIhY 439
273
(1990) (noting that "Roosevelt obtained the authorization he had sought, and signed the
Stabilization Act on October 2,1942").

Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES,
274
May 20, 1977, at A16.
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President has the constitutional authority to violate federal statutes
and treaties prohibiting torture of detainees held in the War on Terror. On the other hand, if the Constitution really does grant the President the authority to approve torture of detainees, it becomes
difficult to identify the line that separates constitutional democracy
from despotism. The next section subjects the claim of a broad presidential emergency power to critical scrutiny.
2.

CriticalEvaluation of an Asserted Emergency Power

The central claim of those who advocate a presidential power to
violate the law in emergency situations is that the President's duty to
protect and defend the nation sometimes takes precedence over his
duty to execute the laws. It is helpful to distinguish between a weaker
and stronger version of this thesis. The strong version asserts that the
President has the sole constitutional authority to decide what specific
actions are necessary to defend the nation, and that any action the
President deems necessary is ipso facto lawful, regardless of any contrary constitutional or statutory provision.2 75 Under the strong version, neither the legislative nor the judicial branch has the
constitutional authority to question the President's judgment that a
particular course of action is required for national security. Impeachment is the only remedy for abuse of presidential power.
Whereas the strong version provides a constitutional defense of
broad presidential emergency powers, the weak version offers a legal
realist account of interbranch behavior in emergency situations. According to this account, Presidents tend to adopt an expansive view of
executive power during perceived emergencies, and the legislative
and judicial branches tend to defer to executive judgments regarding
the situation. Under the weak version, presidential action that contravenes the federal constitution or statutes is illegal, and the existence
of an emergency does not make it legal.2 7 6 As a practical matter, however, executive officers are unlikely to be subjected to civil or criminal
sanctions for violating the law if: (1) they were acting within the scope
of a presidential order; (2) the legislative and judicial branches agree
275
See supra text accompanying note 274 (quoting President Nixon); see also Brief for
the Respondents at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 036696) (stating that "[a] commander's wartime determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the
Commander-in-Chief authority"), availableat 2004 WL 724020; id. at 41 (stating that "the
Fifth Amendment does not restrict the Commander in Chief's constitutional authority to
detain captured enemy combatants during ongoing hostilities.").
See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) (stating
276
that an "[elmergency does not create power .... or diminish the restrictions imposed
upon power granted").

2004]

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

there was a genuine emergency; and (3) the relevant presidential order did not constitute a gross abuse of executive power.
The weak version of the emergency power thesis, understood as a
descriptive theory of interbranch collaboration in times of crisis, has
much to recommend it. Nevertheless, courts have generally rejected
the strong version because of the resulting concentration of power in
the executive branch. For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,277 the Supreme Court entertained a habeas petition brought on behalf of Yaser
Hamdi, an American citizen captured in Afghanistan during armed
conflict between the United States and the Taliban. 278 The Bush Administration claimed the authority to detain him indefinitely, "without
formal charges or proceedings-unless and until it [the executive
branch] makes the determination that access to counsel or further
process is warranted." 279 The Supreme Court rejected this claim of
executive prerogative, stating:
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions
for the Executive ... in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions
a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
2 z0
stake.
The Hamdi Court insists that the judiciary plays a vital role in restraining executive power, even in wartime. This thesis is generally
consistent with the original understanding of separation of powers.
For example, Madison stated that "[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 28 1 To guard against
the excessive accumulation of power in a single branch, the Framers
designed a system "in which the powers of government should be so
divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy as that no
one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually
277
278

542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
Id. at 2635-36.

id. at 2636.
Id. at 2650 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor, writing for a
plurality of four Justices, held that the President had statutory authorization to detain
Hamdi, but only as long as "[a] ctive combat operations" are ongoing in Afghanistan. Id. at
2642. Moreover, to justify his continued detention, the government must prove that
Hamdi is an "enemy combatant," and he is entitled to present his own evidence to rebut
the government's allegations. Id. at 2648. Justice Souter, writing for himself and Justice
Ginsburg, argued that Hamdi's continued detention violates the federal Non-Detention
Act, 18 U.S.C. §4001 (a). Id. at 2653. Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Stevens,
argued that Hamdi's continued detention is unconstitutional. Id. at 2674. Justice Thomas
was the only Justice who supported the Bush Administration's claim that it had the legal
authority to detain Hamdi indefinitely. Id.
281
THE FEOFRAI ST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
279

280
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checked and restrained by the others."28 2 If the President could simply disregard the law in times of crisis, the Framers' careful effort to
incorporate checks and balances into the constitutional design would
be defeated.
One could argue that it makes no sense to interpret the Constitution in a manner that requires the President to obey the law in a situation where rigid adherence to law endangers national security. This
objection misses its mark. There are undoubtedly times when the
President can and will violate the law to defend the nation. In terms
of constitutional law, however, the critical question is whether the legislative and judicial branches have the constitutional authority to challenge the President's judgment. We suggest that the Constitution is
best interpreted to grant the other branches the authority to review
presidential decisions after the fact. If the legislature agrees that the
President responded wisely to the perceived emergency, then the legislature can enact laws to immunize executive officials from any civil
or criminal liability arising from the legal infractions they committed.2 13 On the other hand, if the legislature decides not to immunize
executive officials, then those officials should be held accountable for
28 4
their conduct in a court of law.
Ex parte Menyman 2 provides a useful illustration of these principles. John Merryman, a citizen of Maryland, was a leading secessionist
agitator during the Civil War.2 6 After he was arrested and detained
by the military at Fort McHenry, he petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus.2 8 7 Chief justice Taney personally issued the writ, ordering
General Cadwalader to bring Merryman before him, despite the fact
282
283

Id. No. 48, at 311 (James Madison).
See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1824)
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high
discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a
sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws. Such measures are properly matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable
circumstances, the Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity.

284
As a practical matter, an executive officer who violates federal law in the course of
implementing a Prcsidcntial order is unlikely to face criminal charges during the tenure of
the President who issued the order, because the President would not want to authorize
criminal prosecution of a subordinate who obeyed him. The executive officer might face
criminal prosecution, however, after a change of administration. Moreover, the officer
could potentially be exposed to civil liability. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
170, 179 (1804) (holding a Navy Captain liable for damages for unlawful seizure of a ship,
despite the fact that the President had authorized the seizure, because the seizure violated
a federal statute).
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
285
See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 20 (ex286
panded ed. 1976) (1951).
287 See id. at 20-21.
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that President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus . 2 8 The general
"politely but flatly refused to produce the prisoner, citing as authority
the President's order" suspending the writ.28 9 Taney published an
opinion declaring that the President's order suspending the writ and
the subsequent detention of Merryman was illegal. 290 As a matter of
constitutional law, Taney's analysis was unassailable. Even so, "Lincoln went right on exercising the power that the Chief Justice had
branded palpably unconstitutional."' 29 Taney was forced to concede
29 2
that he had no power to force the President to comply with the law.
Three points emerge from this analysis. First, as a matter of constitutional fact, the President undoubtedly has some power to violate
the law to protect national security. Second, as a matter of constitutional law, a Presidential decision that a particular action is essential
for national security does not render an illegal action lawful. Third,
"[s]o long as public opinion sustains the President, as a sufficient
amount of it sustained Lincoln in his shadowy tilt with Taney and
throughout the rest of the war, he has nothing to fear from the dis293
pleasure of the courts."
Some will object to a concept of "legality" that makes it unlawful
for the President to do what is necessary to protect national security.
Under this view, the law should be interpreted so that any presidential
action that promotes national security is, by definition, legal. The
central problem with this concept of legality, however, is that it fails to
account for the inevitable tension between national security and individual liberty. A presidential action that is fully justified on national
security grounds may nevertheless impose significant constraints on
individual liberty. Thus, the critical constitutional question is whether
the President's judgment about the proper tradeoff between liberty
and security is subject to legislative and judicial oversight. The Supreme Court has answered this question in the affirmative. In the
words of Justice Souter:
For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory

288
289
290
291

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
See Ex ParteMeryman, 17 F. Cas, at 148-49.
ROSSITER, supra note 286, at 23-24.

292 See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153 (' have exercised all the power which the
constitution and laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force too
strong for me to overcome.").
293
ROSSITER, supra note 286, at 25.
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more likely to be reached on the
. A reasonable balance is 294
.
'judgment of a different branch.
The President's Duty to Execute Treaties

B.

Given that the President has a constitutional duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,"29 5 the question arises whether
that duty also applies to treaties. Professor Henkin contends that the
296
This section
President has a general authority to violate treaties.
contends, however, that the Constitution is best interpreted to require
the President to obtain congressional approval, in the form of legislation, if he wants to violate a treaty provision that is the law of the land.
1.

Treaty Termination and Treaty Violation

Before discussing the President's duty to execute treaties, it is important to highlight the distinction between treaty termination and
treaty violation. Under generally accepted principles of international
law, there are a variety of legitimate reasons for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty.2 9 7 The parties to a treaty mayjointly terminate
a treaty either by consent of all the parties2 98 or by concluding a later
treaty. 299 A state may unilaterally terminate or suspend the operation
300
A
of a treaty in response to a material breach by another party.
30 1
or
treaty,"
a
state may also invoke "the impossibility of performing
"[a] fundamental change of circumstances"3 0 2 as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from, or suspending the operation of a treaty. In
124 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2004).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. __,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See HENKIN, supra note 23, at 214 ("The President can terminate a treaty or may
decide to breach it."). Interestingly, this is one area where the Restatement does not adopt
the views of its chief reporter. The Restatement says that "the President has the power,
when acting within his constitutional authority, to disregard . . . an agreement of the United
States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 115 n.3 (emphasis added). The Restatemnent does not purport to define the constitutional limits on the President's authority to
disregard treaties.
297 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 241, arts. 54-64 (listing
the legitimate reasons why a country could terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty).
Id. art. 54(b).
298
Id. art. 59.
299
Id. art. 60. The rules for bilateral and multilateral treaties are different. For bilat00
eral treaties, a material breach by one party is grounds for termination by the other. Id.
art. 60(1). For multilateral treaties, a material breach by one party may be grounds for
another party to unilaterally suspend the operation of the treaty, but a single party cannot
unilaterally terminate the treaty. Id. art. 60(2). These rules "do not apply to provisions
relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian
character." Id. art. 60(5).
Id. art. 61.
301
302 Id. art. 62. Under the Vienna Convention, the changed circumstance justification
294
295
296

is quite narrow. A party may not invoke changed circumstances "as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from [a] treaty unless: (a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by tie treaty; and (b) The
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addition, a single party may unilaterally withdraw from a treaty in ac30 3
Most
cordance with the withdrawal clause contained in the treaty.
304
modern international treaties contain a withdrawal clause,
and the
30 5
Geneva Conventions are no exception.
The Restatement asserts that the President has the constitutional
authority "to suspend or terminate [a treaty] in accordance with" a
termination clause in the treaty. 3° 6 This position makes sense from
both a formal and a functional standpoint. As a formal matter, the
President's power to execute the law3- 0 7 clearly includes the power to
execute a treaty termination or withdrawal clause that is the law of the
land. From a functional standpoint, there are often prudential factors
that favor a presidential choice to work with Congress in executing a
termination or withdrawal clause.308 Nevertheless, when President
Carter terminated a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance
with the treaty's termination clause,3 0 9 a majority of the Supreme
Court agreed that there is no judicially enforceable constitutional constraint that precludes the President from exercising a treaty termination clause unilaterally (i.e., without a congressional vote) on the basis
of his Article II powers. 310 The Court correctly refrained from draweffect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty." Id. art. 62(1).
303
See id. art. 54(a) (permitting withdrawal from a treaty "in conformity with the provisions of the treaty").
304
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 332 cmt. a ("Modem agreements generally
specify either a term for the agreement, or procedures whreby a party may withdraw; therefore, there will rarely be occasion to decide whether a right of withdrawal is implied .... ").
305
See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 63; Geneva II, supranote 44, art. 62; POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 142; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 158.
306
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 339(a).
307
U.S. CONSl. art. 11, § 1, cl. I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.").
308
Congress has sometimes played an active role in treaty termination. See HENKIN,
supra note 23, at 490-91 n.143.
09 See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated by 444 U.S.
996 (1979). The termination clause permitted termination by either party on one year's
notice. See id. at 708.
310 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). In Goldwater, nine Senators and sixteen members of the House of Representatives stied to block the President's unilateral
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 709
(Wright, CJ., concurring). The Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit opinion and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. The
Court produced four widely divergent opinions. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality
of fourJustices, thought that the case presented a non-justiciable political question. See id.
at 1002. Justice Powell, writing only for himself, thought that the case was not ripe, because neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives had taken a formal vote on the
issue. See id. at 996. Justice Brennan, writing for himself, would have affirmed the President's unilateral authority to terminate a treaty. See id, at 1006-07. Justices Blackmun and
-White wotld have set the case for oral argument to give the matter plenary consideration.
See id. at 1006. Justice Marshall concurred in the result without expressing any view on the
issues. See id. at 996.
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ing a constitutional line that would impose unnecessary constraints
upon the President's exercise of his foreign affairs powers. The
Court's decision reflects a tacit judgment that Congress, by political
means, exercises sufficient control over the President's treaty termination power that additional constitutional restraints are
3 11
unwarranted.
The Restatement also asserts that the President has the constitutional authority, even in the absence of a treaty termination clause, "to
make the determination that would justify the United States in terminating or suspending [a treaty] because of its violation by another
party or because of supervening events."3 1 2 Clearly, the question of
whether the United States should terminate or suspend a treaty in
response to a violation by another party, or in response to changed
circumstances, is not an appropriate question for judicial determination.'-5 As between the President and Congress, both formal and
functional considerations support a finding of executive power. As a
formal matter, a determination that actions by a treaty partner constitute a "material breach" of a treaty is of an executive, not a legislative,
nature. The same rationale applies with respect to a decision that recent developments render continued performance by the United
States impossible. From a functional standpoint, the President is better able than Congress to make these types of determinations. 3 14 For
these reasons, the Supreme Court has held explicitly that the President has the constitutional authority to implement a treaty despite an
311

See Goldwater,617 F.2d at 708-09 (
Treaty termination is a political act, but political acts are not customarily
taken without political support. Even if formal advice and consent is not
constitutionally required as a prerequisite to termination, it might be
sought. If the Congress is completely ignored, it has its arsenal of weapons,
as previous Chief Executives have on occasion been sharply reminded.

312
313

supra note 20, § 339(b).
See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889)
RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

[W]hether a treaty with a foreign sovereign had been violated by him,
whether the consideration of a particular stipulation of a treaty had been
voluntarily withdrawn by one party so as to no longer be obligatory upon
the other, and whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative, had given just occasion to the political
departments of our government to withhold the execution of a promise
contained in a treaty ...

were not judicial questions.

314
Under the Vienna Convention, a breach is "material" only if it violates "a provision
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 241, art. 60(3)(b). Impossibility is a legitimate
ground for termination or withdrawal only "if the impossibility results from the permanent
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty."
Id. art. 61 (1). Application of these standards in concrete fact situations requires the expertise of the executive branch.
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apparent violation by the other party. 315 The constitutional power to
choose not to terminate a treaty in response to a breach by the other
party necessarily includes the power to terminate if the breach is sufficiently serious.
The preceding discussion deals only with the President's constitutional authority to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from a treaty in
compliance with international law. As long as a presidential decision
to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from a treaty complies with international law, the President's action is consistent with his constitutional
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."3 16 The question of the President's authority to breach a treaty in violation of international law317 raises very different constitutional issues, because a
presidential breach of a treaty that is the law of the land is also a potential violation of the President's constitutional duty under the Take
Care Clause.
2.

Treaty Violation and the Take Care Clause

Under the Constitution, treaties are declared to be "the supreme
Law of the Land" 313s and the President is obligated to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed."' 19 As a textual matter, there are two
possible interpretations of the word "Laws" in the Take Care Clause.
The first interpretation holds that the word "Laws" includes treaties.
The fact that the Supremacy Clause declares treaties to be "the supreme Law of the Land" lends support to this interpretation. Under
this interpretation, it would seem that the President does not have the
constitutional power to violate treaties because his duty to execute the
Laws includes a duty to execute treaties.
The second interpretation holds that the word "Laws" in the Take
Care Clause excludes treaties. The fact that the Supremacy Clause
distinguishes between "Laws of the United States" on the one hand,
and "Treaties" on the other, 3 20 lends support to this interpretation.
Under this interpretation, the President arguably possesses the constitutional power to violate treaties because he does not have a constitu315 See Chariton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 475-76 (1913) (affirming the executive
branch's decision to extradite U.S. national to Italy under bilateral extradition treaty, despite Italy's refusal to extradite Italian nationals to the United States).
316
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
317 While international law sometimes authorizes suspension, withdrawal, or termination of a treaty, it never authorizes violation of a treaty. SeeVienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 241, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.").
318 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
'319 Id. art. II, § 3.
320
See id.art. VI, cl.2 (stating that "the Laws of the United States... and all Treaties
made . . .under the Nuthority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land").
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tional duty to "take Care" that treaties are "faithfully executed."
Although this textual argument initially appears plausible, it is ultimately untenable: Under this interpretation, the President would also
have the power to violate the Constitution, because the Constitution,
like treaties, is mentioned separately from "Laws" in the Supremacy
-2 1
Clause, but not in the Take Care Clause.
Historical materials support the view that the President's duty
under the Take Care Clause includes a duty to execute treaties that
are the law of the land. Some early drafts of the Take Care Clause
would have limited the Clause so that it applied only to federal statutes. 3 2 2 A later draft would have obligated the President to "take care
32 3
that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed.
At the end of the Convention, however, the Committee of Style deleted the words "of the United States. '3 24 According to one commentator, "It]he deletion of this qualifying language . . . was probably
intended to make clear that the Take Care Clause encompassed not
only federal legislation, but also the other two forms of supreme fed325
eral law-the Constitution and treaties."
One of the earliest foreign relations controversies in the United
States involved President George Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality, 326 which declared the neutrality of the United States in a war
between France and other European powers. 327 Opponents of the
Proclamation argued, among other things, that the President's declared policy of neutrality was inconsistent with U.S. obligations under
Article XI of the Treaty of Alliance with France.3 28 Alexander Hamilton, writing in defense of the Proclamation, did not claim that the
President had a constitutional power to violate the treaty. 29 In fact,
he claimed that the President's power to issue the Proclamation derived in part from his constitutional duty to execute "the Laws, of
321

Compare id. art. II, § 3 (declaring that the President "shall take Care that the Laws

be faithfully executed"), with id. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States... and all Treaties made.., under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land.").
322
See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 244 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) (New Jersey Plan) (granting the Executive authority "to execute the federal acts");
id. at 292 (Hamilton Plan) (granting the Executive authority "to have a negative on all laws
about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed").
323 2 id. at 185 (draft Constitution submitted by Committee of Detail).
324 See id. at 600 (report of Committee of Style).
325 Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Artcle Ili, 42 VA.J. INT'L L. 587, 602 n.65
(2002) (citation omitted).
326
See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in CuRTiS A. BRADLEV &
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 13-14 (2003).
327 See id.
328 See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 223, at 324-25.
'529

See Pacificus No. 1, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold

C. Syrett ed., 1969).
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which Treaties form a part. '330 James Madison disagreed with Hamilton's conclusion that the Proclamation was valid,3 31 but he agreed
with Hamilton's claim that the President's duty to execute "the Laws"
included a duty to execute treaties.13 2 Thus, both sides of the debate
agreed that the President had a duty under the Take Care Clause to
execute the treaty with France.
A few years later, another foreign relations controversy arose
when President John Adams sought, in accordance with the Jay
Treaty, to extradite Jonathan Robbins to Great Britain. 333 Members of
Congress challenged the President's authority to extradite Robbins on
the ground that there was no statute authorizing extradition. 33 4 John
Marshall, who was then a member of the House of Representatives,
defended the President's authority on the grounds that the President
3 5
had a duty to take care that the Jay Treaty was faithfully executed. Marshall said:
The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular
object. The person who is to perform this object is marked out by
the Constitution, since the person is named who conducts the foreign intercourse,. and is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The means by which it is to be performed, the force of the
nation, are in the hands of this person. Ought not this person to
perform the object, although the particular mode of using the
means has not been prescribed? Congress unquestionably may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole
execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of
the Executive department to execute the contract [i.e., the treaty]
3 36
by any means it possesses.
At least one nineteenth century commentator also believed that
the President's duty under the Take Care Clause included a duty to
execute treaties. 33 7 There is very little case law addressing the rela330 Id. at 38 (stating that the President's power to issue the Proclamation is "connected
with" his responsibilities "as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations-as the interpreter of the National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is
not competent .. .as that Power, which is charged with the Execution of the Laws, of
which Treaties form a part").
331
See "Helvidius" Number I, repinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 66, 69
(Thomas Mason et al. eds., 1985).
332
See id.at 69 ("A treaty is not an execution of laws: it does not pre-suppose the
existence of laws. It is, on the contrary, to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried
into execution, like all other laws, by the executive magistrate.").
333 See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionay Martyrdom ofJonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J.
229, 229-30 (1990).
334
See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 595-618 (1800).
335 Id. at 613-14.
336
Id.
337
See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 136 (Phila., H. C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (stating that the Take Care Clause "declares what is his [the President's] duty," and concluding that "[t]he constitution, treaties,
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tionship between treaties and the Take Care Clause. Supreme Court
opinions that do address the topic, however, unanimously support the
view that the President's duty to execute "the Laws" includes a duty to
338
execute treaties.
3.

Structural and Policy Considerations

If the President does have a general power to violate treaties,
then either treaties are not law or the President has the power to violate the law. The latter proposition is at odds with the principle that
our government is "a government of laws, and not of men." 339 As to
the former proposition, it is true that some treaty provisions lack the
status of law within our domestic legal system. This Article has already
demonstrated, however, that most provisions of the Geneva Conventions are the law of the land. 340 Therefore, a general presidential
power to violate the Geneva Conventions would effectively mean that
the President is above the law.
Advocates of a presidential power to violate treaties might seek to
avert this consequence by distinguishing among different types of law.
The federal constitution and statutes are binding on the President. In
contrast, a President is free to disregard an executive order issued by
his predecessor, even though such an executive order has the status of
"law."' 341 One could argue that treaties are like executive orders, because both derive from the President's Article II powers. Thus, the
claim that Presidents have a general power to violate treaties does not
imply that the President is above the law. Rather, the President's
and acts of congress, are declared to be the supreme law of the land. He [the President] is
bound to enforce them").
See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 505 (1915) (stating that the
338
President's duty under the Take Care Clause "is not limited to the enforcement of acts of
Congress according to their express terms. It includes 'the rights and obligations growing
out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the Constitution"' (citation omitted)); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (declaring that "[t]he power to exclude or expel
aliens . . . is to be regulated by treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the
executive authority," regardless of whether the rules are derived from treaties or statutes);
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890) (questioning whether the Presidcnt's
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is "limited to the enforcement of acts
of congress or of treaties of the United States according to their express terms," or whether it
encompasses "the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the constitution"); The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 571 (1841) (argument of Attorney
General on behalf of the United States) ("The executive government was bound to take
A treaty is the supreme law; the
the proper steps for having the treaty executed ....
.
executive duty is especially to take care that the laws be faithfully executed .
339
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
-940 See supra Part II.
441
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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power to violate the law applies only to laws that are promulgated on
the basis of the President's Article II powers.
This argument is unpersuasive. It is true that the Treaty Power is
an Article II power, whereas Congress's legislative powers are derived
from Article I. In this sense, treaties differ from statutes. Treaties are
similar to statutes, however, in that they require the joint action of the
executive and legislative branches. 3 4 2 In contrast, an executive order
43
Thus, from a
can become law without any legislative participation.structural standpoint, the President should not be required to obtain
congressional approval to violate an executive order because the President does not need such approval to adopt an executive order.3 44 On
the other hand, the President must obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty provision that has the status of law45 because treaties re3
quire Senate approval in order to become law.
342

See "Helvidius" Number 1,supra note 331, at 70 (
The power of treaties is vested jointly in the President and in the Senate,
which is a branch of the legislature .... [T]here are sufficient indications
that the power of treaties is regarded by the constitution as materially different from mere executive power, and as having more affinity to the legislative than to the executive character.

See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
-144 See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785-86 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) ("Ordinarily, it is certainly true, that the powers of enacting and repealing laws reside in the same
persons."), affd 67 U.S. 481 (1863).
345 The President might obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty by means of ordinary legislation that supersedes an earlier treaty for purposes of domestic law. See infra
notes 364-71 and accompanying text. The President might also obtain legislative approval
to abrogate a treaty by negotiating a new treaty with a foreign country that supersedes a
prior treaty for purposes of international law. By granting its consent to ratify the new
treaty, the Senate would authorize abrogation of the prior conflicting treaty. Either mechanism provides a legislative check on the President's power to violate a treaty without some
form of legislative authorization.
The question arises whether absent a new agreement with a foreign country, a twothirds Senate vote could grant the President legal authority to violate a treaty if he otherwise lacked such authority. This question must be answered in the negative. The Constitution grants the President plus two-thirds of the Senate the power to create domestic law by
means of an agreement with a foreign country, but the President plus two-thirds of the
Senate do not have any power to make law in the absence of an international agreement,
Since they do not have the power to make law without an international agreement, it is
untenable to claim that they have the power to "un-make" (or violate) law without an
Taylor, 23 F.Cas. at 786 (stating that, if the power to
international agreement. See, e.g.,
modify a treaty was vested exclusively in the President and Senate, then the "government of
the United States could not act at all, to that effect, without the consent of some foreign
government; for no new treaty, affecting, in any manner, one already in existence, can be
made without the concurrence of two parties, one of whom must be a foreign sovereign");
see also THE FEDERALI sr No. 64, at 379 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987):
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will
not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but
still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both, and consequently, that as the consent of both
'34-
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Policy considerations support this constitutional analysis. The
United States has a long-term interest in promoting the development
of an international system that is governed increasingly by agreedupon legal rules, and less by sheer power politics. 346 On the other
hand, the United States, more than any other nation in the world today, has the power to thwart the development of an effective international legal order by shunning the agreed-upon rules when it is
convenient to do so. Moreover, there are many situations where
short-term interests provide incentives for the United States to violate
international law. From a constitutional standpoint, the best way to
promote our long-term interest in fostering the development of the
rule of law in the international sphere is to have constitutional arrangements that make it more difficult for the United States to renege
on its international commitments. A constitutional rule that grants
the President a general power to violate treaties would make it too
easy for the United States to breach its treaty obligations. In contrast,
a constitutional rule that requires the President to obtain legislative
approval to violate a treaty makes it harder for the United States to
violate treaties, and helps promote our long-term national interest in
strengthening the rule of law internationally.
A rule requiring the President to obtain legislative approval to
violate a treaty would also increase the prospects of meaningful international cooperation. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that institutionalized legislative participation in the treaty process increases
the credibility of U.S. commitments, thereby improving the prospects
of meaningful international cooperation. 347 Although this empirical
work documents the importance of ex ante legislative influence (at
the bargaining and ratification stages of international agreements),
the advantages of legislative involvement would be substantially diminished if the President could unilaterally alter the domestic law status
of treaties ex post. Critics might point out that legislative involvement
at the bargaining and ratification stages conveys important information to other states about U.S. preferences, and some useful signaling
function is served by ex ante legislative involvement even if the President may violate treaties without congressional authorization ex post.
This point, we concede, is important and almost certainly correct.
Nevertheless, many of the most important signaling benefits of legislative participation are sacrificed if Presidents may violate treaties unilatwas essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter
or cancel them.
-146 This has been a central theme in the work of Professor Koh. See Harold Hongju
Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 23-24 (2002).
347
See, e.g., LISA L. MARIIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 53-80 (2000); Kenneth A. Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in
InternationalCrises, 92 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 829, 830 (1998).
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erally.34 Indeed, the signaling effect improves the prospects for
international cooperation because it suggests an increased probability
of implementation and compliance. 4 - Legislative involvement in
treaty negotiation and ratification constitutes an important constraint
on the exercise of executive power-suggesting that the legislature
will not hinder the implementation of the agreement and that the
350
executive is a reliable (because constrained) treaty partner.
The main policy argument in favor of a presidential power to violate treaties relates to the President's need for flexibility in handling
the unpredictable contingencies of foreign affairs. Although flexibility is important, the President already has ample flexibility even without a general power to violate treaties.
Three factors support this conclusion. First, if the political
branches decide that a treaty imposes unacceptable limits on presidential flexibility, they can choose not to ratify the treaty35' or to ratify
with conditions specifically designed to preserve flexibility.3 52 Second,
if the President decides after ratification that a treaty imposes unacceptable constraints, he can suspend or terminate the treaty in accordance with its terms, or in accordance with generally recognized
principles of international law.3 53- Third, if the President decides after
ratification that the treaty imposes unacceptable constraints, he can
ask Congress to enact legislation to authorize executive action inconsistent with the treaty. In the nineteenth century, the logistical difficulties involved in convening a special session of Congress made it
difficult for the President to obtain prompt congressional action to
supra note 347, at 53-80.

348

See

349
350

See id. at 62-65.
See, e.g., id. at 5

MARTIN,

Unconstrained executive-branch actors can indeed bargain more flexibly.
But such apparently powerful negotiators can find it difficult to put into
effect the agreements they reach with such ease at the international table.
Their lack of ex ante domestic constraints also gives them the capacity to act
arbitrarily, making them unreliable partners in international cooperation
in spite of their apparently enviable freedom of maneuver.
Every treaty limits presidential flexibility by imposing international legal constraints
351
on the exercise of national sovereignty. Even if one adopts the view that the President has
a constitutional power to violate treaties, a presidential decision to violate a treaty commitment of the United States will almost invariably incur political costs. Those political costs
limit presidential flexibility by providing a disincentive to treaty violations in the first place.
Therefore, the decision to ratify a treaty amounts to a decision that the costs of legal constraints on national sovereignty are outweighed by the benefits that the treaty offers.
952 For example, when the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions, it adopted a
reservation to preserve the right to impose the death penalty in circumstances that would
otherwise be prohibited under Article 68 of the Civilian Convention. See 84 CONG. REC.
9972 (1955) (resolution of ratification for Civilian Convention).
.53
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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deal with national emergencies.3 54 In the twenty-first century, however, it is much easier for the President to obtain prompt congressional action, since members of Congress can travel to Washington in
a matter of hours to respond to a national crisis. Additionally, Congress currently takes much shorter recesses than it did in the nineteenth century.3 55 It took only one week after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 for Congress to enact a joint resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force" to respond to the attacks. 35 6 Thus, a constitutional rule requiring the
President to obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty imposes
fewer constraints on presidential flexibility today than it would have
one hundred years ago.
In sum, textual, structural, historical, and policy considerations
all support the conclusion that the President lacks an independent
constitutional power to violate treaty provisions that have the status of
supreme federal law.
C.

The Commander-in-Chief Power and Law-of-War Treaties

Given that the President must obtain legislative approval to violate treaties, the question arises whether there should be an exception
for law-of-war treaties. The argument in favor of such an exception
can be summarized as follows. Certain provisions of law-of-war treaties
regulate conduct that is constitutionally committed to the Commander in Chief, and is therefore beyond the scope of Congress's legislative powers. If the President was required to await congressional
legislation to authorize violations of such treaty provisions, the federal
government as a whole would lack the power to violate the treaty be354
The difficulty of securing prompt legislative action was one of the main factors that
led President Lincoln to act unilaterally to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during the
Civil War. See Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprintedin ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 266, at 594, 601 (noting that a constitutional provision for suspending habeas corpus was intended only for "a dangerous emergency," and that "it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in
every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together; the
very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the
rebellion").
'455
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 56th Congress ended on March 3,
1901, and the 57th Congress did not convene until December 2, 1901. See Office of the
Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Session Dates of Congress, availtble al http://clerk.
house.gov/histHigh/Congressional History/Session-Dates. Thus, there was a continuous
nine-month period when Congress was not in session. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, the 106th Congress ended on December 15, 2000, and the 107th Congress began
on January 3, 2001. See id. Granted, the House of Representatives took ten different recesses in 2001, for a total of about 130 days in recess. Id. Even so, the House could easily
have convened on short notice to respond to an emergency.
3-56 SeeJoint Resolution: To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L.
107-40, 115 SLat. 224 (2001).
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cause Congress cannot enact legislation beyond the scope of its Article
I powers. Since the federal government must have the power to violate treaties, including law-of-war treaties, the President must have the
independent authority to violate treaty provisions that regulate conduct within the exclusive purview of the Commander in Chief.
This section presents a four-part analysis of the argument summarized above. The first subsection defends the claim that the federal
government as a whole has the power to violate treaties, including lawof-war treaties. The second subsection demonstrates that in the absence of international legal rules, the President as Commander in
Chief would have the exclusive power to control battlefield operations
in wartime, and Congress would lack the power to interfere with the
President's conduct of these operations. The third subsection contends that Congress has the power under Article I to regulate the
treatment of wartime detainees, and congressional legislation in that
area does not impermissibly interfere with the President's exercise of
his Commander-in-Chief power. Therefore, a constitutional rule requiring the President to obtain legislative approval to violate treaties
governing the treatment of detainees would not deprive the federal
government of the power to violate such treaty provisions.
Subsection four demonstrates that the creation of new international legal rules regulating battlefield operations alters the constitutional balance between Congress and the President. In particular, it
argues that the creation of international rules governing the conduct
of warfare activates Congress's power to regulate battlefield operations under the Define and Punish Clause 357 in ways it could not absent such international rules. Finally, it argues that U.S. ratification of
law-of-war treaties activates Congress's power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause 58 to regulate treaty-related conduct that, in the absence of such treaties, would be beyond the scope of Congress's legislative powers. Therefore, the claim that the President has the
independent authority to violate law-of-war treaty provisions beyond
the scope of Congress's legislative powers ultimately fails, because
Congress has the power to enact legislation to supersede domestically
any law-of-war treaty provision.
1.

The FederalPower to Violate Law-of-War Treaties

The argument in favor of a presidential power to violate law-ofwar treaties rests on two premises. The first premise is that the federal
357 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power "[t]o define and punish
...Offences against the Law of Nations").
358
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in thc Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof').
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government must have the power to violate such treaties. The second
premise is that, in some cases, Congress lacks the power to do so because certain provisions of law-of-war treaties address matters within
the exclusive purview of the Commander in Chief. This section defends the first premise. The following sections demonstrate that the
second premise is incorrect.
There are two distinct lines of authority supporting the claim that
the federal government has the power to violate law-of-war treaties.
The first relates to the war powers of the federal government. The
Supreme Court has affirmed that "the war power of the federal government ... is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits
the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation."''- 59 Additionally, the Court has
said:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress
the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions
of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise
ofjudgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of
the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of means for
36°
resisting it.
In light of these and similar precedents, Professor Henkin has remarked that "[t] he Supreme Court has never declared any limit to the
war powers of Congress... or even intimated where such limits might
lie. ''36 1 Similarly, another commentator suggests that "the only limitation of the war power is necessity itself. It is as extensive in scope as
circumstances require. It is complete, total, and adequate when both
Congress and the President act in cooperation. '36 2 These authorities
support the proposition that the federal government as a whole has
the constitutional authority to violate law-of-war treaties in situations
where such treaties would inhibit the power to wage war
363
successfully.
The second line of authority supporting the claim that the federal government has the power to violate law-of-war treaties relates to
the later-in-time rule. Taylor v. Morton3; 64 is the earliest reported judi359
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934); see also Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) ("The war power of the national government is the
power to wage war successfully.").
360
Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 93.
361
HENKIN, supra note 23, at 67.
362
Hollander, supra note 33, at 55.
363
This Article is not claiming, as a factual matter, that law-of-war treaties do inhibit
the federal government's power to wage war successfully. Rather, it claims, as a constitutional matter, that the federal political branches, when acting in unison, have the constitutional authority to violate specific provisions of law-of-war treaties if they decide that such
violations are necessary for successful prosecution of the war effort.
364
23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), afffd 67 U.S. 481 (1863).
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cial decision that provides a coherent justification for the rule. Justice
Curtis wrote the opinion in his capacity as a circuitjustice. In his view,
the case turned on the issue of whether Congress had the power to
violate a treaty. 365 He concluded that Congress must have the power
to violate a treaty, because that power is an essential attribute of national sovereignty:
To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve themselves
to the conscientious judgment of the nation, is a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy; but the power to do so, is prerogative, of which
no nation can be deprived, without deeply affecting its independence. That
the people of the United States have deprived their government of
this power in any case, I do not believe. That it must reside somewhere, and be applicable to all cases, I am convinced. I feel no
doubt that it belongs to congress. That, inasmuch as treaties must
continue to operate as part of our municipal law,... and inasmuch
as the power of repealing these municipal laws must reside somewhere, and no body other than congress possesses it, then legislative
power is applicable to such laws whenever they relate to subjects,
366
which the constitution has placed under that legislative power.
Justice Curtis wrote his opinion in Taylor v. Morton in 1855.367
The Supreme Court first endorsed the later-in-time rule in 1871 in
The Cherokee Tobacco.368 Over the next two decades, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the later-in-time rule in at least three different cases.
All three cases effectively restated the rationale for the rule that Justice Curtis first articulated in Taylor.369 Indeed, all three cases cited
Taylor and endorsed Justice Curtis's opinion.3 7 0 Thus, by the end of
the nineteenth century, the later-in-time rule was firmly entrenched in
Supreme Courtjurisprudence on the strength ofJustice Curtis's analysis. Moreover, his entire analysis was based on the assumption that the
power to violate treaties is an essential attribute of national sovereignty. Therefore, the rationale underlying the later-in-time rule sup365

See id at 786 (discussing whether Congress had the power "to refuse to execute" a

treaty).
Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
See id.at 784.
368 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1871). In that case, the Court did not provide any rationale for
the later-in-time rule. It merely stated that "an act of Congress may supersede a prior
treaty." I& at 621 (citing Taylor v. Morton as authority for the proposition).
369
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
370
See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602 (stating that the issue of conflicts between treaties and statutes "was fully considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, while sitting at the circuit, in
Taylor v. Morton"); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (stating that the "subject was very elaborately
considered at the circuit by Mr. Justice Curtis); Edye, 112 U.S. at 597-98 (stating thatJustice
Curtis "in a very learned opinion exhausted the sources of argument on the subject" of
conflicts between statutes and treaties).
366
367
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has the
ports the proposition that the federal government
3 71
constitutional authority to violate law-of-war treaties.
As noted above, there is an important distinction between treaty
termination and treaty violation, and there are several ways in which a
treaty can legitimately be terminated in accordance with international
law.3 72 Moreover, the President has the constitutional authority to terminate treaties in accordance with international law." v The Geneva
Conventions, in particular, permit parties to denounce the treaties for
any or no reason, subject to a one-year prior notification requirement. 374 Therefore, one could argue that the power to violate treaties
is not an essential attribute of national sovereignty because international rules governing treaty termination adequately protect the sovereignty of all nations.
The preceding argument has some persuasive force. A constitutional rule denying the federal government the authority to violate a
treaty, however, might actually undermine the development of international law by inhibiting the United States from entering into otherwise acceptable treaties. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that a
modern U.S. court would embrace a constitutional rule denying the
federal government the constitutional authority to violate a treaty provision if the political branches decided the provision restricted the nation's ability to wage war successfully. A court can justify a
constitutional rule requiring the President to obtain legislative approval to violate a treaty on the grounds that courts have historically
played an important role in policing the constitutional division of
powers between the President and Congress. 375 In contrast, there is
virtually no judicial precedent supporting a constitutional rulc that
371
This conclusion is entirely consistent with the thesis, advanced by Professor David
Golove, that "in exercising his war powers as commander in chief, the President is constitutionally bound, at a minimum, to comply with international law, [including] ... the laws of
war." David Golove, Military Tribunals, InternationalLaw, and the Constitution:A FranckianMadisonianApproach, 35 N.Y.U.J. INTL'L L. & POL. 363, 364 (2003). While defending the
claim that the laws of war constrain the President's authority as Commander in Chief,

Professor Golove concedes that "the view that Congress is so limited raises large theoretical
questions and is in tension with the so-called 'last in time' rule." Id. at 387.
372
See supra notes 297-317 and accompanying text.
37-3
See supra notes 306-17 and accompanying text.
374
See Geneva 1,supra note 44, art. 63; Geneva II, supranote 44, art. 62; POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 142; Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 158. Insofar as the
Geneva Conventions codify customary international law, the United States would have an
international legal obligation to comply with those customary norms, even if it denounced
the Conventions. It is debatable, however, whether the President would have a domestic
constitutional duty to comply with those customary norms. See supra note 25.
"75
See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (holding that the Line Item
Veto Act is unconstitutional); INS v. Chadlha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that aoneHouse veto is unconstitutional); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
588-89 (1952) (holding that the President lacked constitutional authority to seize steel
mills).
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invokes international law as a limit on the constitutional power of the
federal government,3 76 thereby denying the national government the
constitutional power to violate international law. There may come a
time when the world is politically integrated to such a degree that an
"international supremacy clause" becomes a viable option, but that
time has not yet arrived.
2.

The Commander-in-ChiefPower as a Limitation on Congress's
War Powers

The remaining question is how that power to violate law-of-war
treaties should be divided between the President and Congress. We
contend that international laws of war shape the constitutional division of war powers between the legislative and executive branches.
Subsequent sections address the impact of international laws of war
on the allocation of war powers between the branches. This section
addresses the constitutional division of war powers in the absence of
international legal rules. Specifically, this section demonstrates that,
in the absence of international legal rules, the President as Commander in Chief would have the exclusive power to control battlefield
operations during wartime. Insofar as the President's power is exclusive, Congress lacks the power to interfere with the President's con377
duct of military operations.
The Constitution grants Congress a wide array of war powers.
Under Article I, Congress has the authority to "provide for the common Defence,"378 "raise and support Armies" 379 and "provide and
maintain a Navy," '3 0 "make rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces,"'" "define and punish . . . offenses
against the Law of Nations," '182 and "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water." 3 In addition, Congress is empowered to "make all Laws
376

But see Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 315-16 (1870) (Field, J.,

dissenting) (contending that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to violate the laws
of war).
377
The Article distinguishes here between "concurrent" and "exclusive" powers. In
areas in which the President and Congress share "concurrent" powers, the President has
the freedom to act independently, in the absence of congressional legislation, but he must
conform his conduct to the requirements of any legislation that Congress enacts. In areas
in which the President has "exclusive" power, congressional attempts to legislate are invalid
insofar as they interfere with the President's exercise of his exclusive powers.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
378
'379 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
Iid. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
38I
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
382
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
383
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which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" any
3 4
power vested in the federal government.
Despite this impressive array of congressional war powers, the
President's Commander-in-Chief power constitutes an important constraint on the scope of congressional power. The Commander-inChief power grants the President "the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces."3 8 5 The reason for vesting this
power in the President is obvious: "Of all the cares or concerns of
government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."38 6
Recognizing the need for the Commander in Chief to exercise
unified control over the armed forces, the Supreme Court has affirmed the principle that there are constitutional limits on congressional authority to interfere with the President's operational control
of the military in wartime. For example, Chief Justice Chase stated
that Congress's war
power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the
power and
command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That
38 7
duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief.
He continued: "[N]either can the President, in war more than in
peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress
'383
upon the proper authority of the President.
Congress has rarely attempted to interfere with the President's
operational control of the military in wartime. There was a notable
exception during the Civil War, when President Lincoln was "subjected to unrelenting scrutiny by the powerfulJoint Committee on the
Conduct of War, which ... insisted even on a say in the choice of field
commanders and battle strategy."489 Not surprisingly, congressional
meddling in the details of military operations frustrated the President's war effort. Indeed, "Robert E. Lee once remarked that the
384

Id. art. 1, § 8, cl.18.

69, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Id. No. 74, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton).
387 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, CJ., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) ("As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law
at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass
and conquer and subdue the enemy.").
Ex pane Milligan, 71 U.S. at 139 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
388
-389 DAVD MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 258 (1992); see also GEOFFREY PERRET, LINCOLN'S
WAR: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S GREATEST PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 63,
74-75, 97 (2004) (telling of Lincoln's experience with the Congressional Committee on
385

THE FEDERALIST No.

386

the Conduct of War); BRUCE TAP, OVER LINCOLN'S SHOULDER: THE COMMITTEE ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR

7-8, 36-37 (1998) (same).
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committee was worth two divisions to him." 390 Apart from this single
episode of congressional overreaching, Congress has generally contented itself with issuing nonbinding resolutions that do not intrude
upon the Commander in Chief's authority to exercise control over
battlefield operations in wartime.3 9 1
Commentators generally agree that the President has exclusive
authority over battlefield operations, and that Congress's war powers
are constrained by the need to avoid interfering with the President's
Commander-in-Chief power during wartime. 39 2 As one leading commentator has stated: "Congress declares war and provides the means
for carrying it on, but the President decides how the war is to be conducted and directs the campaigns....
I] n the field of military operations there are no limitations prescribed by the Constitution and the
President's power is therefore exclusive. ' 393 The President's exclusive
power includes "control of the movements of the army and navy" in
time of war, 394 as well as the power to decide "how the forces shall be
used, for what purposes, the manner and extent of their participation

390
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 389, at 258. Lee references only the strategic value of the
information made public in the Committee's hearings. See PERRET, supra note 389, at
332-33. The contemporary Congress, now experienced in "closed hearings" and other
forms of confidential oversight of the executive, would likely do much better.
391
Even in situations where individual Members of Congress objected to Presidential
policy, Congress has been reluctant to enact binding legislation that would restrict the
President's operational control over the military during wartime. See, e.g., CLARENCE A.
BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 123-25 (1920) (discussing
congressional opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops in Siberia after World War I,
which resulted in legislation that "was merely a request for information as to the general
policy respecting Siberia and the maintenance of troops there"); seealso Richard P. Longaker, Introductory Note to RoSSI R, supra note 286, at xi, xvii (discussing congressional
opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops to Europe in 1951, resulting in a resolution in
which "Congress seemed to accept the President's power to dispatch troops
independently").
392
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 23, at 103-04 ("It would be unthinkable for Congress
to attempt detailed, tactical decision, or supervision, and as to these the President's authority is effectively supreme."); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 84 (1990)
(concluding that the President has exclusive authority over "operational battlefield decisions concerning the means to be employed to achieve ends chosen by Congress"); Hollander, supra note 33, at 64 ("Once the nation is at war.., the whole power of conducting
it, as to manner, method, and means is for Presidential determination. He is the sole
judge of the nature and extent of the exigencies, necessities, and duties demanded by the
occasion.").
393
BERDAHL, supra note 391, at 118. Professor Berdahl continues:
[N]either the power of Congress to raise and support armies, nor the
power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces, nor the power to declare war, gives [Congress] the command
of the army. Here the constitutional power of the President as commanderin-chief is exclusive.
Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
394
Id. at 121.
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in campaigns, and the time of their withdrawal."' 3 95 Any congressional
effort to regulate these types of operational and tactical decisions in
wartime would constitute impermissible interference with the President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power.
Although Congress lacks the power-in the absence of international legal rules-to regulate the President's conduct of battlefield
operations in wartime, the United States is a party to certain law-of-war
treaties that do regulate the means and methods of warfare.' 46 In
light of the conclusion of subsection 1 (that the federal government
has the power to violate law-of-war treaties), and the conclusion of this
subsection (that Congress lacks the power to regulate battlefield operations in wartime), one might assert that the federal power to violate
law-of-war treaties is exclusively vested in the President as Commander
in Chief, at least insofar as law-of-war treaties regulate conduct that is
beyond the scope of Congress's Article I powers. Subsection 4 addresses this claim. First, however, subsection 3 considers whether
Congress has the power, in the absence of international legal rules, to
regulate the treatment of wartime detainees.
3.

Congress's Concurrent Authority to Regulate Treatment of
Detainees

This subsection contends that the power to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees is shared between the legislative and executive branches. Therefore, a constitutional rule requiring the
President to obtain legislative approval to violate treaties would not
deprive the federal government of the power to violate treaty provisions concerning wartime detainees, because the Government and

395
Id. at 122. Professor Berdahl wrote these words in 1920. For the past eighty years,
no scholar has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the proper line of demarcation between
the Commander in Chief's exclusive power over battlefield operations and the areas where
Congress and the President share concurrent authority. Given the tremendous changes in
the technology of modern warfare, as well as the evolution of the international laws of war,
some refinement of Professor Berdahl's formulation may be appropriate. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to address this issue in a comprehensive fashion. This Article suggests
that rules governing the treatment of detainees fall on the concurrent side of the line. See
infra Part IV.C.3. This Article also suggests that the development of the international laws
of war expands the scope of Congress's concurrent powers while diminishing the scope of
the President's exclusive powers. See infra Part IV.C.4.
396
See infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing treaties that regulate means and methods of warfare). The United States has the power to enter into treaties that regulate matters beyond
the scope of Congress's Article I powers because limits on Article I do not apply in the
same way to the treaty power. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding a
treaty between the United States and Great Britain was constitutional, even though it regulated a subject matter that Congress presumably could not regulate in the absence of a
treaty).
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Regulation Clause3 9 7 grants Congress the power to prescribe rules
governing the treatment of wartime detainees.
Congress has the power under Article I "[t] o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."' 98 On its
face, this provision is broad enough to empower Congress to prescribe
rules for the treatment of military detainees. Moreover, the Government and Regulation Clause must be construed in light of the principle articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland'.99
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 40 0 This principle
supports a broad interpretation of Congress's powers under the Government and Regulation Clause. Courts have adopted narrower interpretations of enumerated Article I powers in order to protect
individual rights or state sovereignty. 4° 1 But the Supreme Court has
rarely, if ever, adopted a narrow construction of an enumerated Article I power in order to protect the President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief.
The practice of the political branches is consistent with the view
that Congress has the power to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees. Indeed, long before the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Congress prescribed rules that directly regulated the treatment
of wartime detainees. 40 2 These statutory schemes established detailed
rules governing many aspects of military government, including the
treatment of captured enemy combatants. 40 3 Moreover, many Supreme Court cases assume, expressly or implicitly, that Congress has
the power to make rules for the treatment of the enemy in times of
40 4
war.
In a recently declassified memorandum drafted by the Justice Department, the Assistant Attorney General asserted: "Congress may no
.'97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14 (granting Congress the power "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces").
.98 Id.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 421.
401
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (adopting a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause, in part to protect state sovereignty).
402
See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 45, 931 (2d ed. 1920) (documenting long history of congressional regulation of the conduct of war through various
iterations of the "Articles of War"); American Articles of War of 1775, 2 J. CONT. CONG.
111-23 (1775), reprintedin WINTHROP, supra,at 953; American Articles of War of 1786, 30J.
CONT. CONG. 316 (1786), reprinted in WINTHROP, supra, at 972.
403 See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1942) (holding that the Articles of War
authorized the President to try captured enemy combatants by military commission in a
manner consistent with the law of war).
404 See, e.g., id.; In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946).
-99

400
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more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy
combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements
on the battlefield." 40 5 Not surprisingly, the Justice Department failed
to cite any authority for this unprecedented claim of executive prerogative. Moreover, in its most recent decision on the detention of enemy combatants, the Supreme Court rejected the Bush
Administration's claim. The Court distinguished between the procedures governing "initial captures on the battlefield" and the procedures that apply "when the determination is made to continue to hold
those who have been seized. '40 6 The Court tacitly conceded that it
could not review the rules governing initial captures, but it insisted on
judicial review of the policies and procedures governing the continued detention of captured enemy combatants:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relatingto the actual prosecution
of a war... it does not infringe on the core role of the military for
the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally
mandated roles of reviewing and resolving [claims involving
the
40 7
continued detention of those who have been seized].
Clearly, if the courts can review the claims of detainees without infringing on the military's primary function, then Congress can likewise regulate the treatment of detainees without risking such
infringement.
As a practical matter, it is sensible to vest the President with responsibility for the "actual prosecution of a war," while entrusting the
legislature with shared responsibility for prescribing rules governing
continued detention of enemy combatants. Alexander Hamilton defended the unitary executive on the grounds that "[d] ecision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of
one man." 40 8 He contended that these are the qualities needed to
ensure an energetic executive and, one might add, to ensure successful prosecution of a war. In contrast, he argued, a numerous legislature is "best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated
to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests. '40 9 Whereas "activity, secrecy and dispatch" are
405

Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 35; seealso id at 39 (
Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-inChief authority in the President.... Congress can no more interfere with
the President's conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it
can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield.

406
408

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2649 (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).

409

Id.

407
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needed to ensure successful prosecution of a war, "deliberation and
wisdom" are needed to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees
held in long-term captivity. Therefore, it makes sense to construe the
Government and Regulation Clause as granting Congress the power
to prescribe rules for the treatment of wartime detainees, but not to
interfere with the President's control over battlefield operations.
Recall that the Geneva Conventions prescribe rules governing the
treatment of persons captured and detained by enemy forces. 410 The
Civilian Convention, for example, protects "those who, at any given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves . . . in the
hands of a Party . .. of which they are not nationals." 4 1' In addition,
the POW Convention governs only those circumstances in which combatants are captured and detained by the enemy. Accordingly, the
Conventions, for the most part, purport to govern the treatment only
of persons no longer taking active part in hostilities. 41 2 Thus, the vast
majority of the provisions embodied in the Geneva Conventions address matters that are well within the scope of Congress's Government
413
and Regulation Power.
The argument in favor of a presidential power to violate law-ofwar treaties boils down to two points. First, the President must have
the power to violate law-of-war treaties because the federal government has a general power to violate treaties. Second, law-of-war treaties regulate conduct that is beyond the scope of Congress's Article I
powers. This section has demonstrated that the majority of the provisions embodied in the Geneva Conventions concern the treatment of
wartime detainees and that, even in the absence of international rules,
See supra Part I.A.
Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 4 (emphasis added).
412
For example, the POW Convention has a total of 143 articles, including 92 articles
that address "Captivity," and an additional 13 articles that address "Termination of Captivity." See POW Convention, supra note 13. Moreover, the Convention specifically obligates
parties to evacuate POWs "as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an
area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger." POW Convention,
supra note 13, art. 19. Thus, the Convention's primary focus concerns the treatment of
individuals who have been removed from active combat zones.
Some protections established by the Geneva Conventions regulate operational
413
choices more directly, and thereby may impinge on the Commander-in-Chief power. Indeed, it is well understood that the law of war governs not only the treatment of captives,
but also the very "means and methods" of warfare. These rules are, for the most part,
codified in the Hague Convention, supra note 46, and the Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions, supra note 45. Some provisions of the Geneva Conventions also govern war tactics. For example, the Civilian Convention prohibits attacking civilian hospitals.
See Civilian Convention, supra note 15, arts. 18-19. It also requires belligerents to allow
free passage of medical supplies, objects necessary for religious worship, and foodstuffs, so
long as the belligerent is satisfied that these consignments are for civilian use. Id. art. 23.
The next subsection considers whether the President has the constitutional authority to
violate treaty provisions that regulate the conduct of battlefield operations. See infra Part
IV.C.4
410
411
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the Government and Regulation Clause empowers Congress to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees. Therefore, even if the President did have the constitutional authority to violate treaties beyond
the scope of Congress's Article I powers, the President would still be
bound by most portions of the Geneva Conventions because the Conventions primarily address matters within the scope of Congress's legislative powers.
4.

InternationalLaws of War and the Separation of Powers

This subsection argues that the creation of new international legal rules regulating battlefield operations alters the constitutional balance between Congress and the President. Assuming that, in the
absence of controlling international legal rules, any congressional attempt to regulate "the general direction of military and naval operations" would be an unconstitutional infringement of the President's
Commander-in-Chief power, once the United States ratifies a treaty
that constrains the President's operational discretion, that treaty ratification empowers Congress to regulate in areas where it could not otherwise regulate. Therefore, the President does not need the
independent authority to violate law-of-war treaty provisions beyond
the scope of Congress's legislative powers because Congress has the
power to enact legislation to supersede, as a matter of domestic law,
any law-of-war treaty provision.
Two arguments support this conclusion. First, the creation of international rules governing the conduct of warfare activates Congress's power under the Define and Punish Clause to regulate
battlefield operations in ways that it could not in the absence of such
international rules. Second, U.S. ratification of law-of-war treaties activates Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate treaty-related conduct that, in the absence of such treaties,
would be beyond the scope of Congress's legislative powers.
a.

The Define and Punish Clause and the Division of War Powers

The Define and Punish Clause 4 14 expressly empowers Congress
to incorporate the law of nations, including treaties, into domestic
law. 4 15 If there were no international legal rule prohibiting, for exam414
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power to "define and punish
...offenses against the law of nations").
415
Article 25 of the Hague Convention prohibits the bombing of "undefended towns."
See Hague IV, supra note 46, art. 25 ("The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."). This is the
kind of rule that presents the greatest difficulty for our broad claim that the President has
no unilateral authority to violate treaties. The rule purports to restrict the strategic options
of states in time of war. In the absence of international rules, Congress arguably would not
have the power to promulgate such a rule because it would infringe on the President's
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ple, the bombing of undefended towns, then Congress could not create such a rule; it would be beyond the scope of Article I. Once the
United States ratifies a treaty that prohibits the bombing of undefended towns, however, Congress has the power under the Define and
Punish Clause to enact legislation establishing civil or criminal liability
416
for a violation of the norm.
Moreover, Congress's power to punish individuals who violate international norms necessarily includes the power to immunize individuals who violate those same norms in cases where Congress decides
that the infraction was justified. 41 7 Thus, if the President orders the
air force to bomb an undefended town in violation of the Hague Convention, and Congress agrees that the President made a wise choice,
Congress could enact a law on the basis of its Define and Punish
power to immunize the military officers who executed the presidential
order from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise ensue.
There is an important difference, however, between legislation
authorizing certain conduct (e.g., the bombing of undefended towns)
and legislation creating immunity for those who engage in unauthorized conduct. Even if Congress accorded U.S. officials an unqualified
immunity for the bombardment of undefended towns, this military
tactic would still be illegal because it violates a treaty that has the status of law. Hence, although the Define and Punish Clause empowers
Congress to immunize executive officers who violate the Geneva Conventions, it does not empower Congress to enact legislation authorizing such violations. Therefore, the Define and Punish Clause does
not grant Congress the authority to enact legislation superseding lawof-war treaty provisions that address matters within the scope of the
President's exclusive power as Commander in Chief, such as battlefield operations.
b.

The Necessary and Proper Clause

The question remains whether Congress has the authority, given
the existence of international rules, to enact legislation superceding
any such rules. This Article argues that it does, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. If the Geneva Conventions impose operaexclusive Commander-in-Chief powers. This Part contends, however, that the emergence
of an international rule reallocates law-making (and thus, law-breaking) authority between

the political branches.
416 Indeed, this is exactly what Congress has done. Article 25 of the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land is now part of the U.S. criminal
code. See War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441. The House Report on the War Crimes Act
specifically cites the Define and Punish clause as the source of congressional authority to
pass the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166,
2172.
417
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 23, at 68-70. This power also authorizes Congress to
establish (or modify) civil remedies for violations of the law of nations. See id. at 69-70.
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tional constraints that unacceptably compromise the ability of the
Commander in Chief to wage war successfully, Congress has the authority to enact legislation superceding these problematic constraints
because such legislation is "necessary and proper" for the execution of
4 18
the President's power.
Congress has the power, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, to enact any legislation that expands the discretion of the
Commander in Chief in the conduct of war. 41 9 In other words, this
power authorizes Congress to make rules that empower the President
to prosecute the war successfully. In this sense, the Necessary and
Proper rationale provides independent support for the broader claim
that Congress has the constitutional authority to enact legislation that
supersedes the Geneva Conventions.
The claim advanced here is analogous to the Supreme Court's
holding in Missouri v. Holland.420 In that case, the Court assumed that
Congress lacked the power to regulate migratory birds in the absence
of a treaty, but held that a treaty on migratory birds effectively gave
Congress the power, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to regu42 1
late in areas where it could not regulate in the absence of a treaty.
Critics might suggest that the Missouri v. Hollandanalogy fails because
the Necessary and Proper Clause refers to laws "for carrying into Execution" the powers vested in the federal government. 422 In Missouri,
423
the law at issue was designed to "carry into Execution" a treaty.
Here, the issue is whether Congress has the authority to prevent the
execution of a treaty. Critics could argue that these laws are not necessary or proper for carrying out the execution of the Treaty power.
This Article claims, however, that legislation superseding the Conventions may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
Commander-in-Chief power, not the Treaty power. The logic of Missouri applies to any legislation essential to the effective exercise of any
power enumerated in the Constitution, including the Commander-inChief power.
418
See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300-05 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing the contours of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause); see
also id. at 301 ("The exercise by Congress of power ancillary to an enumerated source of
national authority is constitutionally valid, as long as the ancillary power does not conflict
with external limitations such as those of the Bill of Rights and federalism."); supra note
404 and accompanying text.
419
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power to "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" all other powers granted
to the federal government, including the power to regulate the conduct of war),
420
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
421
Id. at 435.
422
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
423
See Holland, 252 U.S. at 430-31.
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The analytical structure of the argument presented in this section
tracks closely the Court's reasoning in Missouri. It starts with the premise that, in the absence of international rules, Congress could not
regulate the means and methods of warfare. For example, the President has exclusive authority, absent international rules, to decide
whether to bomb "undefended towns." This section then posits formal international rules prohibiting specific means and methods of
warfare, including the bombing of undefended towns. It finally concludes that since the international rule is binding on the President,
legislation to remove the constraint is necessary and proper to execute
424
the Commander-in-Chief power.
Taking the analogy a step further, because the treaty power is a
federal power, when the United States ratifies a treaty the act of ratification "nationalizes" the issue (per Missouri) and shifts the locus of
decisionmaking from the state governments to the federal government. Similarly, because treaties have the status of law, the act of ratification "legalizes" the issue (as in the bombing of undefended towns)
and thereby shifts the locus of decisionmaking from the President to
Congress. Absent a treaty, the question of whether to bomb undefended towns is a question of policy for the President to decide.
When the United States ratifies the treaty, however, a legal rule is created, and the President must comply with the legal rule unless Congress changes the law.

In short, absent controlling international laws of war, the President, as Commander in Chief, would have exclusive control over battlefield operations, and Congress would lack the power under Article I
to interfere with such exclusive presidential control. By ratifying law
of war treaties, however, the United States shifts the constitutional balance between Congress and the President. The act of ratification empowers Congress to regulate, under the Define and Punish and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, matters governed by the treaty, even if
those matters would otherwise be subject to the President's exclusive
power.

424 As previously discussed, see supra Part IV.B, the international rule is binding on the
President as a matter of constitutional law because the rule is embodied in a treaty that has
the status of law, and the President has a duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:97

V
THE PRESIDENT, THE COURTS, AND
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

Part IV concluded that the President is bound by the Geneva
Conventions. That conclusion provides little comfort to the foreign
nationals detained at Guantanamo, if-as the Bush Administration
maintains-U.S. courts cannot provide remedies for treaty violations
committed by U.S. military officers. Indeed, if U.S. courts are powerless to enjoin ongoing treaty violations by the U.S. military, or to compensate victims for injuries sustained as a result of violations of the
Conventions, then even if the President is bound in a formal sense, he
is not bound in any practical way because executive officials may continue to violate the Conventions, secure in the knowledge that no one
will stop them.
Part V addresses the role of the courts in ensuring that U.S. military officers and contractors comply with the Geneva Conventions.
There is no question that the federal courts would adjudicate criminal
prosecutions initiated by the federal government against individuals
who allegedly breached the Conventions. 25 Nevertheless, in cases in
which private plaintiffs initiate suits against the federal government,
government employees, or military contractors, the role of the courts
may vary substantially depending upon the identity of the plaintiffs,
the identity of the defendants, the nature of the relief sought, and the
nature of the substantive claim. For example, Guantanamo detainees
may have greater access to U.S. courts than prisoners held in Iraq or
Afghanistan. 426 Also, plaintiffs might evade the bar of sovereign immunity by suing military contractors rather than government employees. 427 There are many possible permutations and combinations of
plaintiffs, defendants, substantive claims, and remedial mechanisms.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore all of them. Even so,
some discussion of the proper role of courts is essential to counter the
425

The War Crimes Act makes it a federal criminal offense to commit a grave breach

of the Geneva Conventions, or to commit a violation of Common Article 3. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441 (2002).
426
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the United States exer-

cises "completejurisdiction and control" over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to justify its
holding that the federal district court had jurisdiction over a habeas petition presented by
Guantanamo detainees. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004). It is
unclear whether the Court would have reached the same result if the petitioners had been
detained in Iraq or Afghanistan.
427 In a recent case, plaintiffs sued private contractors and their employees for abuses
committed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., Amended Complaint,
available at www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Amended-complaint.pdf.
Notably, the complaint does not name any government entities or employees as defendants. This may be
because claims for money damages against government employees would likely fail. See
infra note 467.
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view that the President is bound only in a formal sense and not in a
practical sense.
One particular type of claim that Guantanamo detainees are
likely to raise is a claim to enjoin the future use of interrogation techniques that violate the Geneva Conventions. Part V considers a variety
of objections that government defendants might raise to prevent or
circumscribe judicial review of such a claim. Potential objections include: (a) courts lack jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' claim; (b) the
political question doctrine bars plaintiffs' claim; (c) sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' claim; (d) the Geneva Conventions do not create
privately enforceable rights; and (e) separation-of-powers principles
mandate judicial deference to the executive branch's authoritative interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. Defendants are likely to
raise some variant of most of these five objections in almost any lawsuit in which plaintiffs raise Geneva Conventions claims against federal employees or contractors. By addressing these five objections in
the context of a suit to enjoin the future use of certain interrogation
techniques, Part V will demonstrate that the President is bound by the
Geneva Conventions, in a practical sense, because the courts do have
a significant role to play in adjudicating some types of potential claims
under the Conventions.
A. Jurisdiction
In Rasul v. Bush,428 aliens detained at Guantanamo filed habeas
42 9
In adcorpus petitions challenging the legality of their detention.
condithe
dition, they raised nonhabeas statutory claims challenging
tions of confinement at Guantanamo. 430 The government's brief
3
' barred federal district court jurisasserted that Johnson v. Eisentrager4
diction over both petitioners' habeas claims and their nonhabeas stat432
utory claims.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioners on both counts.
First, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the federal habeas statute
"confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas
corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base." 433- Second, although the Supreme Court did
not decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the
nonhabeas claims, it did state that "nothing in Eisentrageror in any of
our other cases categorically excludes aliens detained in military cus428
429
430
431
432

542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
See id. at 2691.
Id.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See Brief for Respondents at 1-2, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.__,

(No. 03-334), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs.
433

Rasu4 124 S. Ct. at 2698.

124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)
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tody outside the United States from the 'privilege of litigation' in U.S.
courts." 4 3 4 The Court identified two potential grounds for federal jurisdiction over petitioners' nonhabeas claims: the federal question
4 36
statute 4 3 5 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul, and its decision
the next day in Alvarez-Machain,43 7 it is uncertain whether ATS grants
the federal district courts jurisdiction to entertain claims by Guantanamo detainees against U.S. government officers to enjoin the future
use of interrogation techniques violating the Geneva Conventions. 43 8
It is clear in light of Rasul, however, that if there is a federal statute
that creates a private cause of action for the Guantanamo detainees to
challenge the interrogation techniques, the federal question statute
4 9
grants federal district courts jurisdiction to entertain such a claim.
Below, this Part suggests that the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 4 40 creates such a private right of action and thereby gives rise
441
to federal question jurisdiction.
B.

Treaty Interpretation and the Political Question Doctrine

Professor Yoo contends that the political question doctrine generally precludes judicial enforcement of treaties. 442 Although there is a
grain of truth to Yoo's argument, he takes the argument too far.
Some treaty interpretation issues raise nonjusticiable political questions. For example, Article 51 of Protocol I prohibits any "attack
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life . . .
434

435
436
437
438

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
In Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS does not create a statutory cause of

action for violations of international law, but it does grant federal courts jurisdiction to

adjudicate claims in which the common law provides a cause of action for violations of
international law. See id. at 2754-61. The Court adopted a fairly restrictive view of the
types of international law violations that give rise to a federal common law cause of action,
holding that "courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized." Id. at 2761-62. Claims alleging grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or
violations of Common Article 3, would likely satisfy this standard. It is uncertain whether
other alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions would satisfy the Supreme Court's
newly adopted standard.
439 The federal question statute confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear
cases "arising under" federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This means, inter alia, that federal
courts have jurisdiction to entertain any claim in which a federal statute creates a private
right of action. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL-JuRISDICrION 279-80 (3d ed. 1999).
440 Pub. L. No. 108-279, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
441
See infra Part V.D.
442
SeeJohn C. Yoo, Interpretationand the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1305,
1325-28 (2002).
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which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. " 4 4 3 If the United States eventually ratifies
Protocol 1,444 some individual or group might file a lawsuit alleging a
U.S. violation of Article 51. Such a claim would raise a nonjusticiable
political question, however, because the application of Article 51 in
any particular case requires a decisionmaker to weigh the potential
loss of human life against the anticipated military advantage. This
type of cost-benefit analysis is a political question, because there is "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department," 445 and "a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."446
Nevertheless, not all treaty interpretation issues raise nonjusticiable political questions. For example, on April 16, 2003, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld approved a set of twenty-four "counter-resistance
techniques" to be used for "interrogations of unlawful combatants
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." 44 7 Suppose that a group of Guantanamo detainees filed suit to enjoin the future use of some of these
techniques on the grounds that specific techniques violate Article 31
of the Civilian Convention. Article 31 states that "[n]o physical or

Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 51(5)(b).
The United States signed Protocol I on December 12, 1977 but has never ratified it.
See supra note 75.
445
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Specific targeting decisions, which require
someone to weigh the expected military benefit against the potential loss of civilian life,
are arguably constitutionally committed to the President as the "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy." U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see Hollander, supranote 33.
446
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. A different situation would be presented if the government
decided to prosecute a military officer who directed an attack that caused excessive loss of
civilian life. The War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, makes it a federal criminal offense to
commit a war crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (a) (2000). The term "war crime" includes, inter
alia, conduct prohibited by Article 23 of "the-Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441(c)(2). Under Article 23, it is forbidden "[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Hague IV, supra note 46, art. 23(e).
In a civil suit brought by a private individual, the allegation that a military officer
employed arms calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, or that an attack caused incidental loss of civilian life excessive in relation to the military benefit, would raise a nonjusticiable political question. Courts are not competent to second-guess the official judgment of
the U.S. military that suffering was necessary (as in a civil suit against the military). In a
federal criminal prosecution, however, there is nothing to prevent a court from deciding
that an attack was "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Hague IV, supra note 46,
art. 23(e). In cases where the military decides that suffering was unnecessary (as in a war
crimes prosecution), courts are competent to decide whether the officer's action was "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Id.
447
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to the Commander,
US Southern Command (Apr. 16, 2003), available at www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/03.04.16.pdf.
443
444
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moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties."44
Application of the factors identified in Baker v. Carr449 demonstrates that such a claim is justifiable. First, there is no "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department."' 450 Indeed, a determination as to whether a
particular interrogation technique involves physical or moral coercion
involves a straightforward application of law to fact, something that
U.S. courts do on a daily basis in a wide variety of circumstances.
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the question. 4 51 To the contrary, the Geneva Conventions specify in precise detail who are "protected
persons. ' 4 52 Moreover, courts, no less than executive officials, are capable of determining what constitutes "physical or moral coercion."
Third, the question can be decided "without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 453 Indeed,
by ratifying the Geneva Conventions, the political branches made the
initial policy determination to refrain from using physical or moral
coercion against protected persons.
Fourth, a court could resolve these questions "without expressing
lack of respect due coordinate branches of government."4 5 4 Although
courts frequently defer to the executive branch's interpretation of a
treaty, there are many cases in which courts have adopted interpretations that conflict directly with views espoused by the executive
branch. 455 In such cases, courts are not manifesting a lack of respect
for the executive. Rather, they are exercising their constitutional
power to decide cases in accordance with the "Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority. '4 56
Finally, the Bush Administration may claim that the War on Terror creates "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, ' 4 5 7 and that there is a "potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart448

Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 31; see also POW Convention, supranote 13,

art. 17.
449

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

Id. at 217.
Id.
4-52
See supranotes 77-85 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 524-38 and accompanying text.
45Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
450

451

454

Id.

See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,41 UCLA L. REV.
4
953, 962 nn.37-39(199 ) (citing cases in which the courts adopted interpretations of treaties that conflicted with the interpretations of the executive branch).
456
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
457
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
455

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

20041

ments on one question."4 58 The treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo, however, has already generated substantial embarrassment by
subjecting the United States to widespread criticism for its alleged failure to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law.
A judicial decision on the issue could help ameliorate this problem,
either by providing a reasoned opinion that substantiates U.S. compliance with international law, or by remedying previous
noncompliance.
In sum, while the Geneva Conventions present some treaty interpretation issues that raise nonjusticiable political questions, the Conventions also present some treaty interpretation questions that are
well within the scope ofjudicial competence. Specific cases will inevitably involve difficult line-drawing problems that will require a judgment as to whether a particular treaty interpretation issue falls within
the scope of judicial competence. In such cases, the critical issue is
determining who decides. Does the judiciary have the constitutional
power to decide which treaty interpretation issues are justiciable, or
must the judiciary defer to the President's determination that a particular treaty interpretation issue is nonjusticiable? If the latter was true,
then the President would not be bound by the Geneva Conventions.
In several cases decided by U.S. courts, the executive branch has
espoused the view that the President, not the judiciary, gets the final
say as to whether a particular treaty interpretation issue is nonjusticiable.4 59 No court has ever conceded this point, nor could any court do
so without seriously damaging the separation of powers principles embedded in the constitutional structure. The Framers drafted a constitution that divides power in order to promote certain policy
objectives, one of which is to maintain a balance among the
branches. 460 Judicial recognition of an executive power to decide, by
presidential fiat, that certain treaty interpretation issues are nonjusticiable would destroy the balance between the executive and judicial
branches to the detriment of the People, in whose name the President
governs. The Constitution grants the judicial branch the power to determine which issues are justiciable and nonjusticiable so the judiciary
can perform its constitutional function of protecting individuals from
458

Id.

459

See DavidJ. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U.
(observing that the United States's argument in an ami-

COLO. L. REv. 1439, 1483 (1999)

cus brief to the Fourth Circuit "appeared to reduce to the proposition that any case implicating a treaty right is, upon the election of the executive branch, capable of being
characterized as a political question and thus rendered nonjusticiable").
460
See Flaherty, supra note 225, at 1729-30 ("The Founders embraced separation of
powers to further several widely agreed-upon goals . . . . including balance among the
branches, responsibility or accountability to the electorate, and energetic, efticient
government.").
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executive overreaching. 46' Therefore, the President is bound by the
Geneva Conventions because his interpretation of some treaty provisions is subject to judicial review, and the power to determine which
treaty provisions are justiciable belongs to the judicial branch.
C.

Sovereign Immunity

462
Judge
In his concurring opinion in Al Odah v. United States,
Randolph asserted that the Guantanamo "detainees' treaty and international law claims are barred by sovereign immunity. ''46s Like the
political question doctrine, the doctrine of sovereign immunity undoubtedly bars some claims against federal officers and agencies
under the Geneva Conventions, but it does not bar all possible claims
and defenses under the treaties. For example, criminal defendants
have invoked the Conventions as the basis for a defense to a federal
criminal prosecution. 4 64 In these cases, sovereign immunity does not
apply because the doctrine bars only offensive claims against the federal government and its agents. Similarly, the federal habeas statute
entitles an individual to a remedy if "[h]e is in custody in violation of
46 5
Sovereign
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
immunity has never barred habeas corpus actions against federal officers. 466 Thus, habeas petitioners who satisfy the jurisdictional and
other requirements of the habeas statute, and who prove a violation of
the Geneva Conventions, are entitled to relief under the statute without regard to sovereign immunity.
The APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for plaintiffs
467
who seek relief other than money damages against federal officers.

461
462

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 W'heat.) 316, 421 (1819).
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. _,

124 S. Ct.

2686 (2004).
Id. at 1149-50 (RandolphJ, concurring).
463
See, e.g, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (invok464
ing defense based on POW Convention after U.S. citizen charged with violations of federal
anti-terrorisin statutes); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1525-28 (S.D. Fla.

1990) (raising defense based on POW Convention when Commander in Chief of Panamanian Defense Forces charged with various narcotics offenses).
465 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1994) (emphasis added).
466 Petitions for writs addressed to individual officers do not implicate sovereign immunity. SeeLARRV W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 313 (1999) ("Actions for common law writs
are prototypical officer suits, neatly avoiding the government's sovereign immunity.").
467
See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity . . . shall not be dismissed . . . on the ground that it is against the United States ....
see also H. REP. No. 94-1656 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6121, 6121 (stating that
the purpose of the proposed amendment to the APA was "to remove the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review of Federal administrative action otherwise subject
to judicial review").
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The waiver applies, with some exceptions, to any "person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. '468 A violation of individual rights protected
46 9
by a treaty is a "legal wrong" within the meaning of the APA.
Therefore, an individual seeking declaratory or injunctive relief
against a federal officer for an alleged violation of his rights under the
Geneva Conventions could potentially bring an APA claim. Of course,
the APA provides for various limitations on its waiver of sovereign immunity. 470 Accordingly, sovereign immunity may bar some claims for
declaratory or injunctive relief involving alleged violations of the Conventions. The various limitations imposed by the APA will not bar all
possible claims under the Geneva Conventions, however. Case-by-case
decisions will be necessary to determine whether the APA applies in
particular circumstances.
Assume, as above, that a group of Guantanamo detainees filed a
suit to enjoin the future use of certain interrogation techniques approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on the grounds that specific techniques
violate Article 31 of the Civilian Convention. This is similar to one of
the claims raised by the plaintiffs in Al Odah v. United States. 471 In his
Whereas the APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for at least some plaintiffs
who seek declaratory or injunctive relief for violations of the Geneva Conventions, sovereign immunity poses a larger hurdle for plaintiffs who seek money damages. The Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does provide a waiver of sovereign immunity in some cases where
plaintiffs seek money damages from the United States for torts committed by federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) (providing that the United States shall be liable "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances"). Substantive liability is determined, however, "in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1) (2000), and the remedy
provided by the FTCA "is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2000). Thus, the
statutory scheme appears to preclude a damages remedy for a violation of the Geneva
Conventions, unless that violation would give rise to a state tort law claim. Even assuming
that the violation constitutes a tort under state law, the waiver does not apply to "any claim
arising in a foreign country," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2003), or to "any claim arising out of
the combatant activities of the military or naval forces... during time of war." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(j) (2000).
468 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
469 See Sloss, supra note 155, at 1135 & n.139 (citing cases finding that violation of a
treaty right is a cognizable legal wrong under the APA).
470 For example, judicial review of agency action is not permitted under the APA if
"statutes preclude judicial review," 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1) (1994), or if certain decisions are
"committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
471
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2002)), rev'd sub inom.Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. _,
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). In Rasul, the
district court decided two separate cases brought on behalf of two different groups of
Guantanamo detainees that were consolidated at the district court level. In the Rasul case,
the petitioners explicitly sought release from custody, and labeled their claim as a petition
for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 57. In contrast, the Al Odah plaintiffs stated explicitly that
they did not seek release from custody; rather, they sought injunctive relief related to the
conditions of confinement, id. at 58, and they invoked the APA as a basis for judicial re-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:97

concurring opinion in Al Odah, Judge Randolph presented two distinct arguments against judicial review under the APA. First, he argued that APA review is barred because the APA excludes judicial
review of acts by "'military authority exercised in thefield in time of war
.... '472
This argument is unpersuasive. Assuming that the Guantanamo detainees are subject to "military authority exercised.., in time
of war," they are not "inthe field" because they are detained in a military prison thousands of miles away from the battlefield where they
were captured. 473 Thus, Judge Randolph's interpretation of the statute is flawed because it deprives the phrase "in the field" of any mean474
ing whatsoever.
Second, Judge Randolph argued that APA review is unavailable
because the military decisions being challenged are "committed to
view. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1149-50 (Randolph,J., concurring). Thus, the hypothetical
case here is similar to the Al Odah complaint.
472
Al Odak, 321 F.3d at 1149 (Randolph, J., concurring) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551 (1)(G), 701 (h)(1)(G)) (emphasis added).
473 As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in Rasu/, "Guantanamo Bay is
in every practical respect a United States territory." Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct.
2686, 2700 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, even under a very broad interpretation of the statutory phrase "in the field," Guantanamo Bay does not qualify.
474 Judge Randolph cites two cases to support his claim that the Guantanamo detainees are "inthe field" within the meaning of the APA. First, he cites Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), which is simply irrelevant, because it had nothing to
do with the APA. Second, Judge Randolph cites Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1991), which actually undermines Judge Randolph's claim. Sullivan involved a challenge
to an FDA regulation that authorized the DOD to administer investigational drugs to U.S.
military personnel without obtaining informed consent. Id. at 1371. The regulation permitted DOD to waive the informed consent requirement only in the context of "a specific
military operation involving combat or the immediate threat of combat." Id. at 1374. The
government unsuccessfully argued that the FDA regulation was not subject to judicial review under the APA, invoking the statutory exception for "military authority exercised in
the field in time of war." Id. at 1380. Despite the fact that the challenged regulation applied only in combat situations, the court concluded that the regulation was subject to
judicial review under the APA because the plaintiff challenged "the scope of authority
Congress ha[d] entrusted to the FDA." Id. Thus, Sullivan supports the conclusion that a
claim by Guantanamo detainees challenging DOD's authority to adopt rules inconsistent
with the Geneva Conventions would be subject to judicial review under the APA.
Judge Randolph's opinion relies heavily on the following sentence from Sullivan: "Doe
currently does not ask us to review military commands made in combat zones or in preparation for, or in the aftermath of, battle." See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150 (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (quoting Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1380). Judge Randolph claims that Al Odah is
distinguishable from Sullivan, because decisions regarding the Guantanamo detainees involve "military commands made ... in the aftermath of battle," which are exempt from
APA review. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150. In fact, though, the complaint in Sullivan was more
closely connected to battlefield activities than the complaint in Al Odah. The plaintiff in
Sullivan filed his complaint in the midst of Operation Desert Shield, seeking to prevent the
non-consensual administration of drugs to U.S. military personnel engaged in combat activities. See Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1374. Given that Sullivan was subject to APA reviewdespite the statutory exception for "military authority exercised in the field in time of
war"-it is untenable to claim that Al Odah isexempt from APA review under the "military
authority" exception.
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agency discretion by law. '' 47' There may well be some claims related
to the Geneva Conventions that are committed to agency discretion. 476 The executive branch, however, does not have unfettered discretion to decide whether prisoners held at Guantanamo are
protected by the Geneva Conventions because the Conventions themselves specify who is protected, and the treaties have the status of su4 77
preme federal law, which the executive branch has a duty to apply.
Moreover, decisions concerning the methods of interrogation used at
Guantanamo Bay are not committed to agency discretion because the
Geneva Conventions limit the range of permissible interrogation
methods, 478 and the President must obtain legislative approval for
methods prohibited by the Conventions. 479 Finally, the military's own
regulations specify that military officers do not have discretion to violate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that govern treatment
480
of detainees.
There is one other potential objection to APA review that merits
consideration. The APA authorizes judicial review of "final agency action," but "[a] preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action
or ruling" is generally unreviewable. 481 In our hypothetical case, defendants might argue that APA review is unavailable because Secretary
Rumsfeld's April 2003 order approving the use of specific counterresistance techniques was not "final agency action" within the meaning of the APA. In practice, there is tremendous overlap between the
"final agency action" requirement and the requirement for plaintiffs
to exhaust administrative remedies. 482 Agency action is not considered final until a plaintiff has exhausted available administrative remedies.4 83 Conversely, ifan agency does not provide any administrative
remedies, agency action that might otherwise be considered "prelimi475 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2) (1994)).
476 See supra Part V.B.
477 The executive branch has some leeway in interpreting the Conventions, provided
that its interpretation is reasonable. The Bush Administration's claim that the Guantanamo detainees are not protected by the Conventions, however, fails to satisfy even a deferential "reasonableness" standard. See infra Part V.E.
478 See Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 31 ("No physical or moral coercion shall
be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or
from third parties."); see also POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 17 ("No physical or
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer
may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.").
479
See supra Part IV.
480 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
481 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
482

See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD

J.

PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE

§ 15.11 (3d ed. 1994).
483 Id. at 356 ("If a petitioner has not exhausted available administrative remedies, the
agency has usually not yet taken a final action.").
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nary" or "intermediate" will often be deemed final. 48 4 This approach
is consistent with the principle that there is a "strong presumption
that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action. '48 5 The
"final agency action" requirement is not designed to preclude judicial
review altogether, but merely to defer judicial review until after
agency action is final.
The administrative mechanisms available for Guantanamo detainees permit periodic review of the fact of detention. 48 6 There does not
appear to be any administrative mechanism, however, that allows detainees to challenge the conditions of detention. In particular, there is
no evidence that the Bush Administration has established any type of
administrative review procedure that would enable detainees to challenge the methods of interrogation utilized at Guantanamo. Given
the absence of any viable administrative remedy, courts should hold
that Secretary Rumsfeld's April 2003 order constitutes "final agency
48 7
action" within the meaning of the APA.
D.

Privately Enforceable Rights

The government brief in Rasul v. Bush asserts that "[t]he Geneva
Convention does not create privately enforceable rights. ' 48 8 This assertion conflates three distinct issues: (1) whether the Geneva Conventions create primary individual rights under international law; (2)
if so, whether the Conventions create primary individual rights under
domestic law; and (3) if so, whether the Conventions create remedial
rights for individuals under domestic law.
To determine whether the Geneva Conventions create primary
individual rights under international law, it is necessary to consider
specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions. For example, Article
137 of the POW Convention states that "[t]he present Convention
shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be de484
Id. (stating that Mathews v. Eldridg, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), was "a case in which the
Court waived the final agency action requirement based on application of one or more
exceptions to [the exhaustion] requirement. There is no apparent reason why the two
doctrines should differ in scope or be subject to differing exceptions").
485
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
486
See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 80.
487
Rumsfeld's order is "final" because it "mark[s] the consummation of the agency's
decisionmaking process . . . [in that] it [is not] of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature;" and it is "one by which rights or obligations have been determined, [and] from
which legal consequences will flow." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The important point is that the order satisfies the "final agency
action" requirement even though the Department of Defense has established the Combatant Status Review Tribunals to review the classification of detainees. See Lewis, supra note
80. The establishment of Combatant Status Review Tribunals does not deprive the order
of its "finality" because the order itself is not subject to review before these tribunals. Id.
488
See Brief for Respondents at 39, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. __ 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)
(No. 03-334), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs.
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posited at Berne." 4s9 Clearly, this provision does not create primary
individual rights. In contrast, to return to our previous example, Article 31 of the Civilian Convention states that "n]o physical or moral
coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to
obtain information from them or from third parties.."490 This provision creates primary rights for individuals under international law. It
imposes a specific, mandatory duty (not to exercise coercion) upon a
particular class of persons (agents of the detaining power) for the
benefit of an identifiable group of individuals ("protected persons").
Nothing more is required to establish a primary individual right
under international law. 49 1
The question of whether Article 31 creates primary rights for individuals under domestic law must be answered affirmatively. As
noted above, the vast majority of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including Article 31, are law of the land under the Supremacy
Clause. 492 The treaties' status as law of the land means that the treaties create primary domestic rights and primary domestic duties that
correspond to the legal rights and duties that the treaties create under
international law. Since Article 31 creates primary rights for individuals under international law, and since Article 31 has the status of supreme federal law under the Supremacy Clause, it follows that Article
31 creates primary rights for individuals under domestic law.
The government's assertion that the Geneva Conventions do not
create "privately enforceable rights" appears to be consistent with the
preceding analysis. Although the government's position is not entirely clear, it seems to be making the following claim: Even assuming
that the Geneva Conventions create primary rights for individuals
under domestic law, individuals cannot obtain domestic judicial remedies for violations of those primary rights because the Conventions do
not create domestic remedial rights for individuals. 493 This claim
POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 137.
Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 31.
491
In the LaGrand Case, Germany argued that Article 36(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations created individual rights. See LaGrand (Germany v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J. (June 27), 75, available at www.icj-cij.org. The United States disagreed, contending
"that rights of consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of
States, and not of individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals .... Id.
76. The Court rejected the U.S. argument, concluding "that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights." Id. 1 77. The Court relied principally on the plain meaning of the
treaty's text to support its conclusion that Article 36 creates primary rights for individuals
under international law. Id. The Court's analytical methodology in LaGrand strongly supports the conclusion that Article 31 of the Civilian Convention creates primary individual
rights under international law.
492
See supra Part II.A.
493
On the distinction between primary and remedial rights, see HENRY M. HARTJR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAw 122-25 (1994).
489
490
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makes sense only if one assumes that domestic courts should not provide remedies for individuals who are harmed by violations of their
treaty-protected primary rights unless the treaty itself creates a private
right of action (a domestic remedial right) in addition to the primary
4 94
individual right.
This assumption has no merit in a suit for injunctive relief against
federal officers. The APA provides a private right of action for injunctive relief against federal officers for all claims within the scope of the
APA waiver of sovereign immunity. 495 In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,496 plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Interior for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA). Plaintiffs asserted a private right of action under the APA, 497 apparently because the FLPMA does not itself
create a private cause of action. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reaffirmed that "[t] he APA authorizes suit" for federal
statutory violations " [w]here no other statute provides a private right of ac49
tion," if the challenged agency action is a "final agency action. 8
Given that the APA grants plaintiffs a private right of action to sue for
violations of federal statutes that do not themselves create a private
right of action, there is no reason to bar APA claims for injunctive
relief against federal officers who violate treaties that do not create a
private right of action-at least in cases where the treaty provision at
issue, like Article 31 of the Civilian Convention, creates primary rights
for individuals under both international and domestic law.
A different conclusion might be warranted if the treaty makers
manifested an intent to preclude domestic judicial remedies for violations of individual rights protected by the Geneva Conventions. Judicial review of agency action is not permitted under the APA if "statutes
preclude judicial review." 499 Accordingly, a court might be justified in
494
The government's position manifests a "remedies first" approach: the idea is that
courts should decide first whether the law provides a remedial right. If the law does not
provide a remedial right, then courts need not address the issue of primary rights. Hart
and Sacks contend that "[1jots of people have tried to think backwards in this way. It is the
essence of clear analysis to see that it is backwards, and instead to think frontwards." Id. at

136; see also Sloss, supra note 134, at 11 ("To think 'frontwards' in treaty cases, courts
should first ask whether a treaty provision has the status of primary domestic law and then,
if the first question is answered affirmatively, consider the availability ofjudicial remedies

for a violation of that treaty provision.").
495
SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (stating that the APA creates a private right of action). The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, may also create a private right of action for declaratory relief against
federal officers who are engaged in ongoing treaty violations. Detailed analysis of issues

raised by potential claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act is beyond the scope of this
article.
496 542 U.S. -_,124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
497
Id. at 2377.
498
Id. at 2378 (emphasis added).

499

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1994).

2004]

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

declining APA review of claims invoking a particular treaty if the treaty
itself manifested an intent to preclude judicial review. For example,
when the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the treaty makers adopted a declaration
specifying that the ICCPR is "not self-executing.", 0° The non-self-exeintent to precuting declaration provides some evidence of a political
50
1
ICCPR.
the
invoking
claims
of
clude APA review
In contrast, there is no evidence that the treaty makers, at the
time of ratifying the Geneva Conventions, intended to preclude judicial review of claims based on the treaties. One U.S. court has suggested that provisions in the Conventions providing for diplomatic
remedies manifest the drafters' intent to preclude domestic judicial
remedies. 50 2 The court's logic is flawed. One could as easily argue
that provisions in the Conventions providing for domestic criminal
prosecutions 50 3 manifest the drafters' intent to ensure that domestic
courts play a role in enforcing the Conventions. Nonetheless, the
treaty text is silent regarding domestic judicial remedies in civil cases.
This silence supports judicial review under the APA because there is a
"strong presumption that Congress intendsjudicial review of administrative action." 504 Moreover, under international law, there is a presumption in favor of domestic judicial remedies for violations of treaty
provisions that create primary individual rights. 50 5 Therefore, courts
should not dismiss APA claims for treaty violations without compelling
evidence that the treaty makers intended to preclude judicial review
of such claims. The text of the Geneva Conventions, their negotiating
history, and the ratification history in the U.S. Senate are devoid of
any such evidence.
E.

Deference to the Executive Branch's Interpretation of
Treaties

In a brief submitted to the district court in Al Odah v. United
States, the Justice Department stated that the government's position
S4783-84 (1992).
One of the co-authors of this article has argued elsewhere that the non-self-executing declaration attached to the ICCPR was not intended to bar injunctive relief against
federal officers for violations of the ICCPR. See Sloss, supra note 155, at 1136-37. Even so,
this Article concedes that there is at least a plausible argument in support of the view that
the declaration was intended to bar APA claims for ICCPR violations.
502 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated 1y 542 U.S. __,
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
503 See supra Part II.A.1.
504
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
505
See LaGrand (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 L.CJ. (June 27), 128, available at www.icj-cij.
org (holding that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations implicitly obligates the
United States to provide individual remedies for violations of the primary individual rights
protected by the treaty).
500
501

See 138 CONG. REc.
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"does not mean that aliens detained by the military abroad are without rights, but rather that the scope of those rights are to be determined by the Executive and the military, not by the courts."50 6 In
short, the Bush Administration has suggested that the President is not
bound by the Geneva Conventions, at least not in any practical sense,
because the President has unfettered discretion to interpret treaties as
he sees fit. This argument is flawed.
It is firmly established that the courts owe deference to executive
branch interpretations of treaties-how much deference the courts
owe is less clear. 50 7 The first subsection below contends that absolute
deference is unwarranted because the judiciary has an independent
role in treaty interpretation. 50 8 The next subsection applies Chevron
deference to the hypothetical case in which Guantanamo detainees
assert that interrogation techniques violate Article 31 of the Civilian
50 9
Convention.
1.

Absolute Deference

Professor Yoo contends that the Constitution grants the President
exclusive control over treaty interpretation. 5 10 Specifically, he claims
that "the treaty power as a whole ... ought to be regarded as an exclusively executive power."5 1 ' Professor Yoo notes that Article II expressly grants the President the power to make treaties, subject to
Senate consent.5 12 Moreover, he adds, "Article II's Vesting Clause establishes a rule of construction that any unenumerated executive
power... must be given to the President."51 - Given that the power to
Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, A] Odah v. United States, Civil
506
Action No. 02-CV-828 (CKK) (D.D.C. 2002) (on file with author).
507
See REsIATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 326(2) ("Courts in the United States
have final authority to interpret an international agreement.., but will give great weight
to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch.").
508
This statement is not meant to imply that absolute deference is never appropriate.
Indeed, there are some treaty interpretation issues that may require absolute deference.
See, e.g., Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins, Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir.
1999) (stating that the question whether Taiwan is bound by China's adherence to the
Warsaw Convention "is a question for the political branches, rather than thejudiciary"). It
is untenable to claim, however, that the judiciary owes absolute deference to the political
branches in every case involving treaty interpretation.
509
Under the Cheuron doctrine, courts will defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute if the agency is charged with administering the statute and its interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
510 See Yoo, supranote 422, at 1309; John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REv. 851 (2001). For a
partial response to Professor Yoo, see Michael P. Van Alstine, The JudicialPower and Treaty
Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1263 (2002).
511 Yoo, supra note 442, at 1309.
512 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
513' Yoo, supra note 442, at 1309.
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interpret treaties is "an unenumerated executive power," he concludes that Article II grants the President the power to interpret
treaties.
Yoo is correct that the President has a limited power over treaty
interpretation. Yoo's argument is flawed, however, because it assumes
that the power to interpret treaties, in its entirety, is an "unenumerated executive power."51 4 In fact, the power to interpret treaties, like
other constitutional powers, is divided among the various branches.
The Constitution states expressly that "all Treaties made.., under the
Authority of the United States" have the status of law. 515 The power to
interpret the law is granted primarily, but not exclusively, to thejudiciary. In particular, Article III grants federal courts the power to adjudicate cases arising under treaties, 51 6 and Article VI requires state courts
to enforce treaties. 5 17 If, as Yoo claims, the Constitution granted the
President exclusive control over treaty interpretation, the references
to treaties in Articles III and VI of the Constitution would be
superfluous.
In some of its earliest reported decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that treaty interpretation is, at least in part, a
judicial function.5 1 8 Likewise, modern Supreme Court decisions have
reaffirmed the principle that, although courts owe deference to executive branch views on treaty interpretation, "courts interpret treaties
for themselves."51 9 Indeed, there are numerous cases in which U.S.
courts adopted interpretations of treaties that were contrary to the
construction espoused by the executive branch.5 20 Thus, despite Professor Yoo's assertion, constitutional text and judicial precedent confirm that treaty interpretation is not an exclusively executive power.
2.

Chevron Deference

According to the Restatement, "[c]ourts in the United States
have final authority to interpret an international agreement ... but
will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive

515

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

516

Id. art III, § 2, cl. 1.

514

Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that "the Judges in every State shall be bound" by
treaties).
518
See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-110 (1801)
(stating that treaty implementation is usually "superintended by, the executive of each nation," but if a treaty "affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much
binds those rights, and is as much to be regarded by the court, as an act of congress");
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796) ("In all these cases, it seems . .. that the
courts, in which the cases arose, were the only proper authority to decide, whether the case
was within the article of the treaty, and the operation and effect of it").
519
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
520
See generally Bedernan, supra note 455, at 962.
517
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Branch." 52 1 Professor Bradley has suggested that this "treaty interpretation deference" is best understood as a form of Chevron deference. 522 Under the Chevron doctrine, courts are deferential to the
executive branch, but they "do not defer if they find that the plain
language of the treaty clearly resolves the issue, or if the executive
branch's interpretation is unreasonable."' 523 This section contends
that courts applying a Chevron approach to a claim under Article 31 of
the Civilian Convention would likely hold that some of the Guantanamo detainees are protected under the Civilian Convention, if not
the POW Convention, and that at least some of the interrogation techniques approved by Secretary Rumsfeld violate Article 31.
The Administration's claim that none of the detainees are protected by the Civilian Convention constitutes an unreasonable interpretation of the treaty. As previously mentioned, the Bush
Administration's official position is that the Geneva Conventions "apply to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al Qaeda international
terrorists." 52 4 The government's rationale is that al Qaeda members
are not covered by the Conventions, because al Qaeda "is an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state party to the
Geneva Convention. ' 525 Thus, from the government's standpoint, the
al Qaeda detainees are not legally entitled to protection under either
526
common Article 3 or the Civilian Convention.
This position is inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. The
Civilian Convention explicitly provides that it applies to all persons
"who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themsupra note 20, § 326(2).

521

RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

522

Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86

VA.

L. REv. 649, 702

(2000).
523
Id. at 703. This Article does not attempt to defend a Chevron approach to treaty
interpretation as a normative matter. As a descriptive matter, however, the Chevron doctrine does a reasonably good job of describing the courts' approach to treaty interpretation. Accordingly, the Article assumes that courts would adopt this approach in cases
where plaintiffs raise claims under the Geneva Conventions.
524
Press Statement, supra note 14.
525
Id.
526
It is unclear whether the Bush Administration thinks that the Taliban detainees
qualify as protected persons under either common Article 3 or the Civilians Convention.
On the one hand, the government has said that the Conventions "apply to the Taliban
detainees." Id. This seems to imply that they are legally entitled to some protection under
the Conventions. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that
the United States would, as a matter of policy, treat the detainees humanely, but he suggested that the United States was under no legal obligation to do so. See U.S. Dep't of
Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability en Route to Camp X-Ray
(Jan. 27, 2002), availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002. Moreover, there is
no question that the Taliban detainees are being denied some of the protections to which
they would be legally entitled as protected persons under the Civilian Convention. See
supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. This suggests that the Bush Administration
does not believe that they are legally entitled to such protections.
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selves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to
527
the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
There are only three exceptions to this broad coverage. First, the Civilian Convention does not apply to persons protected by one of the
other three Conventions. Second, "[n]ationals of a State which is not
bound by the Convention are not protected by it."' 5 2 8 Third,
"[n]ationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a
belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be
regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose
'529
hands they are.
The Administration cannot rely on the first exception because
the United States claims that none of the Geneva Conventions protect
the al Qaeda detainees. The second exception has very little practical
application because almost every state in the world is bound by the
Conventions. 53 0 Under the third exception, the Administration might
legitimately deny protection to some al Qaeda detainees depending
upon their nationalities. 531 The Administration claims, however, that
the Conventions do not apply to the al Qaeda detainees, regardless of
their nationality. The plain meaning of the Civilian Convention contradicts this claim.
The Administration also argues that the Civilian Convention protects only "non-combatant" civilians and therefore does not apply to
"unlawful combatants."5 3 2 It is difficult to reconcile this position with
the plain meaning of the Civilian Convention. Article 4 of the Convention broadly defines the category of persons protected. 53 3 The
527
528
529

Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.
Id.
Id.

530
As of this writing, there are 191 states that are party to the Geneva Conventions. See
supra note 70.
531
To invoke the third exception as a basis for denying treaty rights to the Guantanamo detainees, the Administration would either have to show that they are "nationals of a
co-belligerent state," or that they are "nationals of a neutral state who find themselves in
the territory of a belligerent State." Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 4. Thus, for
example, British nationals could legitimately be denied protection on the grounds that the
United Kingdom is a co-belligerent state. The vast majority of the detainees, however, are
not nationals of co-belligerent states.
Saudi nationals, for example, would be considered nationals of a neutral state. The
Bush Administration cannot plausibly argue, though, that the Saudi nationals detained at
Guantanamo are "in the territory of a belligerent state," because the Administration has
consistently maintained that Guantanamo is not U.S. territory. If Guantanamo is not U.S.
territory, then any detainees who are not POWs are protected as civilian internees, unless
they are nationals of a co-belligerent state. If Guantanamo is U.S. territory, then the detainees are entitled to federal constitutional and statutory protections that might legitimately be denied to aliens outside U.S. territory.

532

See WORRING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIbN, supra note 9, at 4.

5-33

Civilian Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.
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provision does not expressly limit the Convention's application to
non-combatants. 53 4 In fact, the Convention prescribes, in some detail,
rules governing the treatment of civilians "suspected of or engaged in
activities hostile to the State. '53 5 The definitions of "protected per53 6
sons" in the other Geneva Conventions are also quite detailed.
Thus, when read in light of the other Conventions, the Civilian Convention should not be interpreted as implicitly excluding from its protection a broad category of individuals otherwise satisfying its
definition of "protected persons." Moreover, a consensus of commen538
tators, 537 contemporary international war crimes jurisprudence,
and national military manuals 539 directly contradict the Administration's position.
Given that some of the Guantanamo detainees are protected
under the Civilian Convention, no reasonable construction of Article
31 would permit the interrogation techniques authorized by the Administration. Recall that Article 31 states that "[n]o physical or moral
coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to
obtain information from them or from third parties. '540 By design,
the interrogation techniques authorized for use in Guantanamo involve the systematic application of physical and moral coercion. Although the President's Order depriving the detainees of all protection
534

Id.

,
536

Id. art. 5.

See Geneva I, supra note 44, art. 4; Geneva II, supra note 44, art. 4; POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 4.
537 See, e.g., BOTHE ETiiAL., supra note 71, at 261-63; HILLARE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 137
(2d ed. 1998); George Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 893, 893 n.12 (2002); Knut Dormann, The Legal SituatioN of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants," 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 849 (2003); G.I.A.D. Draper, The
Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 197, 197
(1971);Jinks, supranote 47, at 380; Frits Kalshoven, The Position of GuerrillaFighters Under the
Law of War, 11 REVUE DE DROIT PtNAL MILiTAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 55, 71 (1972);
Esbjorn Rosenblad, Guerrilla Warfare and International Law, 12 REVUE DE DROIT PtNAL
MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 91, 98 (1973).
538
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., ICTY (Judgment), IT-96-21-T, 16 November
1998, para. 271 ("If an individual is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention
as a prisoner of war (or of the First or Second Conventions) he or she necessarily falls
within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4 requirements are satisfied.").
539 See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, supra note 68, at 31 (If a person is determined by a competent tribunal, acting in conformity with Article 5 [GC IIl] not to fall
within any of the categories listed in Article 4 [GC III], he is not entitled to be treated as a

prisoner of war, He is, however, a 'protected person' within the meaning of Article 4 [GC
IV]."); THE WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw PART III: THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND 34
(1958) (United Kingdom) ("Should regular combatants fail to comply with [the four conditions required for POW status], they may in certain cases become unprivileged belligerents
... [and] they would appear to be entitled, at a minimum, to the limited privileges conferred . .. by the Civilian Convention ....").
540
Civilian Convention, supranote 15, art. 31; see also POW Convention, supra note 13,
art. 17.
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under the Geneva Conventions also directed the military to treat all
detainees "humanely," 541 several techniques authorized and utilized
by the DOD violate many of the most fundamental precepts of the
Conventions, including those enshrined in Article 31 of the Civilian
Convention. Indeed, the Administration acknowledges-in the very
order issued in April 2003 by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in which
the Administration's "mature" interrogation policy is established 542that several of the techniques are inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions, including the "Incentive/Removal of Incentive" technique
involving the withdrawal of privileges accorded to detainees as a matSee Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supranote 16.
542 See Rumsfeld April 2003 Memo, supra note 97. This Memo, signed by Secretary
Rumsfeld, details the Administration's considered view on which interrogation techniques-beyond those authorized in then existing military law and policy-are pre-authorized in Guantanamo. See DEP'T OF ARsh', FM 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1987)
(summarizing U.S. policy regarding interrogation of war detainees). The Memo is the
endpoint in the Administration's evolving interrogation policy for Guantanamo. InJanuary 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a memorandum to the joint Chiefs of Staff reporting
that the Department had determined that the detainees were not entitled to POW status
and directing combatant commanders to treat the detainees humanely and "to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva
Conventions of 1949." Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and Al Qaida (an. 19, 2002), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.hml.
Of course, the White House
adopted this policy as a formal matter in February 2002-formally established in President
Bush's February 7 Directive, and publicly announced in the White House Fact Sheet. See
Bush Directive on Treatment of Detainees, supra note 16; Fact Sheet, supranote 16. By the
summer of 2002, combatant commanders had concluded that (1) many of the detainees
had been trained in counter-interrogation techniques; and (2) some of the detainees had
information that could prove quite useful in the War on Terrorism. See Press Briefing,
supra note 22. These conclusions ultimately generated a formal request to utilize so called
"counter-resistence" interrogation techniques on detainees in Guantanamo. The request
made its way up to the Commander of the Southern Command and then to the Pentagon.
See id. On December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld pre-authorized combatant commanders
to utilize several harsh counter-resistance techniques in Guantanamo including 20-hour
interrogations, hooding, removal of clothing, forced shaving, use of stress-induced phobias
like fear of dogs, and telling detainee that he or his family are in imminent danger of
death. See Memorandum from William J. Haynes, I1, General Counsel, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Counter Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
Rumsfeld December 2002 Order] (approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002);
Memorandum from LTC Jerald Phifer, Director, J2, to Commander, Joint Task Force 170
(Oct. 11, 2002) (cataloguing the techniques referenced in Rumsfeld's December 2002 Order), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html. Secretary
Rumsfeld, in turn, rescinded this pre-authorization onJanuary 15, 2003, pending a study to
be undertaken by a special Working Group led by the DOD's General Counsel. See Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense to Commander, Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques (Jan. 15, 2003), available at www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html. This Order did not preclude the use of
the controversial techniques, rather it simply directed the Commander of the Southern
Command to request in writing the use of these techniques if the Commander determines
that the use of any such technique is warranted in an individual case. See id Following the
final report of the Working Group, Secretary Rumsfeld issued the April 2003 Order. See
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION, supra note 9.
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ter of right by the Conventions; 5 43 the "Pride and Ego Down" tech5 44
nique involving attacks or insults against the ego of the detainee;
5 45
the "Mutt and Jeff' technique involving harsh intimidation tactics;
and the "Isolation" technique involving the solitary confinement of
detainees for thirty days or more.5 46 In addition, several other expressly authorized techniques may well violate the Conventions, de5 47
pending on the manner in which they are utilized.
The legal memoranda justifying the use of these techniques only
offer sustained analysis of whether the techniques constitute "torture"
within the meaning of U.S. criminal law.5 48 They do not engage the
question of whether the techniques violate Article 31 of the Civilian
Convention. These techniques are plainly inconsistent with the Civilian Convention (as well as the POW Convention and arguably common Article 3) irrespective of whether they constitute "torture" within
the meaning of either international or U.S. law.
This analysis of potential treaty-based APA claims is provisional.
This Article explores the implications of potential treaty-based APA
claims to illustrate that courts have a meaningful role to play in enforcing the Geneva Conventions. As a consequence, the President is
bound by the Conventions not simply as a formal matter, but also as a
practical matter.
CONCLUSION

The central issue presented in this Article is whether the President is bound by the Geneva Conventions. The preceding analysis
suggests several reasons why the President is bound. First, the Geneva
Conventions are the "Law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause.
Second, Congress has not authorized the President to violate the Geneva Conventions or to promulgate rules inconsistent with the Conventions. Third, any conflict between a presidential order and a treaty
543

Rumsfeld April 2003 Memo, supra note 97, at Tab A, Interrogation Technique B.

544
545

Id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique I.
Id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique 0.
546
Id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique X.
547 These include: the "Dietary Manipulation" technique that may involve the use of
hunger or thirst as an inducement to cooperate, see Rumsfeld April 2003 Memo, supranote
97, at Tab A, Interrogation Technique T; the "Environmental Manipulation" technique
that may involve adjustment of the temperature or the introduction of unpleasant smells,
id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique U; the "Sleep Adjustment" technique, id. at Tab A,
Interrogation Technique V; and the "False Flag" technique whereby the interrogator sets
out to convince the detainee that the interrogator is a national of a country known for the
harsh treatment of detainees, id. at Tab A, Interrogation Technique W. Each of these
su-ategies utilize implied threats of abuse (via the further deterioration of living conditions
or the harsh treatment of a "false flag" interrogator) if the detainee fails to cooperate. As
such, each is arguably inconsistent with the Conventions.
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See, e.g., Bybee Memo, supra note 7; WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERRO-
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that is law of the land must be resolved in favor of the treaty, unless
Congress has authorized executive action inconsistent with the treaty,
or the President is acting within the scope of his exclusive constitutional authority. Fourth, the rules embodied in the Geneva Conventions address matters within the scope of Congress's Article I powers,
and the President lacks the constitutional power-absent congressional authorization-to violate treaty provisions within the scope of
Article I. Finally, U.S. courts have both the power and the duty, in
some circumstances, to restrain federal executive action that violates
the Conventions.
When a crisis presents itself, there is a strong tendency to concentrate power in the executive branch. The events following September
11, 2001 exemplify this trend. In response to that crisis, the Bush Administration adopted a variety of measures to augment executive
power. It is not surprising that executive branch officials responsible
for conducting the War on Terror advocate an approach to constitutional interpretation that maximizes presidential power and minimizes treaty-based constraints on the exercise of that power. It is both
dangerous and counterproductive, however, to permit the President
to utilize the War on Terror as an opportunity to augment the powers
of the executive branch at the expense of the other two branches.
The U.S. Constitution was designed, in part, to limit executive
power. The Founders were aware of the dangers inherent in a system
that concentrates power in the hands of a supreme monarch. To
avert those dangers, they created a governmental structure in which
there is no supreme ruler; the law itself is supreme. Specifically, the
Constitution accords supremacy to three types of law: the Constitution, statutes, and treaties. 549 To ensure that the President is not
above the law, the Constitution gives the President a duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."55 0 This duty applies not
only to constitutional and statutory law, but also to treaty law. Therefore, the President is bound by the Geneva Conventions because they
have the status of supreme federal law, and the President has a constitutional duty to execute treaties.
Some government officials responsible for national security policy may scoff at this conclusion. Constitutional analysis, they say, must
be faithful not only to the text and structure of the Constitution, but
also to the practical realities of life in an age of global terrorism. Terrorists armed with the destructive capacity of modern technology pose
a unique threat to the United States. Moreover, the President has a
duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
-49
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U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.

Id. art. II, § 3.
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States," 55' which necessarily implies a duty to protect and defend the
people of the United States. If faithful execution of the law would
endanger the security of U.S. citizens, then the President's duty to
protect and defend the people must take precedence over rigid adCourt has
herence to the letter of the law. As the U.S. ' Supreme
'- 2
pact."
suicide
a
not
is
Constitution]
stated, "[the
In the authors' view, the alleged dilemma that forces the President to choose between protecting national security and upholding
the rule of law is a false dichotomy, at least insofar as the Geneva Conventions are concerned. U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions does not endanger national security. To the contrary, failure to
comply with the Conventions endangers the welfare of U.S. troops
overseas, because other nations are unlikely to afford captured U.S.
soldiers better treatment than the United States affords to the enemy
troops it captures. 55- In addition, substantial evidence suggests that
mistreatment of the enemy directly undermines the war effort, and
thus national security, by discouraging surrender by the enemy, encouraging reprisals, decreasing the morale of home forces, and decreasing political support for the war effort. 554 Moreover, U.S. failure
to adhere strictly to the Conventions undermines respect for the rule
of law within the international community. 555 This, in turn, weakens
our security, because U.S. national security depends upon the willingness of other nations and subnational actors to conform their conduct
to the requirements of international law. 556 Thus, it is a sad irony that
presidential policies derogating from the Geneva Conventions for the
sake of protecting national security may ultimately thwart accomplishment of that very objective.
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Id. art. 11,§ 1.

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (alteration in original).
See, e.g., Taft Memo, supra note 85; Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of
State, to Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, Draft Decision on the Applicability of
the Geneva Conventions to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://
msnbc.com/id/4999363/site/newsweek.
554 See, e.g., Derek Jinks, Protective Party and the Law of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1493 (2004).
555 See, e.g.,
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479,
1487 (2003) ("[B]y opposing the global rules, the United States can end up undermining
the legitimacy of the rules themselves.").
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